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Abstract
Monitoring is a dynamic technique that observes executions of programs and detects
errors at runtime. The key issue in monitoring is performance overhead: if the over-
head is too high, then monitoring takes too long to terminate or runs out of system
resources.
This thesis investigates aspects of monitoring for bug detection, seeking imple-
mentations that identify errors precisely and that have overheads acceptable for use
with testing. These concerns are addressed by instantiating monitoring analyses for
the problems of memory leaks and disclosure of confidential information, and using
experimentation to investigate incurred overheads. A generalisation is then provided
over primitives identified during the instantiations. This enables monitoring via ab-
stract specifications aimed at reducing the cost of developing monitoring analysis from
scratch.
First, this thesis presents an approach to memory leak detection. The key issue
addressed by the author’s technique is detection of locations where the leaked mem-
ory was lost. Leak detection is enabled by tracking each allocated memory block and
computing the dereference of the block’s address space. This represents reachability
of the memory block with respect to program variables. Unreachable blocks that have
not been de-allocated by the program are reported as memory leaks at the end of
execution. The locations of leakage are given by the locations where blocks were last
reachable. The results of experimentation with the prototype implementation for C
programs indicate that, for monitoring test suites of UNIX utilities and programs se-
lected from the Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC) CPU datasets,
the overheads of the present approach compare favourably to the results produced by
the Valgrind memory debugger.
This thesis also describes an approach to preventing leakage of sensitive informa-
tion used by a program. The technique analyses values and has the ability to identify
whether a disclosed value represents an information leak with respect to the values
considered secret at runtime. This is enabled by tracking secret values and checking
whether assignments transfer secret values to publicly observable locations. A pro-
totype implementation for C programs was used to analyse security-oriented UNIX
utilities and programs chosen from the SPEC CPU datasets. The results of the ex-
periments indicate that the overhead required to detect password disclosure in real
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software does not exceed 1%. The overheads associated with detection of Common
Weakness Enumeration security vulnerabilities in real applications and SPEC CPU
programs are higher, but remain acceptable for use with testing.
Finally, this thesis presents a mechanism, called Specification for Monitoring (SFM),
for concise specification of monitoring analysis. The strength of SFM is that it sep-
arates semantic issues related to monitoring from the implementation details. This
separation of concerns results in compact specifications, as the implementation de-
tails are delegated to the implementation of API. Further, although SFM is abstract,
it is less so than many specification techniques, which means that implementation of
the API can still be very efficient. Several specifications are presented to illustrate the
key ideas.
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
The effects of software errors (often referred to as bugs) differ in severity. While some
are relatively harmless, others often lead to such serious problems as data corruption,
breaches of security, disclosure of confidential information, performance deteriora-
tion and system crashes. Given that software is widely used (including safety critical
systems), detecting computer bugs has long become very important.
Nowadays, software has grown large and complex, often spanning over hundreds
of thousands and even millions lines of code. As a result, manual detection of errors
in large programs is a non-trivial task. Issues associated with manual error detection
are often solved using program analysis, an approach capable of detecting errors with
no or little human interaction.
Program analysis is a broad area that focuses on automatic analysis of program
behaviours with respect to a given property (or a set of properties). For example, a
program can be analysed to ensure that it fulfils certain requirements (e.g., check if a
program is compliant with a given language standard). Then, an error formalised as
a property (for instance, using a code pattern that represents the error) can be also
be detected by means of program analysis.
Program analysis detects software bugs either statically (without executing a pro-
gram) or dynamically (at runtime). A static approach detects errors in a program by
examining the states of its abstract representation, an approximation to the real pro-
gram. The benefit of using a static technique, is that it can identify errors without user
1
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interaction or code instrumentation. The precision of the analysis, however, depends
on the approximations made by the analyser. The complexity of a precise static tech-
nique for solving problems such as aliasing, which is common to many programming
languages, ranges between NP-hard and undecidable [1]. As a result, precise static
analysis of large programs is often not feasible in practice.
Static techniques that use imprecise approximations can check large code bases
in reasonable time, but typically report alarms that do not correspond to real errors
or miss bugs. False positive or false negative results (i.e., incorrectly reported or
missed errors) are produced due to the imprecise approximations used. Therefore,
a developer or an analyst, who receives a potentially incomplete bug report, also
needs to identify whether the reported results correspond to real errors. Verifying
bug reports in large programs is not a trivial task.
The trade-offs of using static techniques of different precision for bug detection are
demonstrated in the preliminary work [2]. This work compares model checking and
static program analysis for a buffer overflow problem using an empirical evaluation
of the tools that implement these techniques – CBMC [3] (a model checker) and
Parfait [4] (a static program analysis tool) . Even though the authors used small
programs, the runtime and memory usage of CBMC were significantly greater than
those of Parfait. For example, to check benchmarks from the Iowa suite [5], CBMC
used over 18 hours and 2.4 GB of memory, while Parfait checked the same programs in
under one minute with less than 7MB of memory. However, CBMC was 98% accurate,
while Parfait missed 35% of the seeded bugs. The present findings indicate that, even
though model checking was more accurate, it is unlikely to scale to full-sized systems.
A similar study, consistent with these results, was reported by Engler [6].
Author’s further experimentation [7] with detection of buffer overflow errors us-
ing symbolic execution gave an indication that issues associated with scalability and
precision of static methods can be addressed using a dynamic approach. One such dy-
namic technique is monitoring, which observes executions of a program and detects
errors at runtime. Since monitoring operates on instantiated values, problems such
as aliasing rarely result in infeasible computations. However, unlike static analysis,
which considers all program behaviours, monitoring checks only individual execu-
tions.
A key issue in monitoring is the cost of analysis. This cost, also known as perfor-
mance overhead, accounts for additional resources (e.g., memory or CPU consump-
tion) and time required to complete the analysis. If the overhead is too high, the
analysis does not scale, so that monitoring takes too long to terminate or runs out of
system resources.
It is not atypical for a monitoring technique to incur runtime overheads of tens
of times those of the normal execution [8–13]. This is because a monitoring analysis
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often requires tracking large amounts of data and checking many operations per-
formed by the program. For example, the Memcheck tool of the Valgrind memory
debugger [14] keeps track of all memory allocated by the program and checks each
memory read or write operation with respect to the captured allocation. As a re-
sult, the memory consumption of the program under Memcheck supervision doubles.
Further, the experimentation with computationally expensive programs [14] indicates
that the runtime overheads of Memcheck for individual runs average 26.5 times those
of the unobserved execution, and can be as high as 47.8 times. Nevertheless, due to
the value of the Memcheck monitoring analysis, which precisely identifies issues in
memory safety, such overheads are deemed acceptable for use with testing. This is
evidenced by the application of Memcheck to testing large and complex projects such
as Mozilla, OpenOffice, MySQL, GIMP and many others [15].
The overheads associated with monitoring can be reduced by using only an ap-
proximation to the actual information required. For example, the AddressSanitizer
memory debugger [16] assumes that all memory accesses are aligned at an 8-byte
boundary. This allows it to shadow the virtual address space of a program using one-
eighth of its original size. However, such approximations are prone to missing bugs.
Similarly, sampling techniques used to track memory leaks [17–19] assume that the
memory regions that are not accessed for a “long time” leak memory. This approach
reduces runtime overheads (compared to conventional techniques that capture mem-
ory and track accesses and allocations); however results in an analysis that is not
sound. Imprecise approximations in monitoring can also lead to false alarms. For
example, a technique for detecting locations of memory leaks by Maebe et al. [20]
reports both false positive and false negative results. This is because this approach
handles the majority but not all of the cases required to detect leaks precisely. Maebe
et al. indicate that accurate analysis is possible, but likely to result in greater over-
heads.
In summary, the overheads of monitored executions vary based on the precision
of the approximations used by the monitor. A more precise approximation typically
results in greater overheads (where 20-40 times slowdown is still considered accept-
able for use with testing), but greater accuracy in identifying issues during a run of
a program and vice versa. Imprecise approximations result in cheaper analysis, but
raise false alarms or miss bugs.
1.1.1 Monitoring for Bug Detection
Research in the field of precise and scalable monitoring for bug detection often focuses
on specific types of defects, such as buffer overflows or SQL injections. This is because
detection of different types of errors potentially requires different implementation
techniques. Therefore, addressing a small issue is more likely to yield an efficient
implementation, as it can be tailored to specific needs.
4 INTRODUCTION
The following section discusses some of the limitations of monitoring for specific
problems. First, it deals with issues related to dynamic detection of memory leaks in
languages where memory is not managed. It then then describes limitations associ-
ated with discovering disclosure or sensitive information at runtime.
1.1.2 Memory Leaks
A memory leak is a type of software defect that occurs when a program fails to de-
allocate memory that is no longer being used. Memory leaks can have serious con-
sequences, potentially leading to such issues as performance degradation or program
crashes.
In languages, such as C or C++ that have no built-in garbage collection, a memory
leak typically accounts for allocated memory that is no longer reachable via program
pointers. Such leaks are often referred to as physical. Another type of leak, known as
logical, refers to unused memory that is still reachable (e.g., through variable refer-
ences). The focus in the present thesis is on physical leaks only.
A physical leak occurs when a block of memory allocated by a programmer via a
memory allocation function (such as malloc) is no longer reachable through a pointer
that can be used to de-allocate this block (e.g., by using the free function). Even
though many monitoring techniques for detecting memory leaks have been devel-
oped [14, 17, 18, 21–24], they typically report only program locations where leaking
blocks have been allocated. While such information provides a good starting point
for tracking a memory leak, detecting the location where the leakage actually occurs
(and thus where it needs to be eliminated) is not a trivial task. This is especially the
case for large programs, where the trace from allocation point to the point of leakage
can span across different files and libraries.
Techniques that aim to detect leakage locations have been also reported in the lit-
erature. For example, Maebe et al. [20] use machine-level instrumentation to track all
pointers to allocated memory using reference count and operations that potentially
change the pointer structure of a program and associated locations. At a program
point, where reference count for a block drops to zero, the block is considered a mem-
ory leak and the program point is determined as the location of the leakage. Clause
and Orso [12] track leakage locations in a similar manner via taint analysis, where
each tracked block receives a taint mark. The taint marks associated with memory
blocks are propagated as execution proceeds. This is based on the propagation policy,
which models operations that change memory structure.
Even though the above approaches can identify locations of leakage, they result in
a runtime slowdown factor of 100-300. Most importantly, these techniques lack pre-
cision. The approach of Maebe et al. reports false alarms and misses memory leaks.
While Clause and Orso identify all memory leaks correctly, their propagation policy is
neither sound nor complete; that is, the reported sources of the leaked memory are
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not guaranteed to be precise.
Another solution that aiming at detection of leakage locations is Boehm GC [25],
a conservative garbage collector for C and C++ languages that uses a variation of
the mark-and-sweep algorithm. This technique is capable of identifying locations of
leakage and is sufficiently scalable to be used with such large projects as Mozilla [26].
However, Boehm GC relies on periodic scanning of the program address space to de-
termine lost memory, and thus also lacks precision in determining locations of leak-
age.
In summary, even though many techniques for memory leak detection exist, they
report only where the leaked memory was allocated. The handful of approaches that
target leakage locations specifically result in high overheads or lack precision.
1.1.3 Information Leakage
This section discusses issues associated with the detection of leakage of sensitive in-
formation at runtime.
The problem addressed by information leakage detection is to ensure that data
(i.e., a set of values in a program run) identified as secret are not exposed externally,
for example, through a publicly visible variable, or direct output by a print function. If
the secret values in a run of a program are known, the program can be checked for in-
formation leakage by calculating dependencies between secret and publicly available
data.
A monitoring approach to information flow [13, 27, 28] or taint analysis [29,
30] is appropriate for the detection of information leakage. This is because such an
approach captures every assignment and evaluates values for a particular program
run. However, tracking every assignment often results in high overhead costs [9, 11,
13].
Additionally, in memory-unsafe languages such as C or C++, precise and scalable
information leakage analysis is a challenge due to language features such as pointer
arithmetic, weak type system or dynamic memory allocation. As a result, the question
of practical information leakage detection in memory-unsafe languages has not been
fully addressed by the existing research.
Techniques for information leakage detection often analyse languages that use
safe memory models [31–33], where features such as dynamic memory allocation
or pointer arithmetic are restricted by the execution environment. Although these
approaches have been applied in practice, they cannot be adopted for monitoring C
programs.
Other approaches, consider restricting features of target languages. For example,
Magazinius et al. [13] developed a framework for inlining dynamic information flow
monitors. This approach, however, does not support aliasing and assumes that func-
tions have no side-effects. An approach called Resin [34] tracks values and detects
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leakage using data-flow assertions checked at runtime. However, since Resin mainly
targets web systems, it does not support analysis in the presence of aliasing or pointer
arithmetic.
Assaf et al. [35] described a dynamic flow-sensitive information flow monitor for
sound enforcement of non-interference property in programs with pointers. However,
this approach uses the semantics of the Clight language [36] (a subset of the C pro-
gramming language used by the CompCert verified compiler [37]), which does not
support pointer arithmetic.
1.2 Aims and Scope
This thesis investigates aspects of monitoring for bug detection that lead to imple-
mentations that identify errors precisely and with overheads acceptable for use with
testing.
One of the goals of this research is to investigate techniques for detecting memory
leaks and locations of leakage in languages where memory is not managed (primarily
C and C++). As stated previously, the focus of this approach is to yield a moni-
toring analysis with overheads acceptable for use with testing. It also concentrates
on detecting physical memory leaks only: in other words, detection of logical leaks
or tolerating memory leaks [38, 39] (task mainly aimed at eliminating performance
degradations) is out of the scope of this work.
This thesis also aims to address the question of high overheads often associated
with runtime detection of disclosure of confidential information and support informa-
tion leakage detection in the presence of features of memory-unsafe languages, such
as dynamic memory allocation, pointer arithmetic and aliasing. The scope of this
problem is to detect leakage of entire values; detection of values that leak via parts
(e.g., bit by bit) is beyond the scope of this thesis. Further, this work concentrates
only on leakage detection; it does not involve tracking issues in memory safety, such
as buffer overflows or use after free errors.
Finally, this thesis aims to provide generalisations for the monitoring components
developed for runtime detection of specific defects. In other words, it aims to employ
monitoring primitives identified from the present analysis for memory leaks and in-
formation leakage to develop an approach in which monitoring is specified concisely
at an abstract level. The aim of such a generalisation is to reduce the development
cost of specifying monitoring for defect detection from scratch, but still yield efficient
implementations.
In summary, the scope of this thesis is limited to developing monitoring analyses
for the detection of memory leaks and information leakage and identifying abstract
representations capable of expressing such issues concisely. Thus, monitoring for
problems other than bug detection (such as debugging or profiling) or discovering
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different defects (e.g., bugs in concurrency) will be beyond the scope of this work.
1.3 Research Questions
The goals stated in the previous section are addressed by instantiating monitoring
analyses for specific issues. First, techniques are developed for runtime detection of
memory leaks and information leakage; empirical evaluation that implements such
techniques is conducted and results reported. Next, a generic monitoring solution is
developed that uses abstract descriptions to specify monitoring for software defects
concisely.
In summary, the research questions addressed in this thesis can be stated as fol-
lows:
1. What features of monitoring enable precise runtime detection of memory leaks
and leakage locations, and enable disclosure of confidential information using
overheads acceptable for use with testing (as specified on page 3)?
2. What features can be used to specify monitoring using concise abstract specifi-
cations that enable instantiation of monitoring analyses?
The following section discusses the contributions made by this thesis.
1.4 Contributions
• This thesis presents an approach to detection of memory leaks in languages that
support dynamic memory allocation (e.g., C or C++) with acceptable over-
heads. The key issue addressed by this technique is the detection of precise
locations where the leaked memory was actually lost.
To enable detection of leakage locations at runtime, the project tracks memory
allocated by a program and associate each tracked block with two types of loca-
tions: allocation and usage. An allocation location represents a program point
at which a memory block associated with it was allocated on the heap. The lo-
cations of usage are updated every time a variable containing references to the
allocated block is accessed by a running program. This represents the reacha-
bility of a memory block with respect to program variables, and is achieved by
computing the dereference of a block’s address space. Unreachable blocks that
have not been de-allocated by the program are reported at the end of execution
as memory leaks. Such reports include information that describes where the
leaked blocks were allocated and where the leakage occurred. The computa-
tion is tunable. Runtime overheads can be reduced for the cost of reporting less
information without losing precision.
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Further, it is shown that this technique is not limited to the detection of memory
leaks: the author employs the monitoring primitives used to detect memory
leaks in monitoring analysis for illegal memory modifications.
The approach is supported by a prototype implementation for C programs. Its
applicability is demonstrated by monitoring real UNIX utilities and programs
selected from the CPU [40] datasets of the Standard Performance Evaluation
Corporation (SPEC). The results of this experimentation show that the perfor-
mance overhead of the present approach compare favourably to those produced
by the Valgrind [14] memory debugger.
• This thesis also describes an approach to preventing leakage of sensitive infor-
mation used by a program at runtime.
Instead of analysing programs by way of its variables, as is common in informa-
tion flow or taint analyses, the present technique analyses values. This method
has the ability to identify whether a disclosed value represents an information
leak with respect to the values considered secret at runtime. Tracking only a
handful of values whose disclosure constitutes information leakage reduces the
overheads associated with tracking.
The suggested approach is supported by a prototype implementation for C pro-
grams. Its applicability is shown using experimentation on detecting leaks of
confidential information in real, security-oriented UNIX software and programs
selected from SPEC CPU datasets.
From experimentation it is shown that the present approach is suitable for ad-
dressing application-specific issues, such as the problem of password disclosure.
The results of experimentation with a number of UNIX security utilities suggest
that the present approach soundly identifies leakage of passwords and incurs
overhead of only 1%. Further experimentation shows that the technique is suit-
able for analysing programs for information flow security vulnerabilities from
the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE). Results of experimentation with
real UNIX programs and programs from the SPEC CPU datasets indicate that
this approach handles complex programs and yields acceptable overheads.
• Finally, this thesis presents a mechanism called Specification for Monitoring
(SFM), for concise and expressive specification of monitoring analysis for a
range well-defined problems in bug-checking.
The strength of SFM is that it separates the semantic issues related to moni-
toring from their implementation details. This separation of concerns results
in compact specifications, as the implementation details are delegated to the
implementation of the SFM API, which makes SFM very flexible. Further, al-
though SFM is abstract, it is not so abstract as many specification techniques,
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which means that the implementation of the API still has the power to be very
efficient.
In addition to the details of abstract representation, SFM also describes the
monitoring API: a collection of functions that encapsulate monitoring tasks (e.g.,
tracking source locations). The API relieves users of the burden of dealing with
minor implementation details or re-implementing well-known paradigms, yet
does not significantly increase overheads compared to manual actions.
To support the present approach, the expressive power of SFM is shown by ex-
ample, using a case study that demonstrates how well-defined problems in bug
checking can be expressed concisely in SFM. The case study presents a complete
analysis for such issues as stack overflows, information flow vulnerabilities, re-
source leakage and SQL injections.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows.
• Chapter 2 presents a literature review. First, it surveys techniques that concen-
trate on detection of memory leaks and locations of leakage, and then discusses
approaches to dynamic detection of information leakage. The chapter concludes
by summarising techniques that enable dynamic analysis using abstract specifi-
cations.
• Chapter 3 discusses the syntax, semantics and memory model of an abstract
imperative language. Elements of this language are used to explain the seman-
tics of the monitoring analyses presented in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 3 also
explains the notations and conventions used throughout this document.
• Chapter 4 describes a monitoring technique for the runtime detection of mem-
ory leaks and leakage locations. First, this approach is discussed at an abstract
level, followed by a discussion of the approximations required to apply it to C
programs. Further, this chapter presents the results of the empirical evaluation
of the technique, comparing the results of the present research prototype to
the results of the Valgrind memory profiler. Finally, an extension for detecting
illegal dereferences is presented.
• Chapter 5 presents a monitoring approach to the runtime detection of leakage
of the confidential information used by a program. Similar to the monitoring
approach discussed in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 first gives an abstract description,
then discusses application of this technique to C programs. Finally, the chapter
presents the results of experimentation with the prototype implementation of
this technique for C programs.
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• Chapter 6 summarises the author’s experience in monitoring and presents a
generic approach to monitoring programs aimed at error detection. This chap-
ter first argues the need for such a generalisation before presenting the SFM
language, designed for concise and expressive specification of monitoring at a
high level of abstraction. The chapter goes on to demonstrate the applicability
of SFM to different problems in error detection using a case study that presents
four complete monitoring analyses for detection of stack overflows, information
flow vulnerabilities, resource leakage and SQL injections.
• Finally, Chapter 7 gives concluding remarks and discusses directions for future
work.
2
Literature Review
This chapter summarises papers that are directly relevant to problems addressed in
the body of this thesis (Chapters 4 – 6). The structure of this chapter is therefore as
follows: Section 2.1 discusses techniques for the detection of memory leaks, review-
ing papers relevant to the authors’ approach to detecting memory leaks and leakage
locations (see Chapter 4). Section 2.2 summarises the current body of work on the
dynamic detection of leakage of sensitive information, reviewing techniques that have
similarities with the author’s technique to detection of information leakage (see Chap-
ter 5). Finally, Section 2.3 focuses on approaches that enable dynamic analysis using
specifications, and discusses work relevant to the technique in monitoring of programs
using concise, yet expressive specifications (see Chapter 6).
2.1 Memory Leaks
This section reviews papers directly relevant to the approach to detecting memory
leaks and leakage locations presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis. This review con-
centrates on dynamic methods that enable detection of physical memory leaks (i.e.,
memory no longer reachable via pointers) in languages that support dynamic memory
allocation.
The structure of this section is as follows. It first discusses memory debuggers –
tools that detect errors by capturing and analysing the memory state of a running pro-
gram. It then reviews techniques for detecting memory leaks that focuses on identi-
fying the precise locations of leakage. Further, this section summarises leak detection
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based on the sampling of program executions. Finally, techniques that detect leaks
using hardware features in place of program instrumentations are reviewed.
2.1.1 Memory Debuggers
One of the first tools capable of dynamic detection of memory leaks is Purify [21]. Pu-
rify inserts additional instructions directly into object files monitoring memory alloca-
tion and every read or write performed by a program under test. This instrumentation
is static (enabled at compile-time). The detection of memory leaks is performed at
runtime using a callable garbage detector based on the conventional mark-and-sweep
algorithm. Memory blocks identified as no longer referenced by a program are re-
ported as memory leaks.
Alternatively, memory operations can be tracked using dynamic binary instrumen-
tations (DBI). In DBI, an executable (a client) is analysed using extra code added
to the client at runtime. An example of such analysis for memory leak detection is
Memcheck [14] – a memory profiler based on the Valgrind [10] platform. A run
of a program under Memcheck first instruments the program with instructions that
track memory blocks allocated on the heap (by intercepting calls to memory alloca-
tion and de-allocation functions). Before a program terminates, Memcheck reports
unreachable blocks that have not been de-allocated as memory leaks. The reachabil-
ity of a block is decided based on the general purpose registers and data words in the
accessible memory of the client.
Dr. Memory [22] also uses DBI instrumentation (via DynamoRIO [41] binary
translator) to detect memory leaks. Similar to Valgrind or Purify, Dr. Memory identi-
fies memory leaks based on reachability, such that a heap memory block is considered
a memory leak if there exist no pointers to it. At runtime, Dr. Memory detects leaks
via a scan that first suspends all threads, and then applies a mark-and-sweep opera-
tion to check reachability of the allocated heap blocks. A leak scan is performed at
program termination or at a program point specified by the user.
A variety of similar memory debugging and profiling tools capable of detecting
memory leaks are available. LeakSanitizer [24] is a memory leak detector integrated
into the AddressSanitizer [16] memory error detector. leaks [42] is a memory leak
detector for Mac OS. This tool periodically scans the memory space of a process and
reports allocated but no longer referenced memory buffers as memory leaks. Intel
Inspector [23] (built on top of the Pin [43] platform) is a memory error debugger
for C, C++, C# and Fortran applications under Windows and Linux; this tool is also
capable of detecting memory leaks. Discover [44] is a memory debugger maintained
by Oracle. dmalloc [45] is a C library of memory management functions that includes
facilities for memory-leak tracking and fence-post write detection. mtrace [46] is a
GNU C library memory debugger that provides essential facilities for tracing memory
allocations and reporting non-freed blocks. D.U.M.A. (Detect Unintended Memory
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Access) [47] is an open source library for detecting issues such as buffer overflows in
C programs; it also provides functionality for reporting allocated but not freed blocks
at the end of execution.
Overall, there exist a wide variety of tools suitable for leak detection. The tech-
niques discussed in this section address the detection of memory leaks and report only
the leaks’ locations of origin (i.e., program locations where lost memory was initially
allocated). This can be contrasted with the author’s approach, which concentrates on
detecting the precise locations where memory was lost. The value of such analysis is
demonstrated in Section 4.4.3 (Chapter 4), which compares conventional (allocation
only) memory leak reports of Valgrind (via Memcheck tool) to the reports of the au-
thor’s prototype implementation which additionally contain locations of leakage. The
following section discusses techniques that concentrate on similar goals.
2.1.2 Detecting Locations of Leakage
Leakpoint
Clause and Orso [12] developed Leakpoint, a technique that detects sources of mem-
ory leaks. Leakpoint tracks memory using dynamic taint analysis. For each allocated
memory block Leakpoint creates new a taint mark. A tainted pointer identifies an ac-
cess alias to that memory block. As execution proceeds, Leakpoint updates taint marks
by observing operations on pointers. This uses a propagation policy that models each
such operation. At runtime Leakpoint keeps track of pointer count per allocated mem-
ory block (i.e., taint marks associated with pointers) and identifies leakage locations
as those where pointer count has dropped to zero.
The main weakness of Leakpoint is that its propagation policy is neither sound
nor complete. That is, while Leakpoint soundly detects leaks, the reported sources of
the leaked memory are not guaranteed to be precise. Additionally, the propagation
policy does not handle internal scopes. This also may result in reporting spurious
leakage locations. Finally, Leakpoint is a DBI approach (built on top of Valgrind)
and thus also suffers from high overheads (e.g., Clause and Orso report 300 times
runtime overheads). The author’s technique addresses similar concerns by using on-
the-fly computation rather than the reference count. Because the author uses the
points-to information of the program rather the approximation to it (i.e., taint mark
propagation) the reported results are precise.
Maebe et al.
Maebe et al. [20] presented a technique that uses machine-level dynamic instrumen-
tation to track all pointers to the allocated memory using reference count. The refer-
ence count is computed by monitoring operations that may change the pointer struc-
ture of a program. A memory block is deemed to be a memory leak if a memory
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operation decreases to zero the reference count associated with that block. In their
paper Maebe et al. also discuss the prototype implementation of their approach using
the Dynamic Instrumentation, Optimization and Transformation of Applications [8]
framework. The empirical evaluation of this technique indicates runtime overheads
that range from 200 to 300 times the normal execution.
The downside of Maebe et al.’s approach is that it reports false alarms. This is
because this technique tracks only the start addresses of memory blocks; that is, there
is no support for handling interior pointers. Further, this approach also misses leaks
in the cases where only a part of the pointer is overwritten. This stands in contrast to
the author’s approach, where such issues are addressed by a traversal of the memory
space. This correctly identifies all pointers and their dependencies and identifies leaks
soundly. However, the reference count is not, thus requiring a program to terminate
in order to detect leaks. Maebe et al.’s technique has no such limitation.
A similar approach, capable of reporting locations of lost memory, was imple-
mented by Meredith [48] in the tool Omega. Clause and Orso [12] indicate that
Omega is an independent implementation of the approach suggested by Maebe et
al. [20].
Boehm Garbage Collector
Another approach that can potentially provide information, such as locations of leak-
age, is Boehm GC [25] – a conservative garbage collector for C and C++ languages
that uses a variation of the mark-and-sweep algorithm. Boehm GC can also detect
memory leaks, although this is not its primary focus.
If used as a leak detector, Boehm GC reports memory blocks that are no longer
accessible (i.e., de-allocated in a normal mode of operation) as memory leaks. This,
however, relies on periodic scanning of the program address space to determine lost
memory, and thus cannot determine precise locations of leakage.
Insure++
Insure++ [49] is a proprietary memory debugger developed by Parasoft. This tool con-
centrates on runtime analysis and memory error detection for programs implemented
in the C and C++ programming languages. Insure++ detects a range of memory er-
rors, including memory leaks. To enable monitoring of memory Insure++ instruments
the source code of applications. Similar to the author’s approach, Insure++ supports
detection of lost memory. However, since Insure++ is a proprietary tool whose imple-
mentation details are not publicly available, the present thesis cannot summarise its
differences to the author’s technique.
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2.1.3 Dynamic Sampling
A different approach to dynamic memory leak detection is via sampling executions of
code fragments.
Hauswirth and Chilimbi [17] presented a dynamic technique for the runtime de-
tection of memory leaks using bursty tracing [50] (a sampling methodology in con-
tinuous program monitoring) and its prototype implementation, called SWAT. SWAT
maintains a model of the heap, recording all memory allocations and constantly mon-
itoring all load and store operations sampling executions at a rate inversely propor-
tional to the execution frequency. This results in reports of stale objects (i.e., memory
areas that have not been accessed for a particular amount of time) as memory leaks.
An advantage of using sampling to detect leaks is that it results in low runtime over-
heads. From their experimentation (using SPEC benchmarks) Hauswirth and Chilimbi
report runtime overheads that are less than 5% compared to unobserved executions.
However, due to the application of sampling, which reports memory blocks that have
not been accessed for a “long” time as leaks, this technique is known to produce false
alarms.
Novark et al. [18] developed an approach to sound runtime detection of memory
leaks and bloat in C and C++ applications, called Hound. To detect memory leaks
Hound uses a data-based sampling technique. This enables sampling based on access
paths to objects. This is different to code-based sampling techniques (e.g., bursty
tracing, used by SWAT) that perform sampling based on execution frequency of code.
Data-based sampling resolves issues associated with overestimating staleness, and
reports no false positives; however it can miss memory leaks. Empirical evaluation of
Hound using SPEC CPU benchmarks indicates that its runtime overheads vary from
approximately 8% to 102% compared to unobserved executions.
A limitation of Hound is that it can miss errors in cases when a hot (i.e., frequently
accessed object) is co-located on a page with a stale object. Lim et al. [19] address
this limitation using context aware data sampling, which allocates memory objects
using callpaths of allocation sites (context information). The authors demonstrate
the benefits of their technique using empirical evaluation that detects memory leaks in
benchmarks from the SPEC CINT2000 suite. The results indicate that context aware
data sampling detects more memory leaks than conventional data sampling using
Hound. However, this does not fully resolve the issues with false negative reports.
One of the most recent approaches to memory leak detection using sampling is
Sniper [51]. Sniper concentrates on runtime leak detection via statistical analysis.
This employs instruction sampling (via performance monitoring units in commodity
processors) to detect staleness of allocated memory. The authors also discuss the re-
sults of empirical evaluation using benchmarked code demonstrating that overheads
of Sniper are low. This is reflected in an F-measure of 81%.
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In sampling-based detection, memory leaks are identified using the notion of stale-
ness. In contrast, the author’s approach relies on locating points-to relationships. The
benefit of the sampling-based techniques is that they can also detect logical leakage
(i.e., reachable but unused memory blocks), which is not supported by the author’s
approach. Therefore, sampling is capable of detecting leaks in memory managed
languages; for example, Sleigh [52] detects memory leaks using sampling in Java
programs. The author’s technique, however, detects all leaks and does not yield false
alarms, while sampling-based techniques are known to yield false positive or false
negative results.
2.1.4 Detecting Memory Leaks at the Hardware Level
Finally, memory leaks can be detected using facilities provided by an execution en-
vironment. Qin et al. [53] presented a tool called SafeMem, which detects memory
corruption errors and memory leaks using Error-Correcting Code (an extension of
parity memory that can detect single-bit errors) in place of program instrumentation.
SafeMem concentrates on detecting continuous leaks – memory leaks that result in
continuous growth of virtual memory space. Leaks are detected by monitoring the
memory usage behaviour and evaluating the life-times of objects with respect to allo-
cations. Empirical evaluation of SafeMem shows runtime overheads of less than 15%
of the normal execution. However, due to the nature of the analysis (which makes as-
sumptions on object life-times), SafeMem can report false alarms. MemTracker [54]
represents a similar effort that enables memory monitoring and debugging via hard-
ware support.
The author’s technique operates at the source level of programs, and therefore is
platform and architecture independent.
2.2 Information Leakage
This section reviews related work in the area of dynamic detection of information
leakage. It summarises papers directly relevant to the author’s approach in detecting
of leakage of sensitive information presented in Chapter 5. This focuses on dynamic
techniques that address the question of protection of sensitive information against
disclosure at runtime.
The structure of this section is as follows. It first reviews techniques in language-
based information flow security that detect leakage implicitly, by extending program-
ming languages with security features, rather than explicitly instrumenting programs.
This section then discusses related work in the area of data-flow tracking. Similar to
the author’s approach, these techniques track values during a run of a program using
instrumentations. Further, this section summarises research on information flow and
taint analysis that track sensitive data in annotated programs. This is followed by a
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discussion on techniques that detect information leakage using multiple executions
of the program under analysis. Finally, this section summarises papers that address
information leakage using testing.
2.2.1 Language-based Information Flow Security
Language-based information flow security [55, 56] enables information analysis in
security-typed languages (such as JFlow [57], JIF [58] or FlowCaml [59]) where
data types are augmented with annotations that specify security policies for the use of
the data at runtime. The specified policies are enforced during a type-checking phase
at compile-time. Adding such annotations, however, is a non-trivial task, especially
given their semantics, which require extending the target language with the security-
oriented type system. The annotations used by the author’s approach are only to
identify memory locations and values that need to be protected against disclosure.
2.2.2 Data Flow Tracking
Data flow tracking is an alternative approach to detecting information leakage. In con-
trast to information flow security, which extends the functionality of languages with
security features, data flow tracking enables detection of leakage using instrumen-
tations that capture different aspects of leakage. This section now discusses related
work in the area of dynamic data flow tracking.
Resin [34] tracks values and detects leakage using data-flow assertions checked at
runtime. This approach is similar to that of the present work. Resin targets analysis of
web systems and supports specification of policies and filters. However, because Resin
mainly supports memory safe languages, such as PhP or Python, this technique tracks
only secret values, but not safe locations and does not handle aliasing. A significant
limitation of Resin is the need to modify the interpreter to handle security policies.
The author’s approach modifies only the input program and standard tools (such as
gcc) can still be used. Further, Resin incurs high overheads (over 400% for some SQL
related operations).
LeakProber [60] also addresses information leakage by analysing the flow of data
in a program. LeakProber integrates static analysis and runtime tracking to generate a
data propagation graph that captures various aspects of the leakage of sensitive infor-
mation. This differs from the author’s approach technique which uses only dynamic
analysis. The main aim of LeakProber is to identify vulnerabilities by comparing nor-
mal and insecure data propagation graphs. LeakProber also focuses on data that
crosses the user/kernel boundary. To achieve this, the authors of LeakProber patch
and recompile the kernel to support profiling.
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2.2.3 Information Flow Analysis
Information leakage can also be detected using information flow analysis, which
tracks the flow of data with respect to the security levels of variables that may only
point to the actual data.
Le Guernic et al. [61, 62] analyse information flow to enforce non-interference
in sequential and concurrent programs using a combination of dynamic and static
analyses. They use the results of static analysis at runtime to detect indirect flows,
which has the usual issues with static analysis, such as false positives. Further, the
technique by Le Guernic et al. does not handle pointers.
Assaf et al. [35] describe a dynamic flow-sensitive information flow monitor for
sound enforcement of the non-interference property in programs with pointers. Assaf
et al. formalise a hybrid information flow monitor for a simple imperative language
with aliasing. This approach uses the semantics of the Clight language [36] (a subset
of the C language used by the CompCert verified compiler [37]), which does not
support pointer arithmetic. The present author’s approach has no such limitation.
Magazinius et al. [13] inject monitors at the source code level. These monitors are
similar to the assertions the author’s approach inserts into the programs. Magazinius
et al.’s technique handles code evaluated on the fly (i.e., executing strings as code),
but it does not handle pointers (or aliasing) and also assumes that the functions have
no side-effects. The overheads of their approach range from 20% to 1700%.
Chandra and Franz [63] present a framework for information flow tracking in the
Java Virtual Machine. Their approach combines static and dynamic techniques. A
static analyser adds annotations, which at runtime are used to update the labels of
variables and enforce the security policy currently in place. The key feature of this
approach is that it uses completely dynamic policies that can be changed during run-
time. Their annotation mechanism relies on static analysis assigning the security level.
Chandra and Franz also present experimental results, indicating runtime overheads
that vary from 23% to 159%, however it is not clear how much data were tracked. In
contrast, program annotations in the present author’s approach only classify memory
locations as safe or unsafe. Additionally, the author’s approach does not need to track
or compute security levels of variables in order to soundly identify leakage.
Hedin and Sabelfeld [32] developed a dynamic type system for a subset of JavaScript,
incorporating objects, higher order functions, exceptions and dynamic code evalua-
tion. This enforces the property of non-interference, thus protecting programs from
leaking private inputs to public outputs. Hedin et al. [33] extend this work and de-
velop a security-enhanced interpreter, called JSFlow, for the full non-strict JavaScript
standard (ECMA-262). In contrast to the author’s approach JSFlow uses types to
detect information leakage: a vulnerability is detected only if all elements can be
typed. In the present approach the author uses memory locations and untyped val-
ues. However, this approach detects only leaks via explicit information flows. JSFlow
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also identifies leakage via implicit flows.
2.2.4 Dynamic Taint Analysis
An alternative approach to information leakage detection is by means of taint analysis
in conjunction with DBI; this combination sometimes referred to as dynamic taint
analysis. The main benefit of such an approach is its ability to track every bit. This
drastically improves the precision of the analysis (since all information is available at
runtime) at a cost of runtime overheads of over 50 times [9] the normal execution.
Such techniques are described below.
LIFT [29] tracks information flow via dynamic taint analysis by tagging secret
values and propagating the tags at execution time. LIFT uses several aggressive opti-
misation strategies aimed at reducing overheads associated with DBI and information
flow tracking. The results of experimentation with LIFT (built on top of the Start-
DBT [64] DBI framework) indicate that it reduces runtime overheads by an order of
magnitude (compared to a TaintCheck [9] – a taint analysis tool for overwrite attacks
detection). The overheads incurred by LIFT average to 3.6 times the normal execu-
tion. The advantage of using LIFT is that it does not require source code, and has
the ability to track information flow across library calls. This is a limitation of the
author’s approach which is based on source code instrumentation and thus, requires
source code to be available.
TaintDroid [65] is an extension to the Android platform that dynamically tracks
the flow of data through third-party applications to identify sensitive information that
leaves the system. To solve the issue of high overhead costs associated with tracking of
data at the instruction level, this technique combines multiple granularities of track-
ing: at the variable, message, method and file levels. The authors report overheads of
14% for micro benchmarks. Extensions to TaintDroid have also been proposed [66].
To enable various levels of tracking, TaintDroid requires modification of the runtime
environment at the operating system level (i.e., Dalvik virtual machine). This is dif-
ferent to the author’s approach, which transforms only the program under analysis.
TaintEraser [30] is a similar system for preventing exposure of sensitive information
based on dynamic application-level taint analysis (using Pin [43] as its DBI platform).
TaintEraser employs object-level propagation, maintains a shadow list of tainted ker-
nel level objects (such as file handles) and monitors changes to these objects. Overall,
TaintDroid and TaintEraser lift the granularity of tracking to a higher level (e.g., object
or file level) that requires fewer instrumentations and as a consequence reduces the
overheads comparing to tracking byte-level tracking. However, this approach leads to
imprecise approximations, as byte-level operations are deliberately omitted from the
analysis. The author’s technique tracks values at memory block level.
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2.2.5 Secure Executions
The techniques for detecting information leakage discussed in the previous sections
consider single executions of a program instrumented with security checks. This sec-
tion discusses approaches that detect information leakage via multiple executions of
programs.
Capizzi et al. [67] developed a practical approach for preventing information leaks
called shadow execution. Shadow execution replaces the original program with two
copies, such that the first (private) copy is supplied with sensitive information and
is prevented from making network connections. The second (public) copy commu-
nicates over the network using only non-confidential information, which then can be
shared with the private process without loss of confidentiality. Capizzi et al. imple-
mented their approach for the Windows platform and report runtime overheads that
range from 23% to 206%. The present author’s technique embeds checks for informa-
tion leakage into the body of a program; under this type of analysis the program never
outputs the leaked data, whereas shadow execution exposes them to the sandboxed
environment, which needs to be secured. Further, there is an additional cost associ-
ated with running a copy of the original program and inter-process communication.
Devriese and Piessens [68] proposed a similar approach for information flow con-
trol called secure multi-execution, where a program is executed multiple times – once
for each security level. This controls a program’s public output, produced only if the
output matches the appropriate security level. The authors implemented their ap-
proach in a model browser. Experimental results indicate that runtime and memory
overheads associated with secure multi-execution can be as high as 200%.
Austin and Flanagan [69] have presented a technique for preventing leakage of
confidential information and violations of data integrity. In their approach Austin
and Flanagan introduce the notion of a faceted value – a pair of two raw values that
contain both public and private information. By manipulating these values, shadow
execution is simulated using a single process. This enables strict information flow
control where multi-processing is involved.
2.2.6 Testing
This section summarises papers that combine information leakage detection with test-
ing.
Panorama [70] is an approach to detecting leakage of sensitive information that
focuses on tracking information flow under test cases. Panorama performs security
information flow analysis in three stages: testing, monitoring and analysing. First, the
code under investigation is loaded into the testing environment, where the set of au-
tomated tests are conducted and the program behaviour is monitored. The result ob-
tained from monitoring is then analysed against user-defined security requirements.
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An alternative approach to information leakage detection is taken by Privacy Ora-
cle [71], which considers an application as a black box. To detect information leaks
Privacy Oracle uses a variation of a black box testing technique, where perturbations
in the application inputs are mapped to perturbations in the application outputs to
discover likely leaks. TightLip [72] is another system that does not require access to
the source code of applications. TightLip employs doppelgangers – sandboxed copy
processes that run in parallel to the original program – and uses divergent process
outputs to detect potential leaks.
2.3 Monitoring Specifications
This section summarises techniques that facilitate construction of dynamic analysis
using specifications. This review highlights differences between the author’s approach
to monitoring, called SFM (see Chapter 6) and similar techniques that enable dynamic
analysis at a specification level.
The structure of this section is as follows. It first discusses monitoring via instru-
mentations and then reviews techniques that enable dynamic analysis using streams
of events that represent program behaviours. This section further discusses behavioural
interface specification languages that enable monitoring using in-line annotations.
This is followed by a discussion on techniques in runtime verification that employ
high-level abstractions (e.g., formal logic) to describe properties that should hold at
execution time. Finally, this section focuses on techniques that use behavioural pat-
terns to observe traces of program events at runtime.
2.3.1 Low-Level Instrumentation
A variety of frameworks that support construction of dynamic analysis have been
developed. Early attempts include techniques such as ATOM (Analysis Tools with
OM) [73, 74], EEL (Executable Editing Library) [75] and Shade [76]. These frame-
works provide infrastructures for code instrumentations at a source code or instruc-
tion level. Some similar state-of-the-art solutions include architectures such as LLVM [77],
Valgrind [10], Pin [43], DynamoRIO [41] and StarDBT [64]. Such tools typically
analyse programs by injecting implementation-specific code at program locations iden-
tified by the user. Such an approach provides fine-grained instrumentation func-
tionality (e.g., modify instructions in the target program) for the cost of complex,
implementation-level specifications. Since it is the user’s responsibility to provide
the program points and code for instrumentations, such techniques are considered
manual. As such, they are beyond the scope of this review which concentrates on
approaches that aim to reduce the development overheads involved in specifying dy-
namic analysis by hand.
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2.3.2 Monitoring Program Events
One way to facilitate specification of monitoring is to represent a program run as
a stream of events and provide means to observe them, for example, via callback
functions scheduled to be executed once specific events are triggered. This section
describes monitoring techniques that explore this idea.
BEE++ [78] is a C++ application framework for dynamic analysis of distributed
programs based on BEE [79], a system of templates and tools implemented in the
C programming language. BEE++ sees program execution as a stream of primitive
events. Built on the notion that primitive events should be used to compose more
complex events, BEE++ allows events to be extended by way of inheritance. Specif-
ically, an event is encapsulated as a C++ class, and a custom instance of an event
is a subclass that inherits from a built-in class provided by the platform. The event
processing model of BEE++ consists of the target program, the dynamic analysis tool
and the event configuration manager. Events generated by the target program are
sent to the dynamic analysis tool, which invokes user-specified code that observes
the execution of the events. In addition, the analysis tool generates events and sends
them to the target program. This is enabled in order to request additional information
required by the analysis.
A Lightweight Architecture for Monitoring (Alamo) [80–82] is a framework for
monitoring programs that aims to reduce the cost of writing monitors. Initially devel-
oped for Icon programs [83], Alamo has been extended to support C. Alamo instru-
ments programs using the Configurable C Instrumentation (CCI) [84, 85] tool. The
instrumented programs transmit events that represent individual units of behaviour.
Typical Alamo events include memory references, heap allocations, program control
flow and procedure calls. To reduce the number of generated events Alamo uses event
masks that specify sets of events that should be observed by the instrumentation. In
response to events generated by a program, Alamo invokes monitors specified as C
macros. These macros are expanded by the CCI tool and used to instrument target
programs.
Olsson et al. [86] suggested an approach to event-driven debugging called Dalek.
Dalek is based on the data-flow view of primitive and high level program events. Prim-
itive events (along with the supported attributes) are defined and raised by a user
(for example, via break points). A high-level event is triggered by a primitive event
and specifies the code to be executed. This uses a custom language similar to C. Dalek
does not support complex event patterns, and is only capable of invoking high-level
events on occurrences of primitive events.
Bates [87] suggested an approach to debugging and monitoring of programs
called Event Based Behavioural Abstraction (EBBA). In EBBA, events that express
behaviours of programs are defined by the programmer via source code annotations.
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These annotations generate event instances at runtime. Behaviour models (other-
wise known as event patterns) that need to be monitored are expressed using regular
expression grammar, where events are represented using tuples of event types and
attributes.
Jahiera and Ducasse [88, 89] suggested specifying monitoring of programs in
functional and logic languages using a monitoring primitive, called foldt – a vari-
ation of the fold function used for traversal of lists in logic programs. fold is similar
to the map function over lists, bit has an additional argument called accumulator ac-
cessed at each step of the execution. foldt is designed to perform similar operations
over streams of events at runtime. Jahiera and Ducasse implemented this approach
for the Mercury programming language [90].
RoadRunner [91] is a tool that supports rapid prototyping with dynamic analyses
for concurrent Java programs. RoadRunner provides an API for communicating with
events generated by the monitored program. Construction of an analysis using Road-
Runner is limited to specifying handlers for built-in events for concurrency analysis
(e.g., non-volatile and volatile memory accesses, lock acquire, release and thread op-
erations). RoadRunner keeps track of threads and memory locations using shadow
memory. This is done in such a way that during the execution of the monitored pro-
gram for each thread there exists a shadow thread (which encapsulates information
about the program thread) and for each program variable there exists a shadow vari-
able. The values of the shadow objects are tracked by the monitored program as it
executes.
Sofya [92, 93] provides support for monitoring of events in concurrency-aware
Java environments. Analysis specifications are enabled using a declarative language
called EDL (Event Description Language) that describes events and the ways in which
they are monitored. In EDL, observed events are specified using a rule-based sys-
tem, where larger events are composed of primitive events (e.g., method invocations
or field reads or writes). Events are processed using a publish/subscribe event han-
dling system. The EDL specifications are translated to Java bytecode and the original
programs are instrumented using the Byte Code Engineering Library [94].
SFM also uses events to observe program behaviours. However, a feature that
differentiates SFM from most of the techniques described in this section (with the
exception of EBBA) is the use of behavioural patterns, allowing for observations of
events that occur in specific sequences. Additionally, the monitoring approaches dis-
cussed in this section specify monitoring using the implementation language of the
monitored programs. This is different to the present approach that specifies moni-
toring using an intermediate language that is used to generate implementation-level
code.
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2.3.3 Behavioural Interface Specification Languages
Behavioural interface specification languages (BISLs) provide formal specifications
of intended program behaviours. Such specifications are provided via annotations
or language extensions that document the desired behaviours using pre- and post-
conditions, invariants and assertions. In dynamic analysis, such in-line specifications
are used to generate implementation-level monitors. At runtime, these monitors en-
force the specified requirements. This section summarises relevant work in this area.
Hatcliff et al. [95] reviewed techniques in formal behavioural specifications of
programs. Their survey provides an overview of the various features of different
BISLs and their use for automatic verification of programs.
Anna (Annotated ADA) [96, 97] is a BISL for formal specification of the intended
behaviour of ADA programs. Anna specifications are provided in the form of annota-
tions associated with ADA syntax constructs. Anna supports type annotations, which
impose constraints on the types in the program, and subprogram annotations, which
specify the intended behaviours of the program. A number of techniques for conver-
sion of the formal properties in the Anna language into runtime checks have also been
developed [98, 99].
Eiffel [100] is an object-oriented programming language developed by Bertrand
Meyer. In Eiffel, the intended behaviours are specified by means of contracts that
document the interface specifications of program components using such language
extensions as pre-conditions, post-conditions and class invariants. This design has
since become known as the design-by-contract principle.
Larch [101] is a two-tier approach to formal specification of program behaviours.
The top tier of Larch consists of a BISL; the bottom tier is called the Larch Shared
Language (LSL). The LSL, which describes mathematical vocabulary, specifies a math-
ematical model and the BISL, tailored to a specific programming language, describes
the interface and the behaviour of the program. Various BISLs for the top tier have
been considered: Larch/C++ [102], Larch/Ada [103], Larch/Smalltalk [104].
Spec# [105] is a behavioural specification language for the .NET platform. Spec#
is a superset of the C# programming language enriched with constructs that cap-
ture the programmer’s intentions. Spec# uses contracts that specify how data and
methods should be used. The Spec# compiler converts the additional constructs into
runtime checks that enforce specifications. Additionally, Spec# employs the Boogie
static verifier, which has the ability to check the program statically against the speci-
fied requirements.
Java Modelling Language (JML) [106] specifies the intended behaviours of Java
classes and interfaces as source code annotations. In JML, behaviours can be de-
scribed using pre- and post-conditions. Additionally, JML allows assertions to be
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placed in the Java code. Burdy et al. [107] survey some of the well-known ap-
plications of JML in different areas of program analysis. Bytecode Modelling Lan-
guage [108] is a similar effort that uses bytecode-level annotations.
E-ACSL [109, 110] is one of the most recent developments in the area. E-ACSL is
a subset of ACSL [111], a formal specification language for C programs used by the
Frama-C [112] framework. ACSL is based on first-order logic that combines the use
of pure (side-effect free) C expressions and keywords that allow for reasoning about
the results of functions. Further, ACSL can express most of the functional properties
of C programs, and implements the design-by-contract principle, such that a contract
can be associated with a function in a program and specify pre- and post-conditions.
While ACSL has been designed for static analysis of C programs, E-ACSL was adopted
for dynamic analysis specifications. The annotations in E-ACSL are translated into
executable monitoring code and embedded into programs as runtime-checks via the
E-ACSL2c compiler.
In the present approach definitions of analysis and source code of monitored pro-
grams are kept separate. The key difference of SFM and a BISL approach is that a SFM
monitoring specification is independent of the monitored program, whereas a BISL
specification is embedded in the body of the monitored program. Such separation of
concerns offers the benefit of using the same analysis, once defined, for monitoring
many programs. SFM, however is less suitable for the specification of application-
specific properties. For example, SFM cannot specify pre- and post-conditions or rea-
son about the behaviours of individual variables or objects.
2.3.4 Runtime Verification
Runtime verification is an area of dynamic analysis that focuses on checking program
executions against properties provided via a requirement specification. Such speci-
fications are often given via high-level abstractions used to generate observers that
monitor the execution of a running program. Checking program runs is enabled ei-
ther on-line (during the execution of a program) or off-line (by extracting a program
trace and verifying it against the set of properties given by the specification). Jin et
al. [113] presented a comparative table for a number of well-known approaches to
runtime verification, briefly surveying properties of the systems such as target lan-
guage, scope of analysis, logic used in writing requirement specifications and modes
of execution (i.e., on-line or off-line). This section surveys some of the relevant run-
time verification techniques.
Monitoring Oriented Programming (MOP) [114] is an approach to runtime ver-
ification of programs aimed at validating formalised program requirements at run-
time. MOP automatically synthesises monitoring code from higher-level formal re-
quirements specified via source-code annotations. Formalisms that capture program
requirements are specified as plug-ins; that is, MOP is independent of any specific
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formalism. The MOP technique is implemented in a runtime verification tool called
Java-MOP [115]. Similar to the BISL techniques (sometimes classified as runtime
verification techniques) MOP targets detection of application-specific requirements
via in-line annotations. This is different to the author’s approach, in which specifica-
tions are independent of the source code of programs.
Program Trace Query Language (PTQL) [116] is an approach to runtime verifi-
cation that specifies requirements using a SQL-like language called Partiqle. Partiqle
uses relational queries over traces of program events viewed as sets of records with
associated timestamps. PTQL enables on-line analysis via external specifications and
uses state machines to execute queries. Since PTQL is, in essence, a query language,
it has expressiveness limitations. For example, the authors of PTQL indicate that it
can express issues, such as mismatched method pairs or serialisation errors, but it
cannot support analysis for SQL injections in its full generality. Unlike PTQL, SFM is
a procedural language that associates procedural routines to be executed when the
match is achieved. This has the power to express arbitrary computations.
MaC [117–119] is a framework for monitoring programs against system require-
ments. MaC specifications are implemented using two languages: Primitive Event
Definition Language (PEDL) defines events observed by the system and Meta Event
Definition Language (MEDL) specifies formal requirements using PEDL events. Spec-
ifications in these languages are used to instrument programs with code that emit
program events at runtime and enables dynamic checking of properties given via the
specifications. MaC mainly targets application-specific requirements and reasons at
the level of specific variables or objects.
Java PathExplorer [120] (JPaX) is a runtime verification tool developed at NASA
Ames Research Center. JPaX first extracts relevant events from the executing program,
then passes the observer that enables analysis based on a specification that uses tem-
poral logic (via the Maude specification language [121]). Additionally, JPaX enables
built-in analyses to detect data race vulnerabilities and deadlocks. Similar solutions
using temporal logic to specify requirements include TemporalRover [122] (combina-
tion of Linear Temporal Logic and Metric Temporal Logic), Hawk [123] (rule-based
temporal logic called Eagle [124]), RuleR [125] (primitive conditional rule-based
system) J-LO [126] (Linear-Time Temporal Logic extended with free variables) and
jUnitRV [127] (Linear Temporal Logic on finite traces [128]).
A SFM monitor is specified using actions and patterns. This is different to runtime
verification, where both components are given in higher-order logic as a single prop-
erty. Such properties are known to be more compact, yet are not trivial to specify,
and are hard to optimise due to the gap between abstract property descriptions and
implementation-level monitors generated from the properties. SFM provides a more
intuitive way of monitoring specifications and tuning performance: the user specifies
what behaviours to observe (via patterns) and how to observe them using actions.
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SFM specifications are also abstract, but they provide a traceable link between ab-
stract patterns and actions and the implementation-level monitors generated from
the specifications.
2.3.5 Trace Monitors
Trace monitors originate from aspect oriented programming (AOP) [129, 130] as a
generalisation of applying advice (i.e., extra code) on pointcuts (collections of well-
defined program points).
In traditional AOP, pointcuts refer only to a current state. Douence et al. [131]
extended the pointcut language and presented stateful, trace-based aspects based on
execution history. The authors argued that such aspects are more expressive because
they allow for tracking and expressing relationships between events occurring at var-
ious points of a program’s execution. This model is based on a monitor observing and
weaving execution traces, where aspects are defined over sequences of executable
states and the aspect weaving is performed on executions, rather than on program
code.
Walker and Viggers [132] developed an approach to trace monitoring based on
AOP that extends pointcuts to patterns that supporting the specification of multiple
events occurring in sequences. In their paper, Walker and Viggers introduce declara-
tive event patterns that explore the idea of defining pointcuts using features of context
free grammars. To demonstrate the benefits of their approach, Walker and Viggers
extended AspectJ [130] with declarative pattern specifications called tracecuts, and
compared their design to the standard features of AspectJ.
Another approach to trace monitoring has been presented by Allan et al. [133].
This technique also uses the idea of history-based executions, introducing a feature
called tracematches. Tracematches enable matching of events in execution traces us-
ing patterns based on regular expressions with free variables. Allan et al. also pre-
sented a prototype implementation of their approach as an extension to the abc As-
pectJ compiler [134]. This extension supports constructs that allow tracematches to
be defined. Further, Allan et al. investigate issues related to efficient implementations
and feasibility of monitors generated using tracematches [135].
Stolz and Bodden [136] presented a trace monitoring approach where patterns
can be specified using LTL properties over AspectJ pointcuts. It is noted, that this
work is closely related to the runtime verification approach discussed earlier. Hui and
Riely [137] presented semantics for temporal aspects that allow for the definition of
pointcuts in terms of events that occurred in the past.
The feature that distinguishes SFM approach from the above trace monitors is the
use of an abstract language to specify actions. Research on trace monitoring has been
focussed on pattern design, and the existing trace monitors specify actions using the
implementation language of a target program. SFM enables specifications of analyses
28 LITERATURE REVIEW
that the existing trace monitors cannot address (e.g., dependency analysis).
The following discusses trace monitors that have the most similarities with SFM.
Program Query Language (PQL)
Program Query Language (PQL) is a trace monitor for Java programs [138]. PQL
focuses on tracking method invocations and accesses of field and array elements in
related objects. In PQL, events are represented as code patterns, e.g., typed assign-
ments. In contrast, SFM uses abstract events to specify actions performed by the
program (e.g., memory allocation). The approach taken by PQL is convenient for
monitoring properties of Java objects; however, it complicates specification for more
generic analyses. For example, to encode propagation of tainted data in PQL, one
needs to specify all relevant code patterns. In SFM this behaviour is captured by a
single flow event that addresses all data transitions regardless of the code patterns
involved (see SFM specification in Listing 6.4). Also, PQL does not support tracking of
conditional jumps and cannot address problems in dependency analysis. For example,
PQL cannot encode flow-sensitive information flow analysis similar to that shown via
the SFM specification in Listing 6.2.
SFM is capable of expressing memory-related problems; (e.g., stack overflow anal-
ysis; see Listing 6.1). Since Java is a memory-safe language such issues are outside of
PQL’s purview. Encoding problems PQL focuses on, for instance mismatched method
pairs or SQL injections, is straightforward in SFM. Similar analyses are shown in List-
ings 6.3 and 6.4.
Arachne
Arachne [139] provides an aspect language for C that features constructs for quantifi-
cations over sequences of events. Events supported by this system capture load and
store operations and function calls. Arachne is also capable of expressing memory
safety problems; for instance, Douence et al. present an AOP specification for buffer
overflow detection.
Likewise, SFM supports memory safety; however, expressing such analyses in SFM
is more straightforward and compact. For example, Arachne does not have a monitor-
ing API, and thus tasks such as memory tracking need to be implemented by the user.
Additionally, memory tracking with Arachne is limited. For example, this approach
cannot track stack memory allocations, and thus analyses for stack overflows (see
Listing 6.1 for an example) cannot be specified. SFM does not have such limitations.
Arachne provides a powerful pattern language over event sequences capable of
expressing problems similar to the resource leakage shown in Listing 6.3. However,
functionality that facilitates the analysis needs to be implemented in C that is consid-
ered one of the least expressive languages [140].
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The literature review presented in this section summarised papers relevant to
monitoring techniques presented by this thesis. This section first discussed related
work in the area of memory leak and disclosure of confidential information detection.
Further, research that concentrates on enabling monitoring using specifications was
presented.
The next section presents a memory model that is used to describe monitoring
techniques (Chapters 4 – 6) that form the contributions of the present thesis. The fol-
lowing section also presents notations and explains conventions used in the remainder
of this thesis.
3
Preliminaries
This thesis presents monitoring techniques to runtime detection of memory leaks and
leakage locations, and disclosure of confidential information. To simplify the presen-
tation, the techniqcal details of the monitoring approaches are given at the level of an
abstract imperative language.
This chapter describes the syntax and semantics of a simple abstract imperative
language similar to the While [141] or Imp [142] languages. This language and its
semantics are referred to as a standard model. To explain the monitoring techniques
presented in this thesis the standard model is extended with features that capture
required properties. For instance, to describe the problem of memory leaks the lan-
guage is extended with memory allocations, dereference operations and location la-
bels. Such features allow to track memory blocks allocated by a program, detect leaks
and report program locations at which leaking blocks were lost. Further, to prevent
disclosure of secret values during a run of a program the standard model is extended
with operations on pointers and assertions.
The following describes the abstract language in greater detail. Section 3.1 de-
scribes the syntax of the language. Its memory model and operational semantics are
discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this thesis respectively.
3.1 Syntax
Figure 3.1 presents the syntax of an abstract imperative language using a BNF-like
notation.
30
3.2 MEMORY SEMANTICS 31
n ::= Num
v ::= Var
e ::= n | v | e⊕ e | f(e)
c ::= skip | def(v) | v := e | if e then c1 else c2 | while e do c | c1 ; c2
f ::= Ident¬ c | f1 ; f2
P ::= f ; e
Figure 3.1: Standard Abstract Language
Expressions e consist of numerals n, variables v, binary expressions e⊕ e (where ⊕
is a binary operator) and function calls f(e). Set Expr denotes the set of all program
expressions.
Commands c (given by the set of all program commands Comm) consist of atomic
commands skip, variable definitions def(v), assignment commands (v := e), condi-
tionals (if e then c1 else c2), loops (while e do c) and sequential composition of
commands (c1 ; c2).
Functions f consist of unique function names (Ident) followed by a command (c)
or a collection of definitions (f1 ; f2). Program P is a non-empty sequence of function
definitions followed by an expression.
The following section discusses the memory semantics of the abstract language
shown in Figure 3.1.
3.2 Memory Semantics
Values and memory addresses are represented using natural numbers given by the set
N. A particular state of memory, or memory mapping, is represented by the function
m : N→ N which maps memory addresses to values; that is, m(a) evaluates to a value
to which address a ∈ N is mapped in the memory mapping m. The set of all possible
memory mappings is denoted Mem =P (N→ N), where P is a powerset operator.
Notation m¹a 7→ kº is used to denote a memory mapping that is identical to m
except for the value mapped to the address a. That is, given that m ∈ Mem is a
memory mapping, k ∈ N is a value and a ∈ N is a memory address:
m¹a 7→ kº(x) =
k, if a = xm(x), otherwise
Every variable v from the set of variables Var has a representation in the memory.
This is indicated by the semantic function ρ : Var→ N that maps variables to memory
addresses. That is, ρ(v) (where v is a variable belonging to Var) evaluates to some
memory address a ∈ N. This representation is unique; that is, for each distinct pair of
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eval(n, m) = N (n)
eval(v, m) = eval(m(ρ(v)))
eval(e1⊕ e2, m) = eval(e1, m)⊕ eval(e2, m)
eval(f(e), m) = f(eval(e, m))
Figure 3.2: Evaluation of Program Expressions
variables x , y belonging to Var their addresses are also distinct (i.e., ρ(x) 6= ρ(y)).
3.3 Operational Semantics
This section describes evaluation of expressions and the operational semantics of com-
mands of the abstract language.
3.3.1 Evaluation of Expressions
The evaluation of a program expression e ∈ Expr is given by the function eval : (Expr×
Mem) → N, where Expr is the set of all program expressions, Mem is the set of all
memory mappings and N is the set of all values. That is, the value of expression
e ∈ Expr in some memory mapping m ∈Mem is given by eval(e, m).
The rules for the evaluation of expressions of the abstract language are shown via
Figure 3.3. The evaluation of numerals n (represented by the set of numerals Num) is
given by the semantic functionN : Num→ Nwhich maps numerals to values. That is,
each numeral n ∈ Num evaluates to a value given by a natural number (i.e., N (n)).
Variables v ∈ Var are direct mappings from their addresses to values in a memory
mapping. That is, the value of a variable v in the memory mapping m is given by
function application m(ρ(v)) that returns the value that the variable v is mapped to
in the memory mapping m. Function calls f(e), which potentially result in side-effects,
evaluate to applications of the function f on the evaluated expression (i.e., eval(e, m)).
Similarly, evaluation of a binary expression e1⊕e2 is eval(e1, m)⊕eval(e2, m), i.e., the
application of a binary operator ⊕ on expressions e1 and e2 evaluated using eval.
3.3.2 Operational Semantics of Program Commands
The following discusses the operational semantics of the commands of the abstract
language.
Commands of the abstract language are given by the set of program commands
Comm. The operational semantics of the commands (see Figure 3.3) is defined as
a relation : (Comm × Mem) → (Comm × Mem) on configurations 〈c : m〉, where
c ∈ Comm is a program command and m ∈Mem is a memory mapping.
There is no rule for skip because 〈skip: m〉 is a final configuration.
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Def: 〈def(v): m〉 〈skip: m〉
Asgn: 〈v := e: m〉 〈skip: m¹ρ(v) 7→ eval(e, m)º〉
Seq1:
〈c1 : m〉 〈c′1 : m′〉
〈c1 ; c2 : m〉 〈c′1 ; c2 : m′〉
Seq2:
〈c1 : m〉 〈skip: m′〉
〈c1 ; c2 : m〉 〈c2 : m′〉
If1: 〈if e then c1 else c2 : m〉 〈c1 : m〉
(where eval(e, m) 6= 0)
If2: 〈if e then c1 else c2 : m〉 〈c2 : m〉
(where eval(e, m) = 0)
While: 〈while e do c: m〉 〈if e then (c ; while e do c) else skip: m〉
Figure 3.3: Operational Semantics of Program Commands
Variable definitions (given by Rule Def) do not change memory mapping. Assign-
ments v := e, where v is a variable in Var and e is an expression in Expr, replaces
the value mapped to the address of a variable v (given by ρ(v)) with the result of
evaluation of e, i.e., eval(e, m) (Rule Asgn).
Rules Seq1 and Seq2 gives the operational semantics of the sequential composition
of statements c1 ; c2. Rule Seq1 shows the case where evaluation of c1 is incomplete
and leads to a new command c′1. Rule Seq2 shows the case where c1 evaluates to skip
(i.e., evaluation of c1 is completed in a single step and the next step can proceed with
evaluation of c2).
Rules If1 and If2 describe the semantics of conditionals if e then c1 else c2.
Rule If1 shows the case where the expression e in the condition of the if statement
evaluates to a non-zero value (that executes c1), and Rule If2 describes the case where
e is zero and command c2 is executed. Finally, Rule While shows the semantics for
loops that is derived from the rules for evaluation of conditional statements. This rule
unfolds a single level of the loop and evaluates it as a conditional. That is, based on
the value expression e evaluates to, this either executes command c in the body of the
loop and unfolds another level or executes skip that terminates the execution of the
loop.
4
Detection of Memory Leaks and
Locations of Leakage
One of the key questions this thesis aims to address is the detection of memory leaks
and locations of leakage using overheads acceptable for use with testing. This chapter
addresses this question by describing a monitoring analysis and presenting a tunable
approach to the detection of memory leaks that reports the locations in the source
code where the leakages occur.
To enable detection of memory leaks and leakage locations at runtime, each tracked
memory block is associated with two types of locations: allocation and usage. The al-
location locations are assigned when blocks are allocated on the heap. The locations
of usage are updated every time a variable containing references to the allocated
block is accessed by a running program. This reflects the reachability of the block
via program variables and is achieved by computing the dereference of a block’s ad-
dress space. Unreachable blocks that have not been de-allocated and the associated
locations of leakage are reported at the end of execution. This computation is tun-
able. Runtime overheads can be reduced, with the cost of reporting less debugging
information without losing precision.
The proposed technique is evaluated in an empirical study that uses a prototype
implementation for C programs, called Skiff, to analyse real UNIX utilities and pro-
grams selected from the SPEC CPU datasets. Experimentation demonstrates that, for
the purpose of memory leak detection the overheads of the proposed approach are
considerably lower those of the state-of-the-art memory profiler Valgrind [14]. Detec-
tion of leakage locations leads to higher overheads; however, this functionality is not
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supported by Valgrind.
The details of the presented technique for the detection of memory leaks and
leakage locations, and the results of the empirical evaluation previously appeared in
a conference publication [143].
This chapter also demonstrates that the set of monitoring primitives used for mem-
ory leak detection is sufficient to enable runtime detection issues related to improper
use of memory. This is demonstrated via an extension for detecting illegal memory
modifications (i.e., modifications of memory locations outside of program allocation).
To detect illegal memory modifications, memory information tracked by the memory
leak detection technique is reused to check every operation that modifies memory.
The results of experimentation with this extension indicate that the overheads of this
approach to monitoring for illegal memory modifications also compare favourably
with those of Valgrind.
This chapter presents the following contributions:
• A tunable monitoring approach to memory leak detection that identifies loca-
tions of leakage.
• An extension for detecting illegal memory modifications.
• A proof-of-concept implementation of the proposed approach, called Skiff.
• An empirical evaluation that compares the results of Skiff to the results pro-
duced by a state-of-the-art memory profiler.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 discusses the syntax
and semantics of an imperative language used to describe the technique for the de-
tection of memory leaks and locations of leakage at the abstract level. This extends
the standard model discussed in Chapter 3, with memory allocation and operations
on pointers. Section 4.2 presents a technical description of the proposed approach
and Section 4.3 shows how to apply it on C programs. Section 4.4 discusses the em-
pirical results of a prototype implementation. Section 4.5 describes the extension to
the memory leak detection technique that aims to support checks for illegal memory
modifications. Finally, Section 4.6 offers concluding remarks.
4.1 Syntax and Semantics
The author presents a monitoring approach for the detection of memory leaks and
leakage locations using an abstract imperative language (see Chapter 3) extended
with dynamic memory allocation and operations on pointers. These extensions al-
low for definitions and therefore detection of memory leaks. The following section
describes the syntax, memory and operational semantics of the extensions used for
memory leak detection.
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n ::= Num
l ::= Lab
v ::= Var
e ::= n | l | v | e⊕ e | f(e) | deref(e)
c ::= skip | def(v) | c1 ; c2 | if e then c1 else c2 | while e do c |
::= 〈l : deref(v) := e〉 | 〈l : v := e〉 | 〈l : v := malloc(e)〉 | 〈l : free(e)〉
f ::= Ident¬ c | f1 ; f2
P ::= f ; e
Figure 4.1: Abstract Language Extended with Dynamic Memory Allocation
4.1.1 Syntax
Figure 4.1 presents an abstract imperative language extended with memory allocation
and operations for manipulating pointers.
Expression e consists of numerals n, variables v, program labels l, composite ex-
pressions e⊕ e (where ⊕ is a binary operator), function calls f(e) and dereferences
deref(e).
Command c consists of atomic commands (skip), variable definitions (def(v)),
conditionals (if e then c1 else c2), loops (while e do c), sequential composition of
commands (c1 ; c2), labelled assignments 〈l : v := e〉, and 〈l : deref(v) := e〉, where
label l (belonging to the set of program labels Lab) identifies the source location of
the command (e.g., a source code line number) and built-in memory allocation and
de-allocation commands 〈l : v := malloc(e)〉 and 〈l : free(e)〉, respectively.
Functions f consist of unique function names (Ident) followed by a command (c)
or a collection of definitions (f1 ; f2). Program P is a non-empty sequence of function
definitions followed by an expression.
4.1.2 Memory Semantics
This section discusses the semantics of the memory model that acts as an extension
to the standard model discussed in Section 3.2.
Let memory blocks span across multiple memory locations. A memory block is
denoted by a pair of over the set N that represents the start and end addresses of
the block. That is, a pair (a, b) ∈ N represents a memory block such that a is its start
address and b is its end address. LetB = N×N be the set of all blocks. Then, memory
allocation is a subset of such pairs. Formally, the set of all possible allocations A is
P (B) with a typical element denoted by α. A valid allocation is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Valid allocation) α ∈A is a valid allocation if and only if
1. For every (a, b) ∈ α, a ≤ b.
2. For every (a, b) and (c, d) ∈ α, if (a, b) 6= (c, d), then there is no address i ∈ N,
such that a ≤ i ≤ b and c ≤ i ≤ d.
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That is, in a valid memory allocation α ∈ A start addresses of allocated memory
blocks are not greater than their end addresses and the allocated blocks are disjoint.
Memory mapping m is the set of pairs N×N, where each pair (a, k) ∈ m, where
a, k ∈ N represents a memory address a mapped to a value k. The set of all possible
memory mappings is denoted by the set Mem =P (N×N). That is m is an element of
Mem. A valid memory mapping is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Valid memory mapping) Given a valid memory allocation α ∈A , m ∈
Mem is a valid memory mapping, if and only if for every pair (a, k) ∈ m, where a ∈ N
is a memory address mapped to a value k ∈ N, there exists a memory block (c, d) ∈ α,
such that c ≤ a ≤ d.
In other words, in a valid memory mapping m ∈ Mem every address mapped to a
value lies within an allocated block.
Store usage by the program (denoted by σ) is a set of pairs Var×N, where pair
(v, k) ∈ σ, v ∈ Var, k ∈ N represents a variable v bound to a value k. Formally, the set
of all possible store usages Store is P (Var×N), where store usage σ in a particular
state is an element of Store.
Finally, the set Lab denotes the set of all program labels. An element l ∈ Lab
denotes either a defined source location (such as a line number) or an undefined one
(denoted ⊥). Labels are used to track usage of blocks during memory allocation and
assignments. The function loc :N×N → Lab denotes usage tracking in a particular
state. For example, a label associated with a block (a, b) ∈ α, where α is a valid
allocation, is retrieved using loc(a, b). The set of all such functions is denoted Lt (for
label tracking).
4.1.3 Operational Semantics
Evaluation of Expressions
The behaviour of program expressions (given by set Expr) is defined by the function
eval(e,α, m,σ), which evaluates to a value k ∈ N, where e ∈ Expr is an expression,
α is a memory allocation, m is a memory mapping and σ is a store usage by the
program. That is, eval(e,α, m,σ) = k denotes an expression e ∈ Expr that evaluates
to a value k ∈ N, where α ∈ A is a valid allocation, m ∈ Mem is a valid memory
mapping and σ ∈ Store is a store usage by program.
The semantics of the evaluation of expressions is given in Figure 4.2. The eval-
uation of numerals is given by the semantic function N : Num → N, which maps
numerals n ∈ Num to natural numbers. The evaluation of program labels (given by
the set Lab) is defined using the semantic function L : Lab→ N that maps program
labels to values from N. That is, each label l ∈ Lab evaluates to a natural number via
L (l). Evaluation of variables is given by a store usage of a program σ ∈ Store. A
38 DETECTION OF MEMORY LEAKS AND LOCATIONS OF LEAKAGE
eval(n,α, m,σ) = N (n)
eval(l,α, m,σ) = L (l)
eval(v,α, m,σ) = k ∈ N : ∃(v, k) ∈ σ
eval(deref(e),α, m,σ) =
(
k ∈ N if ∃(a, k) ∈m∧ a = eval(e,α, m,σ)
0 otherwise
eval(e1⊕ e2,α, m,σ) = eval(e1,α, m,σ)⊕ eval(e2,α, m,σ)
eval(f(e),α, m,σ) = f(eval(e,α, m,σ))
Figure 4.2: Evaluation of Expressions
variable v ∈ Var evaluates to the value k ∈ N to which it is mapped in the store usage
by program, i.e., there exists a pair (v, k) in store σ. Evaluation of dereference expres-
sions deref(e) (where e is a program expression) is given by the memory mapping m.
An expression deref(e) evaluates to some value k that is mapped to an address given
by the result of the evaluation of e in the memory mapping m. For the case where the
address given by e does not exist in the memory mapping m, deref(e) evaluates to a
zero value. The evaluation of binary expressions and function calls is standard and
has been discussed in Section 3.3.1.
Operational Semantics of Commands
The operational semantics of the commands of the abstract language (shown in Fig-
ure 4.3) is defined as a relation on configurations: 〈c:α, m,σ, loc〉 and fault, where
c is a program command, α ∈A is a memory allocation, m ∈Mem is a memory map-
ping, σ ∈ Store is a store usage by the program and loc ∈ Lt is a function that identifies
labels associated with allocated memory blocks. fault is a special configuration that
indicates an abrupt program termination due to a runtime error.
Command 〈l : v := malloc(e)〉 (see Figure 4.3 for operational semantics, in Rule Mal-
loc) allocates a new memory block (e.g., a sequence of contiguous memory cells of
size specified by expression e) and binds the address of the first cell in the allocated
segment to a variable v. The allocated block (i.e., added to the memory allocation α)
is given by the pair of memory addresses (a, a+ eval(e,α, m,σ)), where a is a newly
generated address. The new block added to the memory allocation does not violate
the validity of the memory allocation (given in Definition 1). That is, the blocks in the
updated memory allocation α∗ remain disjoint and the end address of the new mem-
ory block is greater than its start address. Additionally, the rule for 〈l : v := malloc(e)〉
updates aliasing (indicated by the change to the store usage by program σ) such that
the value of the variable v in the store usage is updated to the start address of the
newly allocated block. That is, v is set to point to the new block in memory allocation
α. Finally, Rule Malloc associates the label l with the new block (shown via updated
label tracking function loc∗).
Command 〈l : free(e)〉 de-allocates a memory block, whose first address is given
by expression e. Figure 4.3 describes two rules for command 〈l : free(e)〉 – Free1
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Malloc: 〈〈l : v := malloc(e)〉: α, m,σ, loc〉 〈skip: α∗, m,σ∗, loc∗〉
where:
α∗ = α∪ {(a, a+ eval(e,α, m,σ))}, where a ∈ N is such that
∀x ∈ N : a≤ x ≤ a+ eval(e,α, m,σ),
@(c, d) ∈ α : c ≤ x ≤ d
σ∗ = σ \ {(w, k) | (w, k) ∈ σ∧w = v} ∪ {(v, a)}
loc∗(c, d) =
(
l if (c, d) = (a, a+ eval(e,α, m,σ))
loc(c, d) otherwise
Free1: 〈〈l : free(e)〉: α, m,σ, loc〉 〈skip: α∗, m∗,σ, loc∗〉
(∃(a, b) ∈ α : a = eval(e,α, m,σ))
α∗ = α \ {(a, b)}
m∗ = m \ {(i, k) | a ≤ i ≤ b}
loc∗(c, d) =
(
loc(c, d) if (c, d) 6= (a, b)
⊥ otherwise
Free2: 〈〈l : free(e)〉: α, m,σ, loc〉 fault (@(a, b) ∈ α : a = eval(e,α, m,σ))
VarAsgn: 〈〈l : v := e〉 :α, m,σ, loc〉 〈skip :α, m,σ∗, loc∗〉
where:
σ∗ = σ \ {(w, k) | (w, k) ∈ σ∧w = v} ∪ {(v,eval(e,α, m,σ))}
loc∗(a, b) =
(
l if (a, b) ∈ R+v (α, m,σ, v)
loc(a, b) otherwise
MemAsgn1: 〈〈l : deref(v) = e〉 :α, m,σ, loc〉 〈skip :α, m∗,σ, loc∗〉
(∃(a, k) ∈m : a = eval(v,α, m,σ))
where:
m∗ = m \ {(a, b) | (a, b) ∈m∧ a = eval(v,α, m,σ)}
∪ {eval(v,α, m,σ),eval(e,α, m,σ)}
loc∗(a, b) =
(
l if (a, b) ∈ R+v (α, m,σ, v)
loc(a, b) otherwise
MemAsgn2: 〈〈l : deref(v) = e〉 :α, m,σ, loc〉 fault (@(a, k) ∈m : a = eval(v,α, m,σ))
Figure 4.3: Operational Semantics of Program Commands
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Def: 〈def(v) :α, m,σ, loc〉 〈skip :α, m,σ∪ {(v, 0)}, loc〉
Seq1:
〈c1 :α, m,σ, loc〉 〈c′1 :α′, m′,σ′, loc′〉
〈c1 ; c2 :α, m,σ, loc〉 〈c′1 ; c2 :α′, m′,σ′, loc′〉
Seq2:
〈c1 :α, m,σ, loc〉 〈skip :α′, m′,σ′, loc′〉
〈c1 ; c2 :α, m,σ, loc〉 〈c2 :α′, m′,σ′, loc′〉
If1: 〈if e then c1 else c2 :α, m,σ, loc〉 〈c1 :α, m,σ, loc〉
(where eval(e,α, m,σ, loc) 6= 0)
If2: 〈if e then c1 else c2 :α, m,σ, loc〉 〈c2 :α, m,σ, loc〉
(where eval(e,α, m,σ, loc) = 0)
While: 〈while e do c :α, m,σ, loc〉
〈if e then (c ; while e do c) else skip :α, m,σ, loc〉
Figure 4.3: Operational Semantics of Commands (cont.)
and Free2. Rule Free1 shows the case where an expression e supplied as an input to
function free evaluates to the start address of one of the memory blocks in allocation
(indicated by the side condition in Rule Free1). For this case function call free(e) re-
moves the block whose start address is given by the result of evaluation of expression
e from memory allocation (indicated by the updated memory allocation α∗). Addi-
tionally, this removes all memory mappings belonging to the freed block from the
memory mapping m (indicated by the updated memory mapping m∗) and removes
the label associated with the freed block from label tracking (given by the updated
function loc∗). Rule Free2 describes the case where the input to the function free is
invalid, i.e., it does not correspond to the start address of an allocated memory block
(indicated by the side condition in Rule Free2). In this case the call to free leads to
abrupt program termination (indicated by the special configuration fault).
Rules VarAsgn, MemAsgn1 and MemAsgn2 in Figure 4.3 show semantics of as-
signments that update the memory and alias map. Variable assignment (given by
Rule VarAsgn) updates store usage by program σ. That is, a variable assignment
〈l : v := e〉 updates the value associated with the variable v to the value given by
the result of evaluation of expression e. Assignments via a dereference operator
〈l : deref(v) := e〉 (given by Rules MemAsgn1 and MemAsgn2) update memory map-
ping. Rule MemAsgn1 describes the case where the variable v points to a block from
memory allocation (i.e., there exists a memory mapping from the address given by
v to a value in the memory mapping m). MemAsgn1 associates a new value (given
by evaluation of e) with a memory address which value is given by the evaluation of
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variable v. Rule MemAsgn2 gives semantics for the case where dereference deref(v) is
invalid (i.e., v points to an address that is not in the memory mapping) which leads to
an abrupt program termination via the special configuration fault. Additionally, both
types of assignments update label tracking (via the updated function loc∗).
Rule Def shows the operational semantics for variable definitions def(v). This
updates store usage by the program by associating the variable with a zero value.
The semantics of the remaining commands (i.e., conditionals if e then c1 else c2,
loops while e do c and sequential composition of statements c1 ; c2) is standard (see
Section 3.3).
Memory Leak
This section formally defines memory leaks. These definitions help in capturing mem-
ory leaks and leakage locations at the level of the abstract language.
A variable v points to a memory block (a, b) if the value v is bound to lies within
(a, b). This is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Points to via variable) Given a valid memory allocation α ∈ A , valid
memory mapping m ∈ Mem, store usage by program σ ∈ Store, variable v ∈ Var
and allocated memory block (a, b) ∈ α, v is said to point to (a, b) if and only if
a ≤ eval(v,α, m,σ)≤ b.
An allocated memory block (a, b) points to another allocated block (c, d) if and
only if a memory address within (a, b) is mapped to an address that lies within (c, d).
The relation Rb in Definition 4 defines this formally.
Definition 4 (Points to via block) Given a valid memory allocation α ∈ A , valid
memory mapping m ∈ Mem, store usage by program σ ∈ Store, and allocated mem-
ory block (a, b) ∈ α, the binary relation:
Rb(α,m,σ, (a, b)) = {(c, d) | (c, d) ∈ α∧
(∃i ∈ N : a ≤ i ≤ b ∧ c ≤ eval(deref(i),α, m,σ)≤ d}
defines the set of memory blocks in α, block (a, b) points to.
Thus, in allocation α, memory mapping m and store usage σ, block (a, b) points
to block (c, d) if and only if (c, d) ∈ Rb(α, m,σ, (a, b)).
A given block bn is accessible from another block b0 if there exists a sequence of
blocks b1, · · · , bn−1 such that for all i between 0 and n− 1, bi points to bi+1. This is
formally defined by the relation R+b given in Definition 5.
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Definition 5 (Accessibility) Given a valid memory allocation α ∈ A , valid memory
mapping m ∈ Mem, store usage by program σ ∈ Store and an allocated memory block
(a, b) ∈ α, binary relation:
R+b (α, m,σ, (a, b)) = {(e, f ) |
(e, f ) ∈ Rb(α, m,σ, (a, b))∨ (∃(c, d) ∈ Rb(α, m,σ, (a, b)) :
(e, f ) ∈ R+b (α, m,σ, (c, d))}
defines the set of blocks accessible from (a, b).
Thus, for a memory allocation α, memory mapping m and store usage σ, a
memory block (c, d) ∈ α is accessible from block (a, b) ∈ α if and only if (c, d) ∈
R+b (α, m,σ, (a, b)).
A variable v ∈ Var is said to reference a memory block ((a, b) belonging to a valid
memory allocation α) if v points to (a, b), or there exists some block (c, d) ∈ α, such
that v points to (c, d) and (a, b) is accessible via (c, d). This is formally defined by the
relation R+v in Definition 6.
Definition 6 (Reference) Given a valid memory allocation α, block (a, b) ∈ α, valid
memory mapping m, store usage σ and variable v ∈ Var, binary relation
R+v (α, m,σ, v) = {(a, b) | (a, b) ∈ α : a ≤ eval(v,α, m,σ)≤ b ∨
(∃(c, d) ∈ α : c ≤ eval(v,α, m,σ)≤ d ∧ (a, b) ∈ R+b (α, m,σ, (c, d)))}
defines the set of blocks referenced by variable v.
Thus, given a memory allocation α ∈ A , memory mapping m ∈ Mem and store
usage by program σ ∈ Store, variable v ∈ Var references an allocated memory block
(a, b) ∈ α, if (a, b) ∈ R+v (α, m,σ, v).
Given the above definitions it is indicated that a block (a, b) is a memory leak
when it is not referenced by any of the program variables. Formally, the definition of
the memory leak is as follows.
Definition 7 (Memory leak) Given a valid memory allocation α ∈ A , valid memory
mapping m ∈ Mem, store usage σ ∈ Store, a memory block (a, b) ∈ α, is a memory
leak with respect to store usage by program σ, if there exists no pair (v, k) ∈ σ, v ∈ Var,
k ∈ N, such that (a, b) ∈ R+v (α, m,σ, v).
That is, block (a, b) is not referenced by program variables from the given store
usage.
In a particular state of computation (given by memory allocation α, memory map-
ping m, store usage σ, and label tracking function loc), the set of memory leaks is
given by the set of blocks not referenced by the program variables. Additionally, each
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leaking block is associated with a program label that identifies the source location of
the leakage via a label tracking function loc. Formally, the definition of memory leaks
associated with leakage locations in a particular state of computation is provided via
the following definition.
Definition 8 (Memory leaks) Given a valid memory allocation α ∈ A , valid memory
mapping m ∈Mem, store usage σ ∈ Store, and a label tracking function loc ∈ Lt, the set
of all memory leaks is given by the set:
Leaks(α, m,σ, loc) = {(a, b, l) | (a, b) ∈ α
∧ @(v, k) ∈ σ : (a, b) ∈ R+v (α, m,σ, v)∧ l = loc(a, b)}
where each triple (a, b, l), (a, b) ∈ α, l ∈ Lab identifies an allocated block (a, b) leaking
at program location l.
4.2 Memory Leak Detection
This section presents technical details of the memory leak detection technique. This
technique instruments the program P with statements that track memory allocation
and detect memory leaks at runtime. A run of the modified program P ′ reports any
memory leaks that occurred at the end of its execution.
4.2.1 Memory Tracking State
Data structure Tα is used to keep track of the memory state during the execution
of the program. A state of Tα describes the state of memory that has been tracked
during the execution of the transformed program P ′. Tα is given by a set of 4-tuples
N×N× Lab× Lab. The set of all memory tracking states is denoted Mt (for memory
tracking) and given by P (N× N× Lab× Lab), that is Tα is an element of Mt. Each
element (a, b, la, lu) ∈ Tα, a, b ∈ N, la, lu ∈ Lab represents a memory block (a, b) (where
a and b are its start and end addresses), that was allocated at a program location
given by label la. Label lu represents the last known location at which block (a, b) was
referenced via a variable. Labels la and lu are referred to as allocation and usage labels
respectively.
A memory tracking state Tα is valid if and only if Tα tracks only allocated memory
blocks and each allocated block is tracked exactly once. The notion of validity for a
memory tracking state is formalised using the following definition.
Definition 9 (Valid memory tracking state) Given a valid memory allocation α ∈A ,
a memory tracking state Tα ∈Mt is valid if and only if:
1. ∀(a, b, la, lu) ∈ Tα : (a, b) ∈ α.
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2. ∀(a, b) ∈ α,∃! (c, d, la, lu) ∈ Tα : (c, d) = (a, b).
That is, each element of a valid memory tracking state Tα tracks an allocated
memory block (given by Clause 1 of Definition 9) and Tα has a unique map for each
allocated block (given by Clause 2 of Definition 9).
4.2.2 Semantics of Monitoring Commands
This section describes the semantics of commands used to instrument an original
program (P) with functionality that enables the detection of memory leaks and their
associated leakage locations. This instrumentation yields a modified program P ′. The
monitoring commands are presented as functions that change the memory tracking
state Tα as the modified program P
′ executes. The final memory tracking state (i.e.,
the state of Tα at the point of termination of P
′) describes the detected memory leaks
and captured locations of allocation and usage.
The following discusses monitoring commands and their operational semantics.
The operational semantics of monitoring commands given by the set Commm
(Figure 4.4) is defined as a relation m on configurations: 〈cm : Tα, m,σ〉 where
cm ∈ Commm monitoring command, Tα ∈ Mt is a memory tracking state, m ∈ Mem
is a memory mapping and σ ∈ Store is a store usage by program.
record(Tα, a, b, l)
Function record (shown via Rule Record, Figure 4.4) tracks an allocated memory
block whose start and end addresses are given by arguments a and b and the source
location of the allocation is given by label l. Given a set Tα ∈ Mt and memory ad-
dress a, b ∈ N and a label l ∈ Lab a call to record adds an element (a, b, l, l) to the
memory tracking state Tα. Note, that the usage label (which describes the last known
reference to the block) is also set to l. This is because this command is designed to
record memory blocks allocated via a program command 〈l : v := malloc(e)〉 that
aliases the newly allocated memory block using variable v. Thus, the allocated block
is referenced by variable v (see Definition 6).
delete(Tα, a)
Function delete (shown via Rule Delete, Figure 4.4) represents a de-allocation of an
allocated memory block. Given a set Tα ∈ Mt and a memory address a ∈ N delete
removes an element from Tα, whose start address is a.
updateLabel(Tα, v, l, mode).
updateLabel (shown via Rules UpdateLabel1, UpdateLabel2 and UpdateLabel3 in Fig-
ure 4.4) is the main memory tracking function. The inputs to this function are a set
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Record: 〈record(Tα, a, b, l), Tα, m,σ〉m 〈skip, Tα′, m,σ〉
where Tα
′ = Tα ∪ {(a, b, l, l)}
Delete: 〈delete(Tα, a), Tα, m,σ〉m 〈skip, Tα′, m,σ〉
where Tα
′ = Tα \ {(c, d, la, lu) | (c, d, la, lu) ∈ Tα ∧ c = a}
UpdateLabel1: 〈updateLabel(Tα, v, l, mode), Tα, m,σ〉m 〈skip, Tα′, m,σ〉
(mode = 0)
where A= {(a, b) | (a, b) ∈ Tα}
R = R+v (A, m,σ, v)
Tα
′ = Tα \ {(a, b, l′a, l′u) | (a, b) ∈ R}
∪ {(a, b, la, l′) | (a, b) ∈ R∧ (a, b, la, lu) ∈ Tα ∧ l′ = l}
UpdateLabel2: 〈updateLabel(Tα, v, l, mode), Tα, m,σ〉m 〈skip, Tα′, m,σ〉
(mode > 0)
where A= {(a, b) | (a, b) ∈ Tα}
R = R+v (A, m,σ, v)
R′ = R \ {(c, d) | ∃(e, f ) ∈ R : (c, d) ∈ R+b (A, m,σ, (e, f ))∧ e− f >mode}
Tα
′ = Tα \ {(a, b, l′a, l′u) | (a, b) ∈ R′}
∪ {(a, b, la, l′) | (a, b) ∈ R′ ∧ (a, b, la, lu) ∈ Tα ∧ l′ = l}
UpdateLabel3: 〈updateLabel(Tα, v, l, mode), Tα, m,σ〉m 〈skip, Tα, m,σ〉
(mode < 0)
Report: 〈report(Tα), Tα, m,σ〉m 〈skip, Tα, m,σ〉
Figure 4.4: Operational Semantics of Monitoring Commands
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Tα ∈Mt, variable v ∈ Var, a label l ∈ Lab and a value mode ∈ N. The task of updateLa-
bel is to update the usage labels of memory blocks that participated in assignments.
For example, given an assignment command 〈l : v := e〉, where v is a variable and e
is an expression, updateLabel sets usage labels of all memory blocks referenced by v
to l. The fourth argument, mode, is used to limit the set of blocks whose usage labels
are updated. For example, update only a subset of memory blocks referenced by v.
Informally, the execution of updateLabel is as follows. Given an input variable v,
updateLabel identifies the set of memory blocks (say R) referenced by v (i.e., mem-
ory blocks that can be accessed through v). R is populated by a recursive walk that
dereferences addresses of all memory blocks in R and identifies points-to relationships
via information stored in Tα that captures memory allocation. For example, given that
v points to a memory block (a, b), which in turn points to some block (c, d), update-
Label first dereferences the value of v, then identifies block (a, b) as being pointed
to by v and then adds it to R. Further, it dereferences each value in the range [a, b]
and adds (c, d) to R (since (a, b) points to (c, d)). It then searches through the range
[c, d] and finalises the search (since block (c, d) does not point to any other blocks).
Finally, updateLabel updates usage labels of elements of the memory tracking state
Tα that correspond to blocks in R. For example, given that R contains a memory block
(a, b), then some element (a, b, l′, l′′) of Tα that tracks (a, b) is updated to (a, b, l′, l)
(where l is an input label). Note that since updateLabel recomputes usage labels
using memory allocation tracked via Tα, dangling pointers potentially introduced via
assignments or memory de-allocation do not affect the precision of label tracking.
The fourth argument of updateLabel (mode) is used to control the amount of
dereferences updateLabel function performs. This aims to reduce overheads associ-
ated with dynamically computing the points-to information. Based on the value of
mode, three different modes of computation are identified. In the full mode (where
the value of mode is 0), each block is searched for pointers by dereferencing its con-
tents. In the partial mode (where the value of mode greater than 0), the derefer-
ence is performed only for blocks of a size less than that given by the value of mode.
For instance, in the example from the previous paragraph, updateLabel dereferences
ranges [a, b] and [c, d], which correspond to memory blocks (a, b) and (c, d), regard-
less of their size. This is the behaviour of the full mode. Let some value mode ∈ N
supplied as the fourth argument to updateLabel is greater than zero (i.e., partial
mode) and is such that (b − a) < mode and (d − c) > mode. That is, the size of
block (a, b) is less than the value of mode and the size of block (c, d) is greater. Then,
updateLabel only searches through the range [a, b] but never dereferences [c, d].
Finally, in the minimal mode (where the value mode is less than zero), no derefer-
encing is performed and updateLabel immediately returns. This mode reduces the
analysis to identifying the locations of allocations generated via record.
Formally, the result of an execution of updateLabel is shown via Rules UpdateLabel1,
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UpdateLabel2 and UpdateLabel3 in Figure 4.4. Rule UpdateLabel1 shows an execution
of updateLabel in the full mode (where the value of mode is equal to zero). Set A de-
notes memory allocation (tracked via Tα) and set R denotes the set of memory blocks
referenced via a variable v (see Definition 6). Rule UpdateLabel2 shows the execu-
tion of updateLabel in the partial mode. This reduces the set R (which contains all
blocks referenced by variable v) to the set R′ such that R′ contains no memory blocks
accessible through blocks which sizes are greater than the value of mode (computed
via relation R+b given by Definition 5). Finally, Rule UpdateLabel3 shows the semantics
of an execution of updateLabel in the minimal mode. In this case, the behaviour of
this function is equivalent to skip (as no label updates, and therefore changes to the
memory tracking state are performed).
report(Tα)
Monitoring function report(Tα) (shown via Rule Report, Figure 4.4) reports memory
leaks based on the state of Tα. For each element (a, b, la, lu) belonging to Tα, the func-
tion report reports a memory block (a, b) allocated at location la and last referenced
by a variable at location lu as a memory leak. This can be shown to be consistent
with Definition 8. Note, that the invocation of report does not modify the memory
tracking state.
4.2.3 Syntactic Transformations
This section discusses transformations (see Figure 4.5) that are used to generate a
modified program P ′, such that P ′ is equipped with statements that track memory
allocations and detect memory leaks and leakage locations.
Initialisation
The first step of the transformations instruments an input program P, with a data
structure Tα to keep track of the memory state and a global variable mode (see Fig-
ure 4.5, Rule Program). mode is a user-supplied value (indicated by the statement
〈l : mode := 〈INPUT〉〉, which allows to control over the behaviour of the updateLabel
function.
Memory Allocation
Tracking of memory allocations is enabled via Rules Malloc and Free. Each statement
that allocates memory (i.e., 〈l : v := malloc(e)〉) is followed by a call to record(Tα, v, v+
e, l), where v evaluates to the start address of the allocated block, expression v+e eval-
uates to its end address and l is a block’s allocation label. record captures addresses
of allocated blocks and locations of their allocation and records them to a memory
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Def:
def(v)   def(v)
Skip:
skip   skip
If:
c1   c′1, c2   c′2
if e then c1 else c2   if e then c′1 else c′2
While:
c  c′
while e do c   while e do c′
Malloc: 〈l : v := malloc(e)〉   〈l : v := malloc(e)〉;
record(Tα, v, v + e, l);
Free: free(e)   delete(Tα, e);
free(e);
VarAsgn: 〈l : v := e〉   〈l : v := e〉;
updateLabel(Tα, v, l, mode);
MemAsgn: 〈l : deref(v) := e〉   〈l : deref(v) := e〉;
updateLabel(Tα, v, l, mode);
Function:
c  c′
f ¬ c  f ¬ c′
Program:
f˜   f˜ ′
f ; e   def(Tα);
def(mode);
〈l : mode := 〈INPUT〉〉 ;
f ′; e
report(Tα)
Figure 4.5: Syntactic Transformations
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tracking structure Tα immediately after the blocks are allocated via malloc. Rule Free
inserts calls to delete(Tα, e) before calls to free(e), which de-allocates memory. This
stops the tracking of memory blocks de-allocated by the program by deleting them
from the memory tracking structure Tα.
Label Tracking
Each assignment statement is appended with a call to the function updateLabel
(see Figure 4.5, Rules MemAsgn and VarAsgn), which tracks assignments of mem-
ory blocks referenced by variables. Calls to updateLabel update usage labels. At any
given state, a usage label associated with a block indicates a source location at which
that block was last known to be accessible via a variable.
In the present approach updateLabel is the main cause of the runtime overhead.
To reduce overheads, the behaviour of updateLabel is controlled externally via the
fourth argument of updateLabel – global variable mode. Thus the present approach
results in a tunable tool where the user can determine an acceptable level of over-
heads. The present approach supports three modes of execution: minimal, partial
and full. In the minimal (where the value of mode is less than zero), updateLabel
does not track usage labels. Thus information collected is limited to the existence of
memory leaks and the locations of their allocation. In the full mode of (where the
value of mode is 0), each block (regardless of its size) is searched for pointers. This
may result in larger overheads, however it allows for the identification of all usage
labels. In the partial mode (where the value of mode is greater than zero) only blocks
of size strictly less than mode value are traversed. This allows the overheads to be
reduced due to traversal of memory blocks of particular sizes only. For example, large
memory blocks that are considered data only and do not contain any pointers are
skipped.
Memory Leak Reporting
The final stage of the instrumentation injects a call to a reporting function before the
program exits, such that report(Tα) is the last executed statement (see Figure 4.5,
Rule Program). Thus, at the point of execution of a reporting function, no other
memory operations, such as memory allocation or de-allocation are performed.
4.2.4 Execution of Instrumented Programs
A run of an instrumented program P ′ that is not interrupted via a runtime error
(i.e., by reaching fault configuration) reports memory leaks at the end of execution.
A program run in which Tα is empty does not leak any memory. Otherwise, each
element of Tα (a, b, la, lu) is reported as the memory leak of size (b− a) allocated at
program location la and last known to be accessible through a variable at lu.
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4.3 Application on C Programs
The technical details of the approach as presented above are at the abstract level
and need to be mapped to a concrete level to be able to apply them on a realistic
programming language. This section discusses the extensions required in order to
apply this approach on C programs.
4.3.1 Memory Blocks
Due to the semantics of the C programming language, where memory blocks allocated
on stack are automatically freed, additionally to start and end addresses of memory
blocks, their allocation types (i.e., stack, heap or global) are recorded. This enables
distinguishing between memory that de-allocated dynamically (i.e., calls to functions
that de-allocate memory, such as free) or statically (i.e., by a compiler).
4.3.2 Labels
Unlike those of the abstract language, C statements are not labelled. To generate the
required information, a C program is instrumented with a stack of program locations
that keeps track of entered functions and associated program locations. At any given
moment of execution, the top element of the stack holds the location of the executed
function, line and file, while other elements indicate locations of entered functions
that lead to it.
4.3.3 Memory Tracking
At the concrete level Tα (which keeps track of the memory state of the program) is
represented as look-up table, such that each element of Tα holds information about
an allocated memory block and records a block’s start and end addresses, allocation
type and allocation and usage labels. While a lookup table can be implemented using
various abstract data types, its choice should be dictated by the search operation, as
it is executed most frequently (by updateLabel). Thus, it is imperative to be able to
search quickly through the ranges of integers that represent start and end addresses of
memory blocks, in order to identify whether a particular address (e.g., retrieved using
the & operator) belongs to a memory block stored in Tα. This is because C supports
interior pointers that do not necessarily point to the start address of a memory block.
The present approach implements Tα as a red-black binary tree that uses memory
addresses as keys (as memory addresses are unique integers). Due to the structure of
tracked memory blocks, represented as pairs of integers, where the first element of a
pair is always greater than the second, it is possible to search for an element using a
particular address by testing keys against address ranges stored in nodes, proceeding
to the left if the address is less than the stored start address, or to the right if it
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is less than the end address. Such a search strategy guarantees that an element of
Tα is found using at most log2(n) operations. An additional argument for choosing
red-black trees over, for example, AVL trees or sophisticated hash tables, is that red-
black trees incur sizeof(void*) memory overhead per node, while other data types
require more space. The rest of the operations (e.g., insert or delete) are standard.
4.3.4 Memory Allocation and De-allocation
To be able to track all allocated heap memory, alternative definitions of memory allo-
cation and de-allocation functions are provided. In addition to their usual function-
ality such functions insert or remove elements of the memory tracking structure Tα.
The present implementation relies on the feature of the GNU C library, where malloc
and similar functions are implemented as weak aliases. Thus, the original definitions
of functions such as malloc are replaced with user-defined ones. Such an approach
allows all heap memory to be recorded, including blocks allocated by library func-
tions for which no source code is available, such as strdup. Note that while this is
adequate for experimentation, such an approach may fail to record heap memory in
all cases (e.g., if memory is allocated using kernel-level functions, such as mmap2).
In production systems, a more sophisticated approach, which modifies allocation and
de-allocation functions at the kernel level, can be used.
Stack memory blocks are recorded to Tα explicitly, via inserting calls to record
immediately after definitions of local variables. The sizes of stack blocks are deter-
mined via the sizeof operator. Global variables are detected statically and the call to
record is inserted before each use. Stack memory blocks are removed from Tα when
the scopes of their definitions are reached.
4.3.5 Memory Leak Reporting
The memory leak reporting function report is scheduled for execution via a call to
atexit, which executes it before a program’s termination. report iterates over the
elements of Tα and reports heap memory in Tα (i.e., blocks that have not been de-
allocated). Note that report is executed before the actual end of a program’s scope,
which makes it possible to differentiate between still reachable blocks (e.g. through
global variables) and lost memory.
4.4 Empirical Evaluation
The present approach has been implemented in a prototype tool for C programs,
called Skiff. Skiff is built on top of the Clang [144] compiler architecture (LLVM
project [77]). This section reports the results of experimentation with the prototype
implementation of the present approach to memory leak detection.
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4.4.1 Objectives
This evaluation focuses on the value of extended memory leak reports using the full
mode of Skiff, and on performance overheads, rather than on the number of dis-
covered defects. This is because both techniques are sound and do not report false
alarms. The reliability of Valgrind has been established by various experiments over
the years. The output from Skiff has been checked to be consistent to that of Valgrind
manually.
To evaluate the efficiency of the present approach a number of experiments were
performed. These experiments involved instrumentation and dynamic analysis of
well-known UNIX utilities, such as find, grep, gzip, diff, patch, rcs, locate
and rm, and computationally intensive programs selected from the SPEC CPU [40]
datasets. The main aim during experimentation was to determine the amount of
runtime and memory overhead that the present approach incurs and how it com-
pares to the existing techniques. This section also reports the results produced by
Valgrind [10] (a state-of-the-art system for debugging and profiling programs) on
the same test subjects and compares them to the results collected using the present
approach.
4.4.2 Experiment Setup
This experimentation involved series of runs of both instrumented and original pro-
grams, and calculated overheads relative to the execution time of the original pro-
grams. To account for variance due to external factors, such as the test automation
process or system I/O, the overheads are calculated using the mean over 100 runs of
the modified and the original executables. A single measurement accounts for a run
of a test suite (for UNIX utilities) of a single run of a program (for programs selected
from SPEC).
During the experimentation with UNIX utilities the execution of test suites asso-
ciated with the programs was monitored and the overheads were calculated per test
suite execution. Runs of programs selected from SPEC CPU sets were performed using
the test data set provided by SPEC.
The runs of Valgrind for overhead calculation were performed in a similar fashion
and using the same input data.
The platform for all results reported here was an Intel Core i5-2400 3.1 GHz ma-
chine with 4GB of RAM, running Gentoo Linux.
The following section reports the results of the experimentation. The section first
outlines differences in reporting and points out the benefits of locating sources of
memory leaks. It then compares and discuss performance overheads incurred by
different modes of Skiff and Valgrind.
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==20077== 307,200 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost
==20077== at 0x402B7B8: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:270)
==20077== by 0x804A83D: loadimage (scanner.c:715)
==20077== by 0x80489C8: main (scanner.c:1153)
Figure 4.6: art: Valgrind Report
4.4.3 Memory Leak Reports
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show memory leak reports generated by Valgrind and Skiff in the
full mode. This is related to the memory leak in the art program from the SPEC
CPU2000 dataset. It can be seen that both tools report the same allocation site of the
leaked block using stack traces. Note Valgrind’s stack traces include function calls that
occur in libraries, while Skiff’s traces are limited to instrumented source code. The
full mode of Skiff also reports the source of leaked memory shown in Figure 4.7 as
Leak source. Skiff uses the available source code information to report details of the
leaks, including names of variables (e.g., superbuffer in Figure 4.7) that referenced
the leaked memory block prior to leakage. This removes ambiguity, as a single line
of code in C may contain multiple statements. This feature may be very helpful, as C
programmers take advantage of macro definitions, which often expand into complex
statements spanning across one line. Further, a single location may not be sufficient
to fix a defect, as the same memory block may be accessible via different variables
at runtime. Skiff addresses this issue by producing a trace of usage locations prior
to leakage. This feature is illustrated using the Skiff report for the CPU2000 twolf
program1 (see Figure 4.8), where in addition to the source of leakage Skiff reports
variables that referenced a memory block prior to leakage. This is shown as part of
the Access stack) in Figure 4.8. This information can aid in debugging as it means
that developers do not need to trace the memory blocks manually. The partial mode
of Skiff is aimed at reducing overheads, while still tracking usage locations. Thus, for
carefully chosen sizes of memory blocks omitted from traversal, reports of partial and
full modes match.
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 demonstrate the differences in reporting schemes between
Valgrind and the minimal mode of Skiff. These reports uses a memory leak found in
GNU locate (Findutils 4.4.2). Note, that apart from the differences in formatting, the
information produced by both tools is equivalent. However, as shown in Section 4.4.4
Skiff detects this leak using considerably less memory and runtime overhead than
Valgrind.
4.4.4 Performance Overheads
This section discusses the performance overheads of Skiff and Valgrind.
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show the differences in memory and runtime overheads pro-
duced by a Valgrind run and a Skiff run in the minimal mode. The reports produced
1This memory leak is also used by Clause and Orso [12] to illustrate their approach.
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* 307200 bytes
Allocation site: scanner.c:715
[59]: loadimage [scanner.c:1153]
[1]: main [scanner.c:1049]
****************************************************************
Leak source: scanner.c:715 [ last known alias: ’superbuffer’ ]
[59]: loadimage [scanner.c:1153]
[1]: main [scanner.c:1049]
Figure 4.7: art: Skiff Report (Full mode)
Allocation site: okmalloc.c:28
[3343]: safe_malloc [hash.c:50]
[3315]: addhash [parser.c:210]
[132]: parser [readcell.c:34]
[131]: readcell [main.c:71]
[1]: main [main.c:22]
****************************************************************
Leak source: hash.c:25 [ last known alias: ’zapptr’ ]
[10069]: delHtab [readnets.c:87]
[10039]: readnets [main.c:79]
[1]: main [main.c:22]
****************************************************************
Access stack:
Variable: ’zapptr’ at hash.c:22
Variable: ’hptr’ at hash.c:20
Variable: ’hashtab’ at hash.c:47
Variable: ’hptr’ at hash.c:51
Figure 4.8: twolf: Skiff Report (Full mode)
==11936== 128 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost
==11936== at 0x402B7B8: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:270)
==11936== by 0x80515F9: xmalloc (xmalloc.c:49)
==11936== by 0x804AAE0: search_one_database (locate.c:1106)
==11936== by 0x804BDC3: dolocate (locate.c:1884)
==11936== by 0x804BF43: main (locate.c:1940)
Figure 4.9: locate: Valgrind Report
* 128 bytes
Allocation site: xmalloc.c:49
[35]: xmalloc [locate.c:1106]
[33]: search_one_database [locate.c:1884]
[8]: dolocate [locate.c:1940]
****************************************************************
Leak source: locate.c:879 [ last known alias: ’procdata’ ]
[349]: visit_count [locate.c:375]
[191]: visit [locate.c:385]
[33]: search_one_database [locate.c:1884]
[8]: dolocate [locate.c:1940]
Figure 4.10: locate: Skiff Report (Minimal mode)
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Figure 4.11: Valgrind vs. Minimal Mode. Memory Overhead
by both tools are similar and include detected memory leaks and their allocation sites
as stack traces. Additionally, both tools report reachability of leaked memory blocks.
The Y-axis measures overhead ratio (compared to the runtime or memory consump-
tion of unmodified programs) and each point on the X-axis stands for a series of runs
of a program.
It can be seen that the runtime and memory overheads produced by Skiff are
lower than those of Valgrind. The memory overhead produced by Skiff averages to
1.15 times compared to unobserved execution with the highest spike of approximately
3 times in equake. Memory overheads of Valgrind range from 1.6 to 34 times with
the average of approximately 15 times over both sets of test subjects. The runtime
overheads exhibited by both tools compare similarly. The overheads produced by Skiff
are on average approximately 1.8 times compared to unobserved execution, while the
average runtime overhead of Valgrind is 30.8 times, ranging from 6.8 to 116 times.
Note that high spikes (e.g., 116 times in grep or 70 times in patch) can be partially
attributed to a high number of invocations of programs during test suite execution
(e.g., over 1250 runs in grep test suite), where each invocation causes Valgrind to dy-
namically instrument a program with structures used in memory monitoring. This is
different from the present approach that uses static instrumentation. Another reason
for Skiff to compare favourably to Valgrind is that it tracks memory at the block level
and store only the delta of information, including block addresses, sizes, locations
etc., whereas Valgrind monitors each byte individually. That is, Skiff’s overheads are
proportional to the number of memory blocks allocated by a program, whereas Val-
grind’s are proportional to the overall amount of memory allocated by the program.
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Figure 4.12: Valgrind vs. Minimal Mode. Runtime Overhead
Note that while results indicate that on average block-level tracking yields low over-
heads, the overheads are likely to increase if many small blocks are allocated. This is
demonstrated via the overheads of equake (3 and 9 times for memory and runtime
respectively). Finally, it should be noted that the minimal mode of Skiff monitors
only allocation and de-allocation operations, which is not computationally expensive.
Of course, this does not produce useful debugging information.
The runtime overheads in the full mode varies and increases based on the sizes
of memory blocks in a program run. This is because Skiff’s main runtime overhead
is due to computation; that is iteration through address ranges of memory blocks
and identifying pointers in assignments. Thus, the main factor that influencing Skiff’s
overheads is the size of the memory blocks traversed and the frequency of their use
(i.e., the number of statements that trigger updateLabel). Consequently, larger over-
heads for programs selected from SPEC datasets can be expected. This is because
these programs are crafted to routinely perform computationally intensive tasks (such
as archiving, compilation) on large data chunks. The results of experimentation with
the full mode of Skiff are now discussed.
Figure 4.13 compares the runtime overheads of Skiff ran in the full and mini-
mal modes with those of Valgrind on the set of UNIX utilities. It can be seen that in
the full mode, Skiff’s overheads increase, ranging from 1.3 times compared to unob-
served execution (in gzip) to almost 11 times in the rcs test suite. These overheads,
however, are still lower than the overheads produced by Valgrind. Notably, the mem-
ory overhead does not increase significantly, reaching a maximum of 1.21 times in
UNIX programs. The increased overheads account for extra stack memory used in
recursive invocations of updateLabel. Figure 4.14 illustrates the increase in memory
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Figure 4.13: UNIX Programs Runtime Overhead
overheads in the set of UNIX utilities between the minimal and full modes (over-
heads incurred by Valgrind are not shown). From Figure 4.11 it can be seen that the
overheads of Valgrind are approximately 15-30 times. Including the Valgrind’s results
in one graph would obscure the differences in performance between the two modes.
It is important to note that Skiff in the full mode does not always outperform
Valgrind – especially for programs chosen from the SPEC CPU datasets. In some
cases (e.g., ammp, gzip) Skiff’s runtime overheads are extremely high (over 1000
times). The main factor that contributes to such overheads is the size of the allocated
memory blocks. The larger the size of the memory allocated, the larger the overheads.
This behaviour is confirmed via experimentation in partial mode. When traversal of
memory blocks is limited by the size of the largest data structure (assuming that
larger blocks are data only blocks and do not contain any pointers) the overheads are
reduced (see Figure 4.15). For the sake of clarity Figure 4.15 does not show the data
associated with Valgrind. One can compare the performances of Valgrind and Skiff in
the full mode by combining the data from Figures 4.12 and 4.15. For example, the
overheads for the lbm program are reduced from 566 to only 5 times compared to
unobserved execution. The excessive overheads of these programs, which continue to
incur large overheads in the full mode, is due to the structure of some SPEC programs,
where a large amount of memory is allocated statically, regardless of the input size.
Such an allocation pattern is rarely used in production software.
Relations between the increased runtime overheads and the amount of memory
allocated by programs are illustrated in Figures 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18. In the set of
UNIX utilities (see Figure 4.16) the main purpose of the associated test suites is to
evaluate functional correctness of programs; thus the memory consumption does not
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Figure 4.15: SPEC CPU Runtime Overhead
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Figure 4.16: UNIX Programs Overhead Relative to Memory Usage
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Figure 4.18: SPEC CPU Overhead Relative to Memory Usage
exceed 4.5 megabytes. Even in the full mode, Skiff outperforms Valgrind. In the
programs selected from the SPEC CPU datasets (see Figures 4.17 and 4.18) memory
consumption is much higher. It can be seen that for programs with low memory
consumption (which is typical during the development process), the performance of
Skiff prevails over that of Valgrind, but degrades as memory consumption grows. The
presentation of these data is split because of the differences in the runtime overhead
ratios. As shown in Figure 4.17, Skiff in the minimal mode always outperforms
Valgrind. Figure 4.18 compares the overheads incurred by Skiff in the partial and full
modes. Note that memory size alone does not affect the overheads. If each allocated
block contains pointers, these pointers need to be tracked, adding to overheads, while
if the allocated blocks contain only data, they need not be tracked, reducing the
overheads. This is shown by the variance in the overheads; importantly the overheads
are not consistently high.
It is noted that abnormal cases with extreme overhead in SPEC CPU should be at-
tributed to the design pattern of SPEC programs which are aimed at performance eval-
uation. The memory consumption, however, affect only the full and partial modes.
In the minimal mode the runtime overheads incurred by Skiff are negligible (i.e., the
ratio of Skiff instrumentation to uninstrumented code is close to 1).
The present approach implemented in Skiff is mainly useful in the domain of
functional testing, where program correctness is established through runs with small
inputs. In this scenario, in addition to memory leak detection, the present technique
can provide useful information that facilitates debugging. Note that the experimen-
tation with UNIX utilities suggests that with small inputs the overheads of this ap-
proach are lower than those of conventional monitoring using Valgrind. The author’s
4.5 DETECTING ILLEGAL MEMORY MODIFICATIONS 61
approach can also be used in performance testing, where program runs are costly in
both memory consumption and runtime. Experimentation suggests that for memory
leak detection the present technique uses considerably less resources than DBI, while
still producing the same level of output, especially in the minimal or partial modes.
4.4.5 Threats to Validity
This section discusses factors that may have affected the validity of the results of
experimentation.
The first factor is the choice of programs and the input data used in experimen-
tation. Even though, experimentation with UNIX utilities used realistic programs and
representative inputs (i.e., test suites that are associated with the utilities), which
should account for exercising most of the paths, there is no evidence that applying
the present technique on different programs or using different input values will yield
similar results. Similarly, during the experiment with programs selected from SPEC
datasets, the input values provided may not be representative for the development
process. This is because SPEC concentrates on performance evaluation, rather than
on exploring various behaviours.
The second issue refers to the comparison with Valgrind. Valgrind is a memory
debugger whose core functionality goes far beyond memory leak detection. Conse-
quently, some overheads produced by Valgrind may be attributed to performing tasks
that are not relevant to memory leak detection. However, Skiff is only a proof-of-
concept implementation, while Valgrind is more robust. Thus, a better implementa-
tion of the present technique may improve the results.
Finally, as the overheads of monitored execution depend on the size of a pointer,
the results may be affected by the architecture of the operating system. For example
in a 64-bit system, where size of a pointer is twice that the size of a pointer on a 32-bit
machine, slightly higher overheads may be expected.
4.5 Detecting Illegal Memory Modifications
The previous sections instantiated a technique for monitoring memory related defects
and described an approach to the dynamic detection of memory leaks and leakage
locations. This approach tracks elements of the memory state of a running program,
including memory allocations and associated program locations (i.e., allocation and
usage labels). The nature of the tracked information (e.g., boundaries of allocated
blocks) suggests that this technique can be adapted for the detection of different
memory-related related defects, such as illegal memory dereferencing or free opera-
tions. For example, to detect illegal free errors, it is sufficient to monitor invocations
of memory de-allocation function free and check whether its inputs correspond to the
start addresses of allocated memory blocks. Similarly, to detect illegal dereferences
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errors, one can check whether dereferenced addresses lie within the boundaries of
blocks belonging to the memory allocation.
While such extensions are straightforward, it is not clear whether the performance
overheads of such an approach will continue to compare favourably to the results
of state-of-the-art techniques, such as Valgrind. This section presents an extension
aimed at detecting illegal memory modifications (i.e., modifications of memory loca-
tions outside of the memory allocation). It first describes the details of this extension
at the level of the abstract imperative language (see Figure 4.1). This section then dis-
cusses how to adapt this extension for monitoring of C programs. Finally, the section
presents the results of preliminary evaluation using computationally expensive pro-
grams selected from the SPEC CPU datasets, comparing the results of the prototype
implementation to the results of Valgrind (which implements similar checks). This
comparison shows that the present approach results in lower runtime overheads than
those of Valgrind.
4.5.1 Extension at the Abstract Level
This section describe the extension for detecting illegal memory modifications at the
level of the abstract imperative language (see Figure 4.1). Its syntax, operational
semantics and memory model are discussed in Section 4.1.
Memory Semantics
The Operational semantics of illegal memory modifications is given via Rule VarAsgn2
(see Figure 4.3), leading to a runtime error via the special configuration fault. That is,
an illegal modification of memory occurs via a memory assignment 〈l : deref(v) := e〉,
if the dereferenced address (given by the value variable v evaluates to) does not
belong to the memory allocation α.
Monitoring Commands
In order to detect memory modifications at the level of the abstract language the set of
monitoring commands Commm is extended with the command checkDereference(Tα, a, l)
to detect and report locations of such errors. Given a memory tracking state Tα ∈Mt,
address a ∈ N and a label l ∈ Lab, checkDereference performs a lookup in Tα and
returns 1 if the address a lies within one of the memory blocks tracked by Tα (which
indicates that the dereference is valid), or 0 otherwise. That is,
checkDereference(Tα, a, l) =
1 if ∃(c, d, la, lu) ∈ Tα : c ≤ a ≤ d0 otherwise
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CheckDereference: 〈checkDereference(Tα, a, l), Tα, m,σ〉m 〈skip, Tα′, m,σ〉
Figure 4.19: Operational Semantics of a checkDereference
VarAsgn: 〈l : v := e〉   〈l : v := e〉
MemAsgn: 〈l : deref(v) := e〉   checkDereference(Tα, v, loc);〈l : deref(v) := e〉;
Figure 4.20: Syntactic Transformations for Illegal Dereference Detection
Additionally, if a call to checkDereference(Tα, a, l) returns 0 (i.e., an illegal memory
modification error is detected), this function reports the location of the occurred error
using label l.
Formally, the operational semantics of checkDereference is shown in Figure 4.19.
Since this function only detects and reports invalid memory modifications, it does
not result in a change in the memory tracking state, memory allocation or memory
mapping.
Syntactic Transformations
The syntactic transformations that enable checking for illegal memory modifications
are shown in Figure 4.20. The Rule MemAsgn is used to monitor memory assign-
ments for illegal memory modifications using the checkDereference function. Every
command 〈l : deref(v) := e〉 that assigns a value (given by the result of evaluation of
expression e) to an address in the memory (given by the value bound to variable v)
is preceded by the call to checkDereference. This reports an error at location l if the
address given by the value bound to the variable v does not belong to the memory al-
location and therefore leads to an illegal memory modification. Note that since illegal
memory modifications occur only through memory assignments, no transformations
are performed for variable assignments (see Rule VarAsgn in Figure 4.20).
The rest of the transformations required to capture illegal memory modifications
are shown in Figure 4.5. Note that memory allocation tracking relies on calls insert
and delete, which update the memory tracking state Tα as the modified program
executes.
4.5.2 Application on C Programs
This section discusses issues related to capturing illegal memory modifications at the
level of the C programming language.
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At the concrete level of C the monitoring function checkDereference is used to
check program dereferences via *, -> and . operators and array subscripts. This
captures all illegal memory modifications (as a memory needs to be dereferenced
before it is written to) and additionally identifies whether accesses to memory made
by a program run are valid. That is, before an address a is dereferenced by a run of
a program, it is checked that a exists in the memory allocation. If a is determined
to lie outside of any of the allocated blocks, an illegal dereference is reported. It is
noted, that this concrete level of monitoring, does not differentiate between memory
accesses or modifications and reports errors as illegal dereferences.
The implementation of checkDereference straightforward. This function receives
a memory address a as input, checks whether a belongs to the memory allocation
by performing a lookup in the global memory tracking structure implemented as a
red-black binary tree and reports an illegal dereference error at a currently executed
source location if a does not belong to a program’s memory allocation.
Since illegal memory modifications can occur in expressions in C (e.g. *p++, where
p is a variable), dereference checking is enabled by rewriting dereference expressions
to statement expressions that check the validity of dereferences before they occur. For
example, a dereference via operator * (say *p, where p is a variable), is rewritten to
expression *({checkDereference(p); p;}). This first evaluates the validity of the
dereference of the pointer variable p and then evaluates to the value of the memory
given by the address p points to. Array subscripts are rewritten similarly. For example,
expression a[i] (where a is an array, say char a[10], and i is an integer, say int
i), rewrites to *({checkDereference(a+i); (a+i);}). This is because in C arrays
and pointers are handled similarly. Dereferences via . and -> operators on structs
and unions are checked using the offsetof operator, which evaluates to the byte
offset of a given member within a struct or union. That is, structs and unions can be
handled similarly to arrays, where an index is given by the application of offsetof.
For example, expression a->b, where a is a struct that has a member b, is rewritten
to a->({checkDereference(a + offsetof(a,b)); b;}).
The remaining elements of the technique at the concrete level of C are described
in Section 4.3.
4.5.3 Experimentation Results
This section presents the results of experimentation with the prototype implementa-
tion of the technique for detecting illegal memory modifications and accesses.
To evaluate the overheads the present approach memory modifications and ac-
cesses were checked in the runs of computationally intensive programs selected from
SPEC CPU datasets. Programs selected from SPEC, inputs and experimental setup is
consistent with the experimentation with memory leaks described in Section 4.4.
The main aim of the experimentation was to determine the amount of runtime
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Figure 4.21: Valgrind vs. Skiff. Runtime Overhead
overhead this extension would produce and how it compares Valgrind that imple-
ments similar checks. In other words, the goal is identify whether the present ap-
proach applied to a different problem continues to result in lower overheads than
those of Valgrind. Memory overheads are not investigated; The memory overheads
of Valgrind were discussed in Section 4.4. Memory overheads of the prototype are
similar to the overheads for memory leak detection. This is because same information
as for memory leak detection in the minimal mode is tracked.
This section report the results of Skiff extended to detect illegal memory modifica-
tions and accesses using computationally intensive programs from the SPEC datasets,
and compares them to those of Valgrind using the same set of test subjects. It is noted
that the results presented in this section are preliminary and have not appeared in
published work.
The results of the experimentation are shown in Figure 4.21. The results indicate
that the present approach applied to a different problem continues to result in con-
siderably lower runtime overheads than Valgrind’s. The runtime overheads of Skiff
range from 1.05 times in specrand to approximately 17 times compared to unob-
served execution in h264ref program from SPEC CPU 2006 dataset. On average, for
the programs from SPEC datasets the Skiff overheads are approximately 8.6 times
the unobserved execution. The overheads of Valgrind are higher, averaging approxi-
mately 24.5 times, with a minimum of 3.7 times and a maximum of 61 times. Note
that same as in the experimentation with memory leaks, Skiff does not always out-
perform Valgrind. For example, on the crafty program from SPEC CPU 2000 the
overheads of Skiff are approximately 5.8 times compared to unobserved execution,
whereas Valgrind incurs the overheads of approximately 3.7 times.
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The Skiff’s overheads can be attributed to the number of invocations of check-
Dereference executed for every dereference, array application and struct access. That
is, Skiff’s overheads are proportional to the number of dereferences in a run of a
program. Another factor that contributes to the overheads of Skiff is the number
of allocated and de-allocated memory blocks (which includes variable definitions).
This is because to detect illegal dereferences Skiff needs to track memory allocation.
That is, this extension additionally implements the minimal mode for memory leak
detection (since each allocated block is recorded along with the location of its alloca-
tion). However, the results of experimentation with the minimal mode (Figure 4.12)
indicate that the runtime overheads of Skiff for the case where only locations of al-
locations are recorded average to 1.8 times the unobserved execution. Therefore,
for this analysis, the number of invocations of checkDereference (i.e., number of
lookups performed in the data structure that captures memory allocation) is the main
contributing factor for the incurred overhead.
Threats to Validity
Threats to the validity of the results of this experimentation are similar to those fac-
tors discussed in Section 4.4.5, and include the choice of the programs and the input
data. Another important factor, is that in addition to memory leak detection and
dereference checking Valgrind implements checks for uninitialised values. However,
Skiff checks the validity of dereferences on the stack and on the heap, while Valgrind
checks read and write accesses for heap blocks only. Finally, a different implemen-
tation of checkDereference may yield different results. For example, the current
implementation uses a red-black tree to store memory allocation. An approach that
uses shadow memory is likely to result in lower overheads for lookups, but also to
require more memory to track allocation.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presented a tunable monitoring technique for detecting memory leaks
and locations of leakage. The technique uses source-to-source transformations to in-
strument an input program with statements to monitor its memory state and report
leaks before the modified program terminates. One of the main benefits of this ap-
proach is the ability to locate the sources of where memory was lost. Additionally,
the proposed approach provides tuned monitoring via different modes of execution
enabled at runtime. In full mode extra information of leakage locations is produced
for the cost of larger overheads. Minimal mode reduces overheads using a conven-
tional reporting scheme that outputs only allocation sites, while partial mode reduces
overheads by tracking the leakage locations of memory blocks of specified sizes only.
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This chapter also showed that the monitoring primitives required to detect mem-
ory leaks and associated leakage locations are sufficient to enable detection of other
types of issues. This has been demonstrated by an extension designed to detect illegal
modifications of memory.
The technique discussed in this chapter has been implemented in a research pro-
totype for monitoring of C programs called Skiff. The approach was evaluated using
experimentation that monitored real UNIX utilities and computationally expensive
programs from SPEC CPU datasets, and compared the results of Skiff with those of
the memory debugger Valgrind. The results show that for the problem of memory
leak detection (where only locations of allocations of leaked memory were tracked)
Skiff outperforms Valgrind. This suggests that Skiff may be used as a replacement
for binary instrumentation tools, producing similar results with considerably fewer
system resources.
Experimentation with full mode (which enables detection of locations of leakage)
show that the overheads of Skiff directly depend on the amount of memory allocated
by programs, and they increase as memory consumption grows. For monitoring of
UNIX utilities Skiff performed better than Valgrind mainly due to relatively small al-
located blocks. However, Skiff performed considerably worse on programs selected
from the SPEC datasets, which focus on performance evaluation and thus use large
inputs. Further, the experimentation demonstrated the applicability of overhead tun-
ing using partial mode, where in some cases large overheads of SPEC programs were
reduced by not tracking large data blocks for leakage. At present, it can be suggested
that for the detection of leakage, the proposed approach is mainly useful in the do-
main of functional testing, where correctness is determined using runs with small
inputs.
This chapter also presented preliminary results of evaluation with the extension
that enables detection of illegal memory modifications. For this experimentation runs
of computationally expensive programs selected from the C SPEC CPU datasets were
used and the Skiff’s results were compared to the results of Valgrind, which imple-
ments similar checks. This experimentation indicates that the runtime overheads of
Skiff are considerably lower than those of Valgrind. The results for memory overheads
are consistent with those for memory leak detection.
5
A Value Tracking Approach to
Information Flow Security
This chapter investigates the runtime detection of issues related to leakage of con-
fidential information used by a program. Similarly to the previous chapter, which
focuses on the detection of memory leaks, the aim of this investigation is to develop
precise monitoring techniques with overheads acceptable for use with testing.
This chapter describes a monitoring approach to the detection of information leak-
age via assignment of secret values to unsafe program locations (e.g., publicly visible
variables). It is shown that this approach detects such issues as password disclosure
and a number CWE [145] vulnerabilities related to handling of sensitive data. The
results of the empirical evaluation with the prototype implementation for C programs
indicate that the overheads for detecting of password disclosure in real software does
not exceed 1%. The overheads associated with the detection of CWE vulnerabilities
are still acceptable for use with testing, but incur higher overheads.
Some of the elements of the approach to information leakage and the initial results
of the empirical evaluation of password flow presented in this chapter previously
appeared in a conference publication [146]. An extended version of this paper, which
includes the results of the experiments with CWE vulnerabilities, is currently being
considered for publication in the Information and Software Technology Journal.
The suggested technique analyses program values and has the ability to identify
whether a disclosed value represents an information leak with respect to the values
considered secret at runtime. This differs from the majority of the existing techniques,
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which analyse programs with respect to its variables and track security labels or prop-
agate taint marks. Tracking only a handful of values whose disclosure constitutes
information leakage reduces the overheads associated with tracking.
This approach assumes that statements that generate secret data are identified us-
ing manual annotations to the program; that is, the program locations of assignments
that transfer secret values to program variables are marked. An input program P is
instrumented (via a series of source-to-source transformations) with statements that
track secret values and safe locations, and assertions that check the safety of assign-
ments with respect to the tracked values. This generates a modified program P ′. A
run of P ′ observes the execution of the original program P by detecting information
leakage via assignment of secret values to unsafe locations. A program run that has
no detected assertion failures does not leak the secret values captured at runtime via
the annotated assignments.
The proposed approach is supported by a prototype implementation for C pro-
grams that is used to conduct various experiments. The results of initial experimen-
tation show that this approach can be used to address narrow yet practical problems,
such as preventing leakage of passwords. Monitoring the safety of password flow in
a number of security-oriented UNIX utilities indicates that this dynamic analysis of
secret values results in low overhead of 1%, while still soundly identifying informa-
tion leakage in real security software. Further experimentation demonstrates that this
technique is a good fit for analysing programs for security vulnerabilities related to in-
formation leakage stressed by security-oriented communities, such as the Community
Developed Dictionary of Software Weakness Types [145].
This chapter also reports on experiments using a number of computationally ex-
pensive programs from the SPEC datasets. This addresses issues related to informa-
tion leaks via the de-allocated but not cleared out memory, improper handling of sen-
sitive data (e.g., plain-text storage or hard-coding of passwords), exposure of sensitive
information through standard output channels and information leaks via temporary
files and file handles. The results show that the author’s approach handles complex
programs, such as gcc, while still yielding acceptable overheads. Finally, the same
properties are used to analyse popular security-oriented software such as openssh
and ccrypt; this analysis shows that overheads incurred by the author’s approach
remain low.
This chapter offers the following contributions:
• A value-tracking approach to detecting information leakage due to disclosure of
secret values used by a run of a program.
• A proof-of-concept implementation of the present approach for C programs.
• An empirical evaluation that concentrates on overheads incurred by the moni-
tored execution.
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v ::= x | ptr v
e ::= n | v | e⊕ e | f(e) | addressof(v)
c ::= skip | def(v) | v := e | 〈v := e〉 | assert(e) |
::= if e then c1 else c2 | while e do c | c1 ; c2
f ::= Ident¬ c | f1 ; f2
P ::= f ; e
Figure 5.1: Abstract Language
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 presents exten-
sions to the standard model, first presented in Chapter 3. These extensions capture
the semantics of information leaks and are further used to describe the present ap-
proach at an abstract level in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 discusses how to apply the pro-
posed approach on C programs and Section 5.4 presents the results of the empirical
evaluation using the prototype implementation for C programs. Finally, Section 5.5
offers concluding remarks.
5.1 Syntax and Semantics
This chapter present a monitoring approach to the detection of information leakage
using an abstract imperative language (Chapter 3) extended with operations on point-
ers, assertions and source code annotations. These extensions allow for the definition
and therefore detection of the disclosure of sensitive information at runtime. This sec-
tion describes the syntax, memory and operational semantics of the extensions used
for information leak detection.
5.1.1 Syntax
Figure 5.1 presents an abstract imperative language extended with operations on
pointers, assertions and source code annotations. The following outlines the syntactic
extensions to the standard model (see Figure 3.1) that help to capture information
leaks.
Variables v (given by the set Var) are partitioned into variables that hold primitive
values (indicated by x) and variable references (ptr v), where ptr is a syntactic type
annotation. The set of program expressions Expr is extended with the addressof
operator on program variables. The set of program commands (Comm) is extended
with annotated assignments (〈v := e〉) and assertions assert(e). The rest of the
elements of the language are standard and have been discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
Before discussing these extensions, it is useful to describe elements of the memory
model for information leak detection.
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5.1.2 Memory Semantics
The memory semantics of the extension is consistent with that of the standard model.
Accordingly, values and memory addresses are given by the set of natural numbers N.
Memory mapping in a particular state is represented by the function m : N→ N, which
maps memory addresses to values, and function ρ : Var→ N represents variables in
the memory. Discussion on the memory semantics of the standard model is given in
Section 3.2.
The following discusses extensions to the memory semantics of the standard model
that allow for the representation of information leaks.
In a particular state of computation, a set of secret values (i.e., values that need
to be protected against disclosure) is given by the set of values Sv, such that Sv is an
element of P (N). The set of values Sa ∈ P (N) is used to represent the set of safe
memory addresses in a particular state. A safe memory address represents a memory
location that cannot be observed by an adversary; that is, during a run of a program,
a value mapped to a safe address is never disclosed to a third party. Unsafe addresses,
therefore, represent publicly observable memory locations. It is assumed that in a
program run any location is publicly observable, unless it is given by a safe address.
Accordingly, any value mapped to an unsafe address (i.e., that does not to Sa) can be
viewed by an attacker. Further, it is said that a memory location is safe if it cannot
be observed by a third party (i.e., it is represented by a safe address) and unsafe
otherwise.
5.1.3 Operational Semantics
This section describes evaluation of expressions and the operational semantics of the
commands of the imperative language used to describe the present approach (see
Figure 5.1).
Evaluation of Expressions
Similar to the standard model, the evaluation of a program expression e ∈ Expr is
given by function eval : (Expr×Mem) → N where m ∈ Mem is a memory mapping.
The evaluation of core expressions is shown in Figure 5.2.
The functions l-value and r-value are used to distinguish between l-values and
r-values of variables respectively. Given some variable v ∈ Var, function l-value =
Var×Mem → N returns a memory location (i.e., an address) associated with v and
function r-value = Var × Mem → N returns the value to which variable v evalu-
ates in the memory. For a primitive variable x, l-value returns its memory address:
that is, l-value(x, m) = ρ(x), where m is a memory mapping. For a variable refer-
ence ptr v, l-value returns the address of the memory location that v references, i.e.,
l-value(ptr v, m) = r-value(v, m). Evaluation of variables in the memory is given via
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l-value(x, m) = ρ(x)
l-value(ptr v, m) = r-value(v, m)
r-value(v, m) = m(l-value(v, m))
eval(v, m) = r-value(v, m)
eval(addressof(v), m) = l-value(v, m)
Figure 5.2: Evaluation of Program Expressions
r-value, such that r-value(v, m) = m(l-value(v, m)). That is, a primitive variable x eval-
uates to the value to which its address is mapped in the memory: m(ρ(x)). A variable
reference ptr v evaluates to the value mapped to the address of the memory block
it references: m(m(ρ(v))). The evaluation of variables in a program is thus defined
via r-value, and the evaluation of expression addressof(v), where addressof is an
operator that identifies memory locations and v is a variable, is given by l-value.
Evaluation of numerals, binary expressions and function calls is standard (see
Section 3.3.1).
Operational Semantics of Commands
The operational semantics of commands of the abstract language is shown in Fig-
ure 5.3 and defined as a relation  on configurations: 〈c: m, Sa, Sv〉 and abort, where
c ∈ Comm is a program command, m ∈ Mem is a memory mapping, Sa ∈ P (N) is a
set of safe addresses and Sv ∈ P (N) is a set of secret values. abort is a special config-
uration that leads to an abrupt program termination. Configuration 〈skip : m, Sa, Sv〉
is final.
The operational semantics of assignments (given via Rule Asgn, Figure 5.1.4) is
similar to the standard model (see Section 3.3.2, Chapter 3). That is, assignments
v := e, where v is a variable in Var and e is an expression in Expr replace the value
mapped to the address of a variable v (given via l-value(v, m) where m is a memory
mapping) with the result of evaluation of expression e (i.e., eval(e, m)).
Annotated assignments 〈v := e〉 (see Figure 5.1.4, Rule Annotated) represent the
assignment of secret values to safe locations. That is, an annotated assignment 〈v := e〉
transfers a secret value (given via the expression e) to a safe location given by the
address of variable v (shown via the updated sets of secret values and safe locations
Sa
∗ and Sv∗). Further, since construct 〈c〉 (where c is a command) is only a syntactic
annotation, command 〈v := e〉 executes assignment v := e.
The operational semantics of assertions is given via Rules Assert1 and Assert2.
assert(e) (where e is an expression that evaluates to a zero value) results in an abrupt
program termination (i.e., executes the special configuration abort, Rule Assert1).
For the case when e evaluates to a non-zero value (indicated via the side condition
eval(e, m) 6= 0 in Rule Assert2) assert(e) is equivalent to skip.
Operational semantics of the remaining commands, variable definitions def(v)
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Def: 〈def(v): m, Sa, Sv〉 〈skip: m, Sa, Sv〉
Asgn: 〈v := e: m, Sa, Sv〉 〈skip: m¹l-value(v, m) 7→ eval(e, m)º, Sa, Sv〉
Annotated: 〈〈v := e〉: m, Sa, Sv〉 〈v := e: m, Sa∗, Sv∗〉
where:
Sa
∗ = Sa ∪ l-value(v, m)
Sv
∗ = Sv ∪ eval(e, m)
Assert1: 〈assert(e): m, Sa, Sv〉 abort
(eval(e, m) = 0)
Assert2: 〈assert(e): m, Sa, Sv〉 〈skip: m, Sa, Sv〉
(eval(e, m) 6= 0)
Seq1:
〈c1 : m, Sa, Sv〉 〈c′1 : m′, Sa′, Sv′〉
〈c1 ; c2 : m, Sa, Sv〉 〈c′1 ; c2 : m′, Sa′, Sv′〉
Seq2:
〈c1 : m, Sa, Sv〉 〈skip: m′, Sa′, Sv′〉
〈c1 ; c2 : m, Sa, Sv〉 〈c2 : m′, Sa′, Sv′〉
If1: 〈if e then c1 else c2 : m, Sa, Sv〉 〈c1 : m, Sa, Sv〉
(where eval(e, m) 6= 0)
If2: 〈if e then c1 else c2 : m, Sa, Sv〉 〈c2 : m, Sa, Sv〉
(where eval(e, m) = 0)
While: 〈while e do c: m, Sa, Sv〉 〈if e then (c ; while e do c) else skip: m, Sa, Sv〉
Figure 5.3: Operational Semantics of Program Commands
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(Rule Def), conditionals if e then c1 else c2 (Rules If1 and If2), loops while e do c
(Rule While) and sequential compositions of commands c1 ; c2 (Rules Seq1 and Seq2)
are standard and have been discussed in detail in Section 3.3.2.
5.1.4 Information Leak
The following provides a definition of an information leak.
Informally, an information leak occurs when a secret value or a value that is ‘close
enough’ to one of the secret values in a program run is assigned to an unsafe location.
For instance, a value k that needs to be protected against disclosure, or values that
are similar, but not identical to k, become publicly observable. The exact definition
of ‘close enough’, which denotes similar but not identical values, can be customised,
but for any given implementation it is fixed. For the purpose of this abstract presenta-
tion it is assumed that this measure of similarity between values is given by function
isSimilar : N×N→ N that takes two values and returns a non-zero value if the input
values are ‘close enough’ and zero otherwise.
The following provides a formal definition an information leak occurring at run-
time.
Definition 10 (Information leak) Let Sa ∈ P (N) be the set of values that represent
addresses of safe locations, Sv ∈ P (N) be the set of secret values, c, c′ ∈ Comm be program
commands, m ∈ Mem is a memory mapping and k, a ∈ N be values. The following
property defines an information leak that occurs as a result of the execution of the
command c in the memory mapping m with respect to the set of addresses of safe locations
Sa and the set of secret values Sv:
Leak(c, m, Sa, Sv) ⇐⇒ 〈c, m〉m 〈c′, m¹a 7→ kº〉∧a /∈ Sa∧∃x ∈ Sv : isSimilar(k, x) 6= 0
That is, there exists a transition 〈c, m〉m 〈c′, m¹a 7→ kº〉 in the program that as-
sociates a memory address given by the value a to the value k in the memory mapping
m¹a 7→ kº. Since assignment is the only command that modifies the memory map-
ping of the program, this transition is the result of the execution of some assignment
v := e, such that the address of the variable v is given by the value a and k is the result
of evaluation of expression e in the memory mapping m. That is, the execution of the
assignment v := e results in an information leak (denoted as Leak(c, m, Sa, Sv)) if and
only if a represents an unsafe location (i.e., does not belong to the set of addresses
of safe locations given by Sa) and the value k is ‘close enough’ to one of the secret
values from Sv. The latter is determined by the function isSimilar, which compares
two input values and returns a non-zero value if the input values are determined to
be ‘close enough’.
Using this formal definition of an information leak, the following section describe
details of the present monitoring approach to information leak detection.
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5.2 Information Leak Detection
The present analysis makes source-to-source transformations on an input program
P containing annotated assignments that mark the assignment of secret values (i.e.,
values that need to be protected against disclosure) to safe memory locations that are
not publicly observable. These transformations yield a modified program P ′. A run of
P ′ tracks the secret values and addresses of safe locations and prevents disclosure of
secret values by aborting the execution if an information leak is detected.
This section describes the details of runtime information leak detection. It first
describes the elements of a monitoring state (i.e., data that needs to be tracked to
detect information leaks). This section then discusses the semantics of monitoring
commands and presents the set of transformation rules used to derive the instru-
mented programs. Finally, it describes how the execution of the modified programs
prevents information leaks at runtime.
5.2.1 Monitoring State
To keep track of the data required to capture information leaks during the execution
of a modified program P ′, collections of values Hval and Hvar are used. Hvar represents
a collection that tracks addresses of safe locations and Hval represents a collection
of secret values that should be protected against disclosure. Formally, Hvar and Hval
are given by sets of values, that is Hvar, Hval ∈ P (N). Further, a monitoring state
of a modified program is represented by a pair of sets (Hvar, Hval), where Hvar tracks
addresses of safe locations and Hval captures secret values.
5.2.2 Semantics of Monitoring Commands
This section describes semantics of commands used to instrument an original program
(say P) with functionality that enables information leak detection.
The operational semantics of monitoring commands (shown via Figure 5.4) is de-
fined as a relation m: (Commm ×P (N)×P (N)) → (Commm ×P (N)×P (N)) on
configurations 〈cm : Hvar, Hval〉 and abort, where cm is a monitoring command belong-
ing to the set of monitoring commands Commm, Hvar ∈ P (N) represents the set of
tracked safe addresses and Hval ∈ P (N) represents the set of tracked secret values.
Configuration 〈skip : Hvar, Hval〉 is final. abort denotes a special configuration that
leads to an immediate program termination.
In the following, the operational semantics of monitoring commands are dis-
cussed.
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HvarDef: 〈def(Hvar): Hvar, Hval〉m 〈skip: ;, Hval〉
HvalDef: 〈def(Hval): Hvar, Hval〉m 〈skip: Hvar,;〉
HvarAdd: 〈insert(Hvar, a): Hvar, Hval〉m 〈skip: Hvar ∪ {a}, Hval〉
HvalAdd: 〈insert(Hval, k): Hvar, Hval〉m 〈skip: Hvar, Hval ∪ {k}〉
SecAssert1: 〈assert(exists(a, Hvar) ‖ foundIn(e, Hval) = 0): Hvar, Hval〉m 〈skip: Hvar, Hval〉
(a ∈ Hvar)
SecAssert2: 〈assert(exists(a, Hvar) ‖ foundIn(k, Hval) = 0): Hvar, Hval〉m 〈skip: Hvar, Hval〉
(a /∈ Hvar ∧∀t ∈ Hval : isSimilar(t, k) = 0)
SecAssert3: 〈assert(exists(a, Hvar) ‖ foundIn(k, Hval) = 0): Hvar, Hval〉m abort
(a /∈ Hvar ∧ ∃t ∈ Hval : isSimilar(t, k) 6= 0)
Figure 5.4: Operational Semantics of Monitoring Commands
Initialisation
Command def(Hvar) (see Figure 5.4, Rule HvarDef) initialises the set of tracked ad-
dresses of safe locations to an empty set indicated by the configuration 〈skip: ;, Hval〉.
The set Hval, which tracks secret values is similarly initialised via command def(Hval)
(Rule HvalDef).
Safe Locations and Secret Values
Rule HvarAdd (Figure 5.4) shows semantics for monitoring command insert(Hvar, a),
used to record an address of a secret location (a) to the collection Hvar that tracks
addresses of safe locations. The update of the monitoring state is given by (Hvar ∪
{a}, Hval). Secret values are similarly recorded to Hval (Rule HvalAdd).
Security Assertions
To detect information leakage at runtime, assignments in the original program are
instrumented with security assertions. Security assertions abort the execution of a
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program if leakage via assignment of a secret value to an unsafe memory location
is detected. This prevents information leaks before they occur. Operational seman-
tics of a security assertion is shown in Rules SecAssert1, SecAssert2 and SecAssert3
(Figure 5.4). The following discusses how security assertions capture and prevent
information leaks at runtime.
By Definition 10 assignment v := e (where v is a variable and e is an expression)
leaks sensitive information if a secret value (or a value that is ‘close enough’ to a secret
value) is assigned to an unsafe location. Let set Hvar store addresses of safe locations
and set Hval represent the set of secret values. Let a and k be values, such that a
represents the address of a variable v and k is the result of evaluation of expression e.
Then, assignment v := e leaks secret information if a is not captured by Hvar and there
exists a secret value in Hval (say t) that is ‘close enough’ to k. That is, if isSimilar(t, k)
(where value k denotes the result of evaluation of e) returns a non-zero value.
Syntactically, a security assertion is given by command
assert(exists(a, Hvar) ‖ foundIn(k, Hval) = 0) (5.1)
Let symbol ‖ denotes logical disjunction. Function call exists(a, Hvar) evaluates to
a non-zero value if value a is stored in the set Hvar of addresses of safe locations and to
a zero value otherwise. Monitoring expression foundIn(k, Hval) determines whether
the value k is ‘close enough’ to one of the secret values tracked by the collection of
secret values Hval. A call to foundIn(k, Hval) returns 0 if no values ‘close enough’ to
k exist in Hval and a non-zero value otherwise. The similarity between two values is
given by the function isSimilar, which returns 1 if input values are ‘close enough’ and
0 otherwise. That is, an expression foundIn(k, Hval) = 0 that evaluates to a non-zero
value indicates that there exist no secret values in Hval that are ‘close enough’ to the
input value k and to zero otherwise.
The execution of a security assertion (see Figure 5.4, Rules SecAssert1, SecAssert2
and SecAssert3) that evaluates the safety of some assignment v := e (where v is a
variable which address is given by value a, and e is an expression that evaluates to
value k) is as follows. The security assertion first checks whether the address of a
variable v (given by value a) belongs to the set of safe locations tracked in Hvar (in-
dicated by exists(a, Hvar)). exists(a, Hvar) that evaluates to a zero value (i.e., a is an
element of Hvar) indicates that v represents a safe location and thus the assignment is
safe (by Definition 10). In this case the behaviour of the security assertion is equiv-
alent to skip (Rule SecAssert1), which allows the program to continue execution. If
exists(a, Hvar) evaluates to zero (which indicates that a memory location given by v is
not a safe location), expression foundIn(k, Hval) = 0 is evaluated. This checks whether
the value k given by expression e is ‘close enough’ to one of the secret values tracked via
Hvar. foundIn(k, Hval) that evaluates to a non-zero value indicates that the application
foundIn returned 0, thus no similarities between the input value and the set of secret
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Def:
def(v)  def(v)
Skip:
skip  skip
Annotated: 〈v := e〉   v := e;
insert(Hvar,addressof(v))
insert(Hval,v)
Asgn:
v := e   def(temp);
temp := e;
assert(exists(addressof(v), Hvar) ‖ foundIn(temp, Hval) = 0);
v := temp
If:
c1   c′1, c2   c′2
if e then c1 else c2   if e then c′1 else c′2
Seq:
c1   c′1, c2   c′2
c1 ; c2   c′1 ; c′2
While:
c  c′
while e do c  while e do c′
Function:
c  c′
f ¬ c  f ¬ c′
Program:
f˜   f˜ ′
f ; e   def(Hvar);
def(Hval);
f ′; e
Figure 5.5: Transformation Rules
values were identified and therefore the assignment is safe (see Rule SecAssert2). Oth-
erwise, (i.e., foundIn(k, Hval) evaluates to a non-zero value) the information leak is
detected (because value that is ‘close enough’ to one of the secret values is transferred
to an unsafe location) and the program aborts (see Rule SecAssert3).
5.2.3 Transformation Rules
This section describes the set of compositional transformation rules that instrument an
original program with statements that capture secret values at runtime and assertions
that verify the safety of the program’s assignments with respect to the captured sets
of addresses of safe locations and secret values. Figure 5.5 shows the full set of
transformation rules applied on an input program P. This yields a modified program
P ′ equipped with statements that prevent information leakage by assignment of secret
values to unsafe locations. The transformation steps are now discussed in greater
detail.
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Initialisation
The first step instruments an original program with collections of values Hvar and Hval
(see Figure 5.5, Rule Program). At runtime, Hvar will hold memory addresses of safe
locations and Hval will hold the secret values for a particular run.
Capturing Safe Locations and Secret Values
The second step in instrumentation inserts commands that record secret values and
safe locations to Hval and Hvar respectively. This is done for every annotated assign-
ment in the input program (see Figure 5.5, Rule Annotated).
To record safe addresses, commands that retrieve addresses of memory locations
(via the application of the addressof operator on a variable assigned a secret value)
are inserted immediately after the annotated assignments. These addresses are then
added to the collection Hvar that tracks safe memory locations. This action indicated
by the monitoring command insert(Hvar,addressof(v)) in Rule Annotated, where v is
a variable assigned a secret value. This is followed by the command that records the
secret value (assigned to the safe location) to the collection Hval. This is given by the
command insert(Hval, v), which appends the collection of secret values Hval with the
value bound to variable v (Rule Annotated).
Enforcing Safety of Assignments
Finally, the program is instrumented with security assertions that enforce safety of
non-annotated assignments (Rule Asgn). Each such assignment is considered po-
tentially unsafe, as it may transfer a secret value to an unsafe location, resulting in
leakage. For each non-annotated assignment v := e (where v is a variable and e is an
expression), first a temporary variable temp is introduced. The result of evaluation
of e is stored in temp; this is to avoid evaluating e twice (since program expressions
include function calls execution of e can result in a side effect). A security assertion
that verifies the safety of the assignment with respect to Hvar and Hval is then inserted.
The assignment is safe if the location being assigned a value (i.e., addressof(v)) is
recorded in Hvar, or if the value assigned to an unsafe location (stored in temp) is
not found in the collection Hval of secret values recorded for a program run. A de-
tailed discussion on how security assertions verify the safety of assignments is given
in Section 5.2.2.
Note that since the aim is to prevent information leakage, the assignment is
checked for leakage before it is allowed to proceed with transferring the result of
evaluation of e (stored in the temporary variable temp) to v. In this way, the fail-
ing assertion prevents leakage by aborting the run of a program before the unsafe
assignment is executed.
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5.2.4 Execution of Instrumented Programs
At runtime, security assertions added to the original program P check the safety of its
assignments. A failure of a security assertion is indicative of a prevented information
leak. On execution, Hvar and Hval are initialised to empty collections. As execution
proceeds, values and addresses for annotated assignments are added to Hvar and Hval
respectively. Non-annotated assignments are evaluated with respect to data stored
in Hvar and Hval. If an unsafe location is being assigned a value, P
′ invokes a security
assertion that aborts the execution if a secret value is transferred to an unsafe location.
A program run that has no detected failures does not leak any secret information via
assignments.
5.3 Application to C Programs
The transformation rules in Figure 5.5 are defined for the abstract language, and
need to be mapped to a concrete level to apply to a real programming language.
Further, implementations need to be provided of the isSimilar and foundIn functions,
operators addressof and collections Hvar and Hval. Note that this means that isSimilar
and foundIn can be tailored to suit specific safety requirements. This section discusses
how to adapt the present approach for C programs.
Program Annotation
To record secret values for a program run, assignments that transfer secret values
to safe locations are annotated at the source level of the C programming language.
These annotations are merely serve to instruct the instrumentation engine on the
locations of secret values. The programs are annotated by a developer or an ana-
lyst, who manually marks assignments that transfer secret data to safe locations. An
alternative way of introducing annotations is by marking functions. For example,
the C standard library provides functionality to fetch passwords (e.g., getpass), en-
crypt data (e.g., crypt), read data from password databases (e.g., /etc/shadow via
getspnam or getspent) or read data from standard input or files (e.g., gets, fgets,
scanf). Here it is assumed that the values these functions retrieve are secret, and au-
tomatically annotate assignments that transfer values retrieved using these functions
to program variables. For example, for an assignment char *pwd = getpass(), the
instrumentation engine generates code to record a secret value pointed to by pwd.
Value Containers
To store safe locations and secret values, red-black trees are used. Hvar stores ad-
dresses of safe locations as the start addresses of memory blocks. That is, the elements
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of Hvar are integers wide enough to store memory addresses (e.g., intptr_t). Hval,
which represents a collection of secret values, stores untyped (i.e., void*) pointers to
copies of secret values and their sizes. Since C is a weakly typed language, these can
be typecasted as needed at comparison time.
Secret Values
Variables identified at the source level as ones that hold or point to secret data are
used to record addresses of safe locations and secret values to collections Hvar and
Hval respectively. The values and locations are recorded in the context of the syntactic
types of variables that hold secret data. For example, for a character pointer char
*s that points to a secret value, its value is given by the application of strdup(s),
which creates a copy of the C string pointed to by s, and its safe location is &*s,
which is the start address of a memory block that holds actual data. Note that in
C, &*s, which explicitly extracts the address of the memory block pointed to by s,
evaluates to same address as s. Composite types (i.e., structs) are processed with
respect to their elements. For example, struct stt { char *p1, char *p2 } st
has memory locations &*st.p1 and &*st.p2.
In a more complex but typical scenario, one needs to take into account dynamic
memory allocation in order to calculate secret values. This is because it is not always
possible to determine the size of a memory block statically. For example, given a
double-pointer int ∗∗p, which points to some set of secret values, one needs to know
the size of *p in order to retrieve all the values to which it points to. This type of
information can be determined by tracking memory allocation.
Library or External Functions
Functions for which source code is available are instrumented as described above.
However, approximations are required for the library, or external functions, for which
the source code is not available. Calls to external functions are potential sources
of information leakage because function calls may leak their arguments. For exam-
ple, printf("%s",ptr) is a security violation if &ptr[0] is a safe location. Such
functions are annotated before the analysis as either safe or unsafe. Every call to
an unsafe external function is instrumented with an assertion that evaluates that
function’s arguments and fails if any of the arguments leak secret values. For ex-
ample, a call to the unsafe standard function printf("%s",ptr) is transformed to if
(addressof(ptr) ∈ Hvar) assert(0); printf("%s",ptr);.
In C external function calls can make assignments to their pointer arguments. For
example, library function strcpy(char *dest, const char *src) copies the value
of src to dest. For safety reasons, it is over-approximated that any parameter of an
external function that is a pointer is assigned a value within the body of that function.
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The program is analysed as if there were an assignment of that parameter’s value
to itself immediately after the execution of the function. For example, for a function
call strcpy(dest,src) it is assumed that dest is assigned in the body of strcpy, and
treat the call as if it were strcpy(dest,src); dest = dest;. These transformations
need to be performed before the instrumentation to track the values.
Value Comparison
The present studies primarily target discovering information leakage via disclosed or
partially disclosed strings. Thus, rather than using a direct look-up based on equal-
ity foundIn is implemented as the function that uses the Levenshtein distance [147]
as the measure of similarity (encapsulated in the isSimilar function) between values
as strings. The Levenshtein distance is frequently used to evaluate the strength of
passwords against dictionaries [148]; it is computed by counting the number of edits
required to transform one string into another. foundIn detects that strings are ‘close
enough’ if the Levenshtein distance between strings is less than a pre-defined thresh-
old, and identifies strings as different otherwise. The benefit of using this measure is
that detects similar, but not identical strings. For example, this can detect the leakage
of a password secret string, via a partially exposed string ‘secret trunk’, which can be
converted to ‘secret string’ using three edits. Failures due to comparison of strings
of less than a threshold length are solved using an identity function as a measure of
string similarity.
Safe Termination
C memory de-allocation procedures (e.g., free) do not guarantee the destruction of
the values stored in de-allocated memory regions. This may result in disclosure of
secret values left in memory after a program terminates. The present analysis checks
that a program correctly cleans up its secret values by first disabling memory de-
allocation functions, and then, before program termination, checking that no location
in Hvar points to a value from Hval. This check is triggered using standard C library
functions atexit and signal. Note that while this approach is adequate for the ex-
perimentation purposes, a more sophisticated approach could be used in production
monitoring systems; for example, one that remembers designated safe memory ad-
dresses and scans possibly freed memory on termination.
5.4 Experimental Results
The present approach for the detection of information leakage has been implemented
in a prototype tool for C programs. The research prototype is built on top of the
Clang [144] compiler infrastructure. To evaluate the applicability of the present
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approach the prototype was used to monitor safety of assignments in real security-
oriented software and benchmarked code. This section reports the results of the
experimentation that focuses on the trade-offs of using the present approach with
respect to the runtime overheads incurred by the monitoring for information leakage.
5.4.1 Objectives
This section discusses the two main objectives of this experimentation.
The first objective is to investigate the runtime overheads of the present approach
for an application-specific problem in real software. This aims to address a scenario
where a security property requires checking of only a limited number of assignments,
for example, only assignments that belong to specific functions or modules, where the
rest of the assignments in the program are known to not leak.
To evaluate the approach for an application-specific property, the prototype was
used to check the safety of password flow in six well-known security UNIX utilities:
su, sudo, passwd, dropbear, ftp and vlock. During this experiment, assignments
that transfer password values to program variables are annotated manually. Further,
the safety of assignments in functions involved in password authentication is checked.
Since applications often use relatively few values and assignments to authenticate a
user, the prototype is expected to have near negligible runtime overheads. However,
as this analysis checks all assignments involved in the handling of password values, it
is also expected to soundly identify password leakage. This experiment is described
in greater detail in Section 5.4.3.
The second objective is to investigate the runtime overheads of the present ap-
proach for a class of security properties in large and computationally intensive pro-
grams. This involves application of the present approach to a scenario where security
properties require tracking large sets of secret values and safe locations and also re-
quire checking the majority of program assignments for leakage.
Section 5.4.4 discusses the investigation of the application of the proposed tech-
nique in information leakage detection to multiple security properties and large pro-
grams. Since various security requirements exist, the author chooses to check pro-
grams against the security properties from the CWE repository. This is because the
CWE repository provides realistic security properties applicable to a wide range of
programs, where the attacker model is known and well understood. The present ex-
periments involve monitoring programs for a number of CWE properties related to
information leakage, including information leaks via the de-allocated but not cleared
out memory; improper handling of sensitive data; exposure of sensitive information
through standard output channels; and information leaks via temporary files and file
handles. This experiment is divided in two parts. In the first part computationally
intensive programs selected from the SPEC CPU [40] datasets are monitored. This
aims to evaluate overheads of the present approach for large programs with heavy
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workload. The second part of this experiment monitors executions of test suites of
security-oriented applications, such as openssh or ccrypt, for leakage. These runs
are used to evaluate the overheads incurred by the present approach in a realistic
setting.
For the experimentation with CWE security properties, overheads higher than the
overheads of the experimentation with the flow of passwords are expected. This
is because CWE properties require tracking of a larger number of safe locations and
secret values. However, the overheads can still be expected to be within an acceptable
range use for detection of information leaks during testing.
The following sections describe the experimentation in greater detail.
5.4.2 Experimental Setup
This experimentation involved performing series of runs of instrumented and original
programs and calculated overheads relative to the execution time of the original pro-
grams. To account for variance due to external factors, such as the test automation
process or system I/O, the overheads are calculated using the mean over 50 runs of
the modified and original executables. In the experiment with password flow a single
measurement is taken by executing a program 1000 times. This is because the execu-
tion time of a single run of a program from the set of UNIX utilities used is too small
to measure accurately. During the experimentation with the CWE properties, where
program runs are substantially longer, a single measurement accounts for a single run
of a program or a run of a test suite (if available).
To correctly calculate overheads incurred by the prototype implementation, abort
statements in the instrumented assertions are disabled. The assertions are evaluated
and the violations are reported, but program runs are not terminated. The purpose of
this is to evaluate the total runtime overheads of applications that trigger failures of
the security assertions.
The number of added annotations and instrumented assertions are also reported.
This is to determine the extent to which the instrumentation influences overheads
incurred by the monitored execution.
The platform for all results reported here was dual-processor 2.4GHz Intel Xenon
machine with 16GB of RAM, running Gentoo Linux.
Since different experiments use different annotations, security properties, pro-
grams and input values, these details are discussed in separate sections for each ex-
periment.
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Figure 5.6: Runtime Overheads of UNIX Utilities
5.4.3 Password Flow
This section investigates the application of the author’s technique to a problem that
requires checking only a limited number of potentially unsafe assignments. The ap-
proach is evaluated by checking the flow of passwords in six UNIX utilities: su, sudo,
passwd, ftp, vlock, and dropbear. Programs were chosen for this experimentation
based on availability of password-authenticating functionality at a system level – tools
for which securing password values is important. These tools are mature and have
been extensively tested, yet leaks were found in su and ftp: su does not safely de-
stroy the hash sum of the plain-text password, and ftp does not overwrite a pointer
where the plain-text password value received from the user is stored. For this ex-
periment program locations that transfer password values to program variables were
determined manually and the programs used were annotated by hand.
Figure 5.6 shows the running times of the original and instrumented programs.
The figure adjacent to the name of the program is the percentage overhead. The bars
indicate standard deviation.
In continuous runs of the modified and original versions of the tools correct pass-
word values of 10 characters in length were used. The purpose of this is to avoid
failures due to short strings comparison, and ensure that the run of a modified pro-
gram invokes the majority of the instrumented assertions.
It can be seen that the overheads produced by the application of the author’s
technique do not exceed 1%, and range from 0.05% for ftp to 0.86% for su. For
dropbear and ftp, however, the standard deviation is considerably greater for the
instrumented program than for the original. This is because of variable response
times of the network, since during the experimentation both tools were configured to
connect to real servers.
Table 5.1 shows the number of source code annotations and injected assertions per
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Program Version Annotations Assertions
su (coreutils 8.13) 3 3
sudo (1.8.2) 1 14
passwd (shadow 4.1.4) 3 64
vlock (2.2) 1 12
ftp (inetutils 1.8) 2 99
dropbear (2011.54) 1 5
Table 5.1: Instrumentation Statistics of UNIX Utilities
program. It can be seen that the number of generated assertions does not impact the
overhead produced by the instrumentation. For example, the overhead of monitoring
execution of ftp (0.05%) is the lowest, despite having the largest number of injected
assertions (99). This is because the main factors affecting overhead are the length of
the strings that need to be compared and the number of secret values tracked.
The results of this experiment suggest that when applied to narrow and well-
defined problems such as ensuring the safety of password flow, the proposed tech-
nique scales well for real software. The low overhead of the technique is mainly due
to instrumentation that checks only assignments directly involved in handling pass-
word values. Such an approach results in a lightweight, but sound analysis. This is
demonstrated by reporting information leakage discovered in ftp and sudo, where
issues were detected using only a few assertions (e.g., 14 assertions for sudo).
It can be noted that low overheads of the prototype for password analysis are
attributed to security assertions that evaluate only authentication functionality, where
an injected assertion is run once per an input password value. Thus, monitoring in the
presence of different properties, where assertions are invoked multiple times (e.g., if
placed into the bodies of loops), is likely to result in greater overheads.
The next section reports the results of experimentation with a class of well-known
security properties in computationally intensive runs of large software.
5.4.4 CWE-based Security Properties
This section describes the experiment that investigates information leakage using sev-
eral CWE security properties and large, computationally expensive programs. This
experimentation uses the following CWE properties:
• Use of hardcoded or storage of plain-text passwords (CWE-256, CWE-259).
• Exposure of sensitive information via shell messages (CWE-497, CWE-535).
• Software failure to fully clear previously used information in a data structure,
file, or other resource (CWE-226).
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Program Dataset Annotations Assertions
164.gzip CPU2000 258 377
175.vpr CPU2000 1270 1872
176.gcc CPU2000 3976 5516
177.mesa CPU2000 1312 1645
179.art CPU2000 65 104
181.mcf CPU2000 47 84
183.equake CPU2000 92 162
186.crafty CPU2000 1999 2835
188.ammp CPU2000 1289 1431
197.parser CPU2000 986 1299
255.vortex CPU2000 2185 2278
256.bzip2 CPU2000 123 222
Program Dataset Annotations Assertions
300.twolf CPU2000 2375 2986
401.bzip2 CPU2006 127 229
429.mcf CPU2006 46 83
433.milc CPU2006 642 1001
456.hmmer CPU2006 3620 4077
458.sjeng CPU2006 1175 1418
462.libquantum CPU2006 62 120
464.h264ref CPU2006 884 1155
470.lbm CPU2006 28 40
482.sphinx3 CPU2006 2814 3057
998.specrand CPU2006 7 14
999.specrand CPU2006 7 14
Table 5.2: Instrumentation Statistics of Programs from SPEC CPU Datasets
• Failure to properly clean up and remove temporary or supporting resources after
they have been used (CWE-459).
For this experiment, in addition to manual annotations that capture flow of pass-
word values into safe locations, the author automatically added annotations that
marked memory blocks assigned data received via standard input channels (i.e., using
stdio.h functions) as safe locations.
The experimentation with the above CWE properties first investigates the over-
heads of the present approach in computationally expensive runs of large software
using programs chosen from the SPEC CPU datasets. Then, the execution of test
suites of real security software: openssh and ccrypt are monitored.
The following section discusses the results of the experiment with CWE properties.
It first discusses the experimentation with programs taken from the SPEC benchmarks,
and further reports on the results of monitoring of test suites of real software.
Programs from SPEC CPU Datasets
To evaluate runtime characteristics of the present approach on large software C pro-
grams selected from the SPEC CPU2000 and CPU2006 were instrumented and mon-
itored. Even though the SPEC benchmarks are not security related, they are used to
calculate the overheads on large programs that have a heavy workload. This serves
purely to estimate the overheads in extreme situations. Results are reported for all C
programs from these sets, except for 253.perlbmk, 400.perlbench, 445.gobmk and
403.gcc, which were omitted due to compile issues with the original versions of the
programs. The sizes of the analysed software ranges from 49 to 140,000 of lines of
code (excluding commented and white space lines). Note that these programs have
no concern for information security. Thus, information leaks, discovered during the
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Figure 5.7: Runtime Overheads of Programs from SPEC CPU Datasets
experimentation are unlikely to be of interest to SPEC. However, analysis of such
programs is likely to result in many instrumentations and multiple invocations of se-
curity assertions. Below are reported the results of the experiments with programs
chosen from the SPEC CPU datasets focussing on the runtime overheads caused by
the monitored execution.
Figure 5.8 shows the runtime overheads of the prototype relative to the nor-
malised execution time of unobserved runs for the test dataset provided by SPEC. For
reasons of scale of the figure the exact average times of runs and standard deviation
are not presented. This is to better summarise the overhead results for multiple pro-
grams, for which runtime varies. The exact runtimes for each program are available
from the author on request.
On average, the runtime overheads of the prototype are approximately 7.4 times
compared to the normal execution time, with the highest overhead 44.38 times in
429.mcf and the lowest result of approximately 1.11 times in the 470.lbm program.
The high average time is mainly due to spikes, such as, 39.83 times compared to
unobserved execution in 482.sphinx or 44.38 times in 470.lbm. In the majority of
the programs overheads do not exceed 4 times compared to unobserved execution.
The experimentation suggests that the main causes of the runtime overhead are op-
erations on strings in executions of instrumented assertions. That is, the overheads
mainly depend on the lengths of the strings checked for leakage, the complexity of the
string comparison function (only the Levenshtein distance was used) and the number
of assertions executed by the instrumented program.
Further, the experimentation suggests that the runtime overheads of the moni-
tored execution do not depend on the number of annotations or instrumentations
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Program Version Annotations Assertions
openssh (6.2p1) 5421 5839
ccrypt (1.10) 496 635
Table 5.3: Instrumentation Statistics of Security Programs
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Figure 5.8: Runtime Overheads of Security Programs
(see Table 5.2 for instrumentation statistics for programs selected from the SPEC CPU
datasets). This is shown in the differences in runtime overheads between the 176.gcc
and 429.mcf programs. While 176.gcc has a high number of assertions (5516), it in-
curs less than 4 times overhead, whereas 429.mcf, which uses only 83 assertions,
incurs the highest overhead of over 40 times. Such abnormal overhead is due to the
security assertions executed multiple times on large value sets, which is directly linked
to the number of string comparisons executed by programs. For example, during its
execution, 429.mcf performs over 25 million string comparison operations, whereas
176.gcc invokes the comparison function less than 200,000 times. Since input to
programs for this experimentation is considered secret information, large inputs re-
sult in large numbers of values that need to be checked every time a security assertion
is invoked. Thus, abnormal cases with high overhead (such as 429.mcf) should be
attributed to the large input to programs requiring checking for leakage.
Experimentation with programs taken from the SPEC benchmarks investigated the
overheads incurred by the prototype for the case using large programs and inputs. The
next section reports the results of experimentation on security related applications for
the same set of CWE-based security properties.
Security Software
This section discusses the results of experimentation with the prototype implementa-
tion of the present approach to information leakage detection run on openssh, the
popular SSH client in UNIX environment, and ccrypt, an encryption utility similar to
the UNIX crypt program. Since overhead introduced by the monitoring techniques
depends on input values, security programs that have test suites are chosen. Thus,
the number of paths followed for overhead calculation depends on the inputs used by
the published test suites.
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Figure 5.8 shows the runtime overheads incurred by the monitored execution of
test suites of openssh and ccrypt – 2% and 39% respectively (vertical bars indicate
standard deviation). The low overheads of the security tools used are due to relatively
low number of input and output operations, compared to the programs selected from
the SPEC CPU datasets. For example, the overheads of openssh are mainly caused by
a number of constants used by the program (i.e., check for CWE-259). Additionally,
as data read from configuration files are interpreted as secret, they also contribute to
the overhead incurred by the monitored version of the program. Note that, due to a
large number of invocations of the monitored executable in the test suite (1090 times
for openssh), the overhead in standalone invocations will vary slightly and depend,
for example, on the size of the configuration files read by the application during a
run. Runtime overheads of ccrypt are higher (39%); however are still substantially
lower than the overheads of the programs taken from the SPEC CPU benchmarks. In
ccrypt the main cause of overheads is the size of input data interpreted as secret.
Table 5.3 shows instrumentation statistics for openssh and ccrypt. This is similar
to the results of programs selected from the SPEC CPU datasets, where the num-
ber of instrumentations was not directly linked to the overhead incurred. It can be
seen that monitoring of openssh (instrumented with 5839 assertions) results in lower
overheads than monitoring of ccrypt (instrumented with only 635 assertions).
In summary, the results of the experimentation with CWE vulnerabilities suggest
that the overheads of the prototype do not depend on the number of instrumenta-
tions; rather, they mainly depend on the size of the input and the number of string
comparisons.
5.4.5 Threats to Validity
This section discusses factors that may have affected the validity of the present results.
The first factor is the choice of input data used in the experimentation. For ex-
ample, insignificant runtime overheads in the experiment with password flow are
partially attributed to the number and size of input values. While typical values of
passwords were chosen, there is no guarantee that these passwords exercised all paths
within programs. No coverage metric have been implemented; thus there could be
paths that lead to higher overheads. Small runtime overheads in openssh and ccrypt
are partially attributed to a large number of invocations of monitored executables
(1090 and 403 times respectively), where overhead incurred by the program is amor-
tised by operations that are not relevant for information leakage monitoring (e.g.,
establishing a network connection). Larger overheads may be expected during sin-
gle executions. Additionally, even though during experimentation with openssh and
ccrypt the author used test suites associated with the utilities, there is no evidence
that applying this technique on different programs or using different input values will
yield similar results. Finally, during the experiment with programs selected from the
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SPEC CPU datasets, the input values provided by SPEC may not be representative
for evaluating overheads associated with the detection of information leakage. This
is because SPEC concentrates on performance evaluation, rather than on exploring
various behaviours.
The second factor involves the choice of programs. The experimentation with
password flow used real security tools; however it cannot be claimed these tools are
representative of all programs in the security domain. Further, when monitoring for
CWE properties, programs from the SPEC benchmarks were taken. These programs
focus on performance evaluation, rather than on information security. Finally, the
experimentation with CWE properties uses only two real security programs. This is
because the aim was to monitor security software with test functionality, which is
rare, since releasing such a test suite may be a security issue.
Another factor that may have skewed the results of the empirical evaluation is the
annotation process. During the experiment with password flow programs were an-
notated manually. The author believes all locations and values relevant to password
security are tracked; however, some values or locations may have been overlooked.
This could result in different overheads. The experimentation with CWE properties
relies on automatically derived annotations, where any kind of input data is inter-
preted as secret. While this is adequate for experimentation, it is not certain that all
input information should in practice be tagged secret. Similarly, such automatic an-
notation may have missed some of the values or locations that need to be protected
against disclosure. Thus, a better annotation process may improve the accuracy of the
results.
The final factor is the string comparison. Although Levenshtein distance is a re-
liable criterion, it may not be optimal in all cases. Further, as string comparison is
the main source of the incurred overheads, a different string comparison function
may yield different results. For example, the Hamming distance is likely to result in
smaller overheads, than the more expensive Levenshtein distance criteria used in this
experimentation.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presented a value-driven approach to the detection of leakage of sensi-
tive information at runtime. The proposed approach works on source programs that
have annotations marking the secret values that need to protected against disclosure,
and the memory locations assumed to store such data safely. This technique first
instruments an input program with statements that capture secret values and safe
locations, indicated via annotations. Each potentially unsafe assignment is then in-
strumented with a security assertion that fails if an information leak is detected. The
execution of the modified program monitors assignments in the original program for
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information leakage. A program execution that has no assertion failures does not leak
the nominated secret values.
The proposed approach has been implemented for C programs. The prototype
implementation targets the detection leaks of passwords and also supports the detec-
tion of well-defined problems inspired by the CWE vulnerabilities, such as, exposure
of sensitive information through standard output channels and information leaks via
temporary files and file handles.
Experiments with a number of security-oriented UNIX utilities show that the over-
head incurred in detecting leakage of passwords is less than 1%. The prototype imple-
mentation of the proposed approach detects vulnerabilities in ftp and su programs.
This result suggests that for specific information security problems (e.g., integrity of
password values at runtime), the instrumentation introduced by the proposed ap-
proach can be used with release versions of software. Further, the experimentation
with chosen programs from the SPEC CPU datasets investigates the overheads of the
prototype implementation in the case where large programs perform heavy compu-
tations and therefore many security assertions are used. Monitoring programs from
the SPEC datasets incur higher overheads, as the costs of monitoring increase propor-
tionally to the number of executed assertions that use expensive string comparison
operations. However, when the technique is applied to testing, where correctness of
programs is established through inexpensive runs (i.e., experimentation with moni-
toring openssh and ccrypt test suites), the overheads of the prototype remain low –
39% and 2% for openssh and ccrypt respectively.
6
Concise Specification Language for
Monitoring
Chapters 4 and 5 described monitoring analyses for specific issues, presenting tech-
niques for runtime detection of memory leaks and disclosure of confidential informa-
tion. This chapter focuses on a generic approach to monitoring programs aimed at
error detection. Before this approach is discussed, an argument is advanced for the
usefulness of such a generalisation, explaining and how it addresses the limitations
of the existing techniques.
6.1 Need for Generalisation
Implementing monitoring from scratch is a daunting task that involves high develop-
ment costs. In the author’s experience, most of the time used for prototype develop-
ment is spent on addressing technical details and debugging. This motivated a search
for a solution, where a prototype is specified concisely at a high level and the con-
crete implementation is then generated from such specifications; that is, in which the
main effort is directed towards developing the elements of the analysis, rather than
on handling technical details or re-implementation of standard features.
Early attempts to support the construction of dynamic analyses [73, 75, 76, 78, 79,
86, 149] implemented interfaces for monitoring programs at the source or instruction
level. These tools inspired the development of state-of-the-art analysis architectures,
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such as Pin [43], Valgrind [10], Frama-C [112] and LLVM [77]. Typically, specifi-
cation of a monitoring approach using these frameworks requires instrumentation of
implementation-specific code at program locations identified by the user. This affords
the power to express a wide variety of dynamic analyses; however, the development
overhead is also large. It is noted that the prototype implementations of the monitor-
ing techniques discussed in this thesis were created using the Clang [144] compiler
architecture belonging to the LLVM project [77] and comprise over 15 KLOC of C and
C++ code.
Other solutions make use of BISL [96, 105, 106, 109], which formalise intended
behaviours of program components via annotations of source programs. The rich
features of such languages support monitoring for a wide class of properties, but
require manual annotation of each analysed program. This means that this approach
does not separate the monitoring specifications from the program under analysis. As
a result, BISL specifications cannot be reused. An additional issue is the size of the
analysed programs. Consider, for example, the test subjects used in the experiments
reported in this thesis (i.e., UNIX utilities and programs from the SPEC CPU datasets).
These programs often consist of tens or even hundreds of thousands of lines of code.
This factor is likely to contribute to the complexity of specifying monitoring.
This issue of concise and reusable specifications is addressed via runtime verifica-
tion [114, 120, 122–124, 150], where implementation-level monitors are generated
from specifications commonly given by properties in higher-order logic. The gener-
ated code is used to check whether a given property holds during the execution of the
instrumented program. Such specifications are known to be compact; however, they
are not trivial to specify and are hard to optimise due to the gap between the high-
level property specifications and implementation-level monitors generated from the
properties. In other words, runtime verification techniques are missing the trackable
link between abstract descriptions and implementation details.
Finally, monitoring can be enabled through traces of events generated by a run-
ning program. Trace monitors originate from AOP [129, 130] as a generalisation of
applying advice (i.e., extra code) on pointcuts (collections of well-defined program
points, such as function calls of variable definitions). A trace monitor captures a his-
tory of program events at runtime, and observes them by executing extra code if the
captured trace matches a partial trace given by the specification. A typical trace mon-
itor specification consists of a pattern that describes a partial trace, and an action –
code executed on a pattern match.
State-of-the-art trace monitors [116, 132, 133, 138, 151] mainly focus on the ex-
pressiveness of patterns, and specify actions using the implementation language of a
monitored program. Such an approach is adequate for problems that can be captured
by patterns, such as checking whether a particular sequence of events is executed. In
this case, most of the monitoring code is generated from pattern specifications and
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actions are used for simple tasks, such as aborting an execution. However, even ex-
pressive pattern languages often require non-trivial actions to be implemented. For
example, SQL injection analysis using PQL [138], which claims the expressiveness
of a context-free grammar, requires Java implementations of functions that sanitise
input and execute SQL. Similarly, a transfer protocol analysis in Arachne [139] uses
C networking functions. Such specifications are inherently implementation specific
and verbose, contributing to the development overhead and complicating the specifi-
cation of the analysis. Consider, for example implementing the author’s memory leak
analysis as a trace monitor. This does not require sophisticated patterns, as all assign-
ments and memory allocations are being observed; the implementation complexity
arises from the definitions of actions that compute points-to relationships on-the-fly.
In summary, despite the large body of work in the area, techniques that aim to ad-
dress specification monitoring at a generic level have limitations. This mainly refers to
issues such as lack of separation concerns (in specifications via behavioural interface
languages), verbosity and implementation specificity of actions (in trace monitors)
and absence of trackable link between monitoring specifications and generated mon-
itors (in runtime verification).
This chapter addresses such limitations and present an approach that aims to re-
duce the effort associated with developing monitoring code manually. The author
proposes the SFM mechanism for specifying monitoring at a higher level of abstrac-
tion. An abstract API showing how to implement the monitor is also proposed.
SFM is designed to be concise and has the ability to express various monitoring
analyses, focussing on error detection. Further, although SFM specifications are ab-
stract, they are not “too” abstract, allowing its implementation to be efficient. Finally,
SFM specifications are kept distinct from the source code of monitoring applications,
thus allowing to monitor different programs using a single specification.
SFM is presented as a trace monitor with a key focus on abstract specifications of
actions. This enables users to specify actions at a high level and provides a powerful
pattern language over sequences of events. Also described is the monitoring API:
a collection of functions that encapsulate monitoring tasks (e.g., tracking of source
locations).
In support this approach a case study in error detection is presented. This case
study demonstrates the expressive power of SFM by example and presents SFM spec-
ifications that address monitoring for well-known problems, including of stack over-
flows, information flow vulnerabilities, resource leakage, and SQL injections. This
case study aims to demonstrate SFM’s capability of addressing runtime defect detec-
tion at different levels of abstraction.
This chapter focuses on issues related to concise and expressive specifications
for fault detection in memory safety and information flow security. The key ideas
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on how to enable instrumentation and implement monitoring components were dis-
cussed previously (see Chapters 4 and 5 for details). The contributions made by this
chapter are as follows.
• The design of the SFM language, which describes monitoring at a high level of
abstraction.
• A case study in the expressiveness of SFM for fault detection, showing shows
the power of SFM by example and presenting four complete monitoring specifi-
cations that address well known problems in error detection at a high level.
Contributions presented in this chapter have been accepted for a publication in
proceedings of the forthcoming ACM/SIGAPP Symposium on Applied Computing
(SAC’15) [152].
The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents the de-
tails of the SFM language, discussing how program events, behaviour patterns and
actions are represented in SFM. Section 6.3 describes the monitoring API, a collec-
tion of functions that encapsulate monitoring tasks for fault detections. Section 6.4
presents monitoring specifications implemented in SFM. Finally, Section 6.5 offers
concluding remarks.
6.2 The SFM Language
This section presents the details of the SFM specification language. First, it informally
outlines the abstract model and then goes on to discuss SFM syntax.
6.2.1 Informal Model
A run of a program is modelled as a trace (or sequence) of events. An event represents
a behaviour of a program, such as a function call. Events can also represent points
during program execution, such as the start or termination of the program. Events
consist of types and attributes, where type denotes the kind of the behaviour the event
represents (e.g., the function call) and attributes describe its details (e.g., the name
and arguments of the called function). For the purpose of this thesis, the discussion
focuses on function calls, program inputs and outputs and memory operations.
Events are grouped using patterns. A pattern is a template that defines partial
orders of events using their types and attributes. It is said that a pattern matches a
program trace if at runtime the semantics of the pattern satisfies the order of events in
the program trace. Patterns can be thought of as regular expressions over the alphabet
of program events.
A monitoring specification consists of trace monitors that associate actions (exe-
cutable code fragments) with patterns. At runtime, a trace monitor observes an event
6.2 THE SFM LANGUAGE 97
by executing an action if the pattern associated with that action matches a program
trace. The trace monitors are specified via a syntactic construct match Pat using Stmt,
where Pat is a pattern, Stmt represents code executed when Pat matches the program
trace, and match and using are keywords.
The following sections discuss how actions, events and patterns are represented
in SFM.
6.2.2 Actions
To represent executable code of actions (specified via using clause of trace monitors),
the subset of the Perl6 language specification [153] is used. Since such elements are
standard, only an overview of the supported features is given here. The full EBNF
grammar of the SFM language is presented in Appendix A.
The type system of SFM consists of scalars, lists and hashes. Scalars represent
integers, floating point numbers and strings, which are augmented with static types
Int, Rat, and Str respectively. Lists (denoted by List) represent lists of scalars,
and hashes (denoted by Hash) represent associative arrays. The types of elements in
lists and types of keys and values in hashes are inferred from the context. Variable
names are prefixed with syntactic type identifiers ($ for scalars, @ for lists and % for
hashes). Access to and modification of elements of lists and hashes is accomplished
using standard Perl notation: that is, list elements are retrieved using [] subscript
and hash elements using {}. For example, $lst[5] (where variable @lst is of List
type) accesses an element at position 5 and $hsh{"k"} retrieves the value bound to
key "k" in the hash named %hsh.
Variables need to be declared before use. A variable is declared using the my
keyword followed by the type, and variable name, and potentially an initialiser. For
example, the statement my Int $i = 1; declares an integer variable named $i. Vari-
able declarations are either local (to actions) or global.
Expressions are limited to variable names, composite expressions using unary and
binary operators, and function calls. Supported operators include exists and delete
unary operators on lists and hashes. exists checks whether a given element exists
within a list or a hash and delete removes an input element from the structure. SFM
also implements a number of standard Perl functions such as print or length.
Statements consist of variable declarations, if-then-else conditional statements,
while loops and sequential composition of statements. SFM also supports map state-
ments over hashes. For example, given a hash %hsh, statement map { print $_; }
%hsh outputs all keys of this hash.
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6.2.3 Events
Events supported by SFM are shown in Table 6.1. The Type column shows types of
events (as symbolic identifiers); the Attributes column lists event attributes and their
syntactic types and the column Description offers textual description.
SFM events are designed to support fault detection. Memory events (read, write,
malloc, free, def, undef) enable detection of memory-related errors such as buffer
overruns or illegal dereferences. Note that the author uses a C-like memory model
and differentiate between stack and heap allocations. Such a distinction enables the
detection of issues such as stack overflows, where only one type of allocation is in-
volved. Events in and out describe interactions with the external environment by
capturing inputs a program receives and outputs it produces. These events are rele-
vant for detection of information-flow related vulnerabilities, where one is interested
in calculating dependencies between private inputs a program receives and public
outputs it produces. Structural events (begin, end, init, final) allow code to be
placed at various program points (e.g., to perform initialisation before the program
begins). Finally, internal events call, ret, and flow give SFM the ability to observe
executions of program modules, thus allowing detection of issues such as API viola-
tions, and to track the flow of data within a program (e.g., for taint analysis). It is
noted that the set of events supported by the author’s approach can be extended to
support monitoring for other issues.
6.2.4 Patterns
Patterns are specified via the match clause of trace monitors and can be basic or
composite. Basic patterns are similar to events and consist of types and attributes.
A basic pattern matches a program trace if it describes the type and attributes of
the most recently generated event in the trace. Following Perl conventions, basic
patterns are specified as hash initialisers using the big arrow notation, which maps
names of attributes to concrete values. For example, a basic pattern that matches a
heap memory allocation event malloc if the size of the allocated block is 10 bytes is
written as { type => malloc, size => 10 }. The value mapped to type specifies
the type of the event the pattern should match, while attribute size initialised to 10
constrains the match to those malloc events that allocate blocks of 10 bytes. Attribute
names that can be used in the construction of basic patterns are shown via Attributes
column of Table 6.1. Additionally, the keys type and ref can be used. The type key,
initialised to one of the keywords given by the Type column of Table 6.1, specifies
an event type to match (also shown in the example above). The ref key specifies
the name of the reference to the event. This can be used to retrieve values of event
attributes. For example, in the body of an action attached to pattern { type =>
malloc, ref => pat }, the start address of the allocated block is accessed using
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Type Attributes Description
Memory Operations
read Int addr Memory access at address addr.
write Int addr Memory modification at address addr.
malloc Int addr,
Int size
Heap memory allocation of size bytes starting at address addr.
free Int addr,
Int size
De-allocation of a heap memory block of size bytes starting at
address addr.
def Int addr,
Int size
Stack memory allocation of size bytes starting at address addr.
undef Int addr,
Int size
De-allocation of a stack memory block of size bytes starting at
address addr.
Interactions with Environment
out Int addr Data stored in the memory block starting at address addr is
output to a stream or a file.
in Int addr Program input is stored to a memory block starting at address
addr.
Structural Events
begin Str name Initial event of function name.
end Str name Final event of function name.
init Initial program event.
final Final program event.
Internal Events
call Str name,
Int posn,
Int addr
Memory block starting at address addr is used as pos argument
in function call name.
ret Str name,
Int addr
Memory block starting at address addr is returned by a function
call name.
flow Int src,
Int dest
Value stored in the memory block starting at address src flows
to a location in the memory block which start address is dest.
Table 6.1: Program Events
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$pat->addr and its size is retrieved via $pat->size.
Composite patterns are constructed from smaller patterns using operators, and
match multiple events. Operators for pattern composition have been described in
the literature [154]; only a subset supported by SFM is reviewed here. Program
trace T matches a disjunction of patterns x|y , if T matches either x or y . The
sequencing operator > specifies non-strict matching for chains of events, such that
pattern x>y results in a match if events from x occurred at any stage before y . The
immediate sequence operator ∼ is similar to >; however it specifies a strict sequence
relationship, such that in pattern x∼y events from x should immediately be followed
by y events. Additionally, patterns are negated using the ! operator, and grouped
with parentheses.
6.3 Monitoring API
SFM events address the types of issues SFM can address. For instance, tracking mem-
ory allocations enables analyses for memory safety properties: for example, to detect
a stack overflow error, it is sufficient to track stack memory via events def and undef
and report an error if the size of the stack allocation exceeds some limit (e.g., 8MB,
the size of stack allocations used by the gcc compiler). Such an analysis, however, has
some issues. First, a program, can increase or decrease the size of its stack dynami-
cally. That is, a stack limit other than 8MB is likely to result in false alarms or missed
errors. Additionally, the language presented in the Section 6.2 cannot track program
locations. That is, the analysis is capable of detecting stack overflows; however it
cannot report the program locations where such errors originate. This makes it hard
to track the detected errors, and consequently diminishes the value of the analysis.
Such issues can be solved by introducing additional events or attributes that cap-
ture desired behaviours. For example, events can be extended to support the location
attribute that holds program locations. However, capturing locations per event re-
quires that every tracked event stores an additional attribute, which is likely to in-
crease overheads. Note that reporting stack overflow errors requires only a single lo-
cation that corresponds to the “current” program point during a program’s execution.
Introducing new events (for example for the purpose of tracking locations), increases
the number of events that need to be tracked. This is also likely to contribute to the
overheads.
From the implementation perspective, a more feasible solution is an API that en-
capsulates monitoring components. This is because, instead of unconditional genera-
tion of events or attributes, the appropriate functionality is triggered by a function call
and invoked only where requested by the specification. Further, monitoring API pro-
vides a way to reuse common monitoring tasks (e.g., track memory allocation) across
multiple specifications. This results in more compact specifications and allows for
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Name Description
Int isAllocated(Int $addr) Return the start address of the memory block address
$addr belongs to or 0 if $addr does not belong to the
memory allocation.
Int blockSize(Int $addr) Return the size of a memory block address $addr be-
longs to or 0 if addr does not belong to the memory
allocation.
Int stackSize() Stack memory allocation size.
Int heapSize() Heap memory allocation size.
Int stackLimit() The maximal size of the process stack.
Int getTag(Int $addr) Return an integer value associated with a memory block
identified by address $addr.
Void setTag(Int $addr, Int
$val)
Associate integer $val with a memory block given by
its start address $addr.
Void abort(Str $fmt,...) Output a message to the standard error stream using a
printf-like format string and terminate the execution.
List depends() Return a list memory addresses of blocks used in condi-
tions that lead to the current program point.
Str location() Return a symbolic representation of a currently exe-
cuted program location.
Table 6.2: SFM API
specifying tracking internally, which is likely to be more efficient. For example, in the
author’s experience, tracking memory allocations at the SFM level (for example, via
associative arrays) has higher runtime overheads than internal memory shadowing.
The core functions of the SFM monitoring API are shown in Table 6.2, where the
Name column shows the function names and arguments they accept, and the column
Description offers textual description.
The API functions shown in Table 6.2 facilitate detection of a range of runtime
faults. This is demonstrated in Section 6.4, which presents complete specifications
for runtime detection of problems such as stack overflows, resource leakage, SQL in-
jections and information flow vulnerabilities. It is noted that an analysis may require
functionality that is not provided by the API presented here. For example, detecting
locations of leakage (as presented in Chapter 4) requires extracting integer values
bound to addresses (i.e., dereferencing). In order to handle such extensions interfac-
ing with the target language is allowed, such that a specification in SFM can call a
function implemented in the target language. This is similar to the XS interface that
allows a Perl script to call functions implemented in C. For the purposes of this thesis,
however, the focus is on the expressiveness of the monitoring API (see Table 6.2).
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1 match { type => def }
2 using {
3 my Int $MaxStackSize = stackLimit();
4 my Int $StackSize = stackSize();
5 if ($MaxStackSize < $StackSize) {
6 abort("Stack Overflow at %s",location());
7 }
8 }
Listing 6.1: Stack Overflow Detection
6.4 SFM Examples
This section present four complete specifications that demonstrate how SFM addresses
monitoring problems in fault detection at different levels of abstraction. The first
example, presented in Section 6.4.1, involves runtime detection of stack overflows,
a memory safety issue. The specification in Section 6.4.2 shows how a higher-level
problem of information flow vulnerability detection is expressed in SFM. Section 6.4.3
discusses monitoring for a CWE-based vulnerability of resource leakage. Finally, Sec-
tion 6.4.4 presents a SFM specification aimed at detection of SQL injections.
6.4.1 Stack Overflow Detection
Consider a SFM specification (see Listing 6.1) that consists of a monitor executed
on events of type def that allocate memory on the program’s stack (see Listing 6.1,
Line 1). The maximal size of the process stack is saved to variable $MaxStackSize
(Line 3) and is retrieved using an API function stackLimit. This ensures that $MaxStackSize
captures the actual stack size of the running program (which reflects possible compile
or runtime changes). Variable $StackSize (Line 4) captures the actual stack size of
the running program that is retrieved using function stackSize which returns the size
of the program’s stack allocation. The check for a stack overflow error is enabled via
the conditional statement (Line 5) that compares the stack limit to the actual stack
size and aborts the execution (Line 6) if the size of the program’s stack allocation
(captured via variable $StackSize) exceeds the maximal stack size given via variable
$MaxStackSize. Note that a call to abort at Line 6 also reports the location of the
detected error via an invocation of function location.
The monitoring specification presented in this section provides an example of an
application of SFM for detection of a memory-related issue. Overall, in the presence of
the monitoring API, detection of memory-related errors is straightforward. For exam-
ple, illegal accesses or modifications of memory are detected using the isAllocated
function, which identifies a memory address as belonging (or not) to a program’s
memory allocation. To detect heap memory leaks (i.e., analysis similar to one imple-
mented by Memcheck), one tracks memory allocations and associated locations via
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events malloc and free, and then uses the final event to report the details (e.g., the
sizes and locations) of the leaked memory blocks (allocated using malloc but never
de-allocated by free).
6.4.2 Explicit Information Flow
This section presents a SFM specification for the detection of information flow vulner-
abilities based on the analysis developed by Denning [155]. Here it is assumed that
the reader is familiar with information flow concepts; the discussion is limited to how
such an analysis is represented in SFM.
This specification considers only high and low security levels given by integer
values 1 and 0 respectively. The security levels are attached to all variables, repre-
sented as start addresses of memory blocks, via the built-in tagging mechanism (i.e.,
functions getTag and setTag that retrieve and associate integer values with memory
blocks).
An information flow security violation via an explicit flow is represented by the
flow of data from a memory block tagged 1 to a memory block tagged 0 (i.e., high
to low). For an event of type flow, which transfers data from a memory block whose
start address is given by the attribute src to a memory block whose start address
is given by the attribute dest, the information flow vulnerability is detected if the
security level associated with src is greater than the security level of dest.
Security vulnerabilities via implicit flows are detected using the global security
context. At a given program point, the global security context is computed as the
greatest security level of blocks used in conditions. For example, in the program
fragment if (p && q) { s; }, at the point given by statement s, the global security
context is the maximum of security levels associated with memory blocks represented
by variables p and q. Then, given that variable Pc holds the global security context,
the flow of data from one memory block to another (given by their addresses src
and dest) constitutes an information flow security violation via an implicit flow if the
security level captured by Pc is greater than the security level of dest. That is, a low
location is assigned a value that depends (via a condition) on a high value.
The SFM specification shown in Listing 6.2 implements a Denning-style informa-
tion flow analysis. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that memory blocks do
not change their security levels at runtime and that some of the memory blocks are
already tagged with 1, indicating high security.
This SFM specification consists of a single monitor invoked on events of type
flow. The specification first computes the global security context via a map statement
(Line 4). This iterates over all addresses used in conditions (retrieved via function
depends) and stores the highest (i.e., most private) security level in the local variable
$Pc declared at Line 3. Two conditional statements (Lines 7 and 10) detect infor-
mation flow security violations via explicit and implicit flows by comparing values
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1 match { type => flow, ref => e }
2 using {
3 Int $Pc = 0;
4 map depends() {
5 $Pc = max(Pc,getTag($_));
6 }
7 if (getTag($e->dest) < getTag($e->src)) {
8 abort("Flow Violation at %s\n",location());
9 }
10 if (Pc < getTag($e->dest)) {
11 abort("Flow Violation at %s\n",location());
12 }
13 }
Listing 6.2: Information Flow Analysis
1 my %FH;
2 match { type => ret, name => "fopen", ref => e }
3 using {
4 $FH{$e->addr} = location();
5 }
6
7 match { type => call, name => "fclose", pos => 1, ref => e }
8 using {
9 delete $FH{$e->addr};
10 }
11
12 match { type => final, ref => e }
13 using {
14 map %FH {
15 printf("Stream opened at %s leaks\n",$FH{$_});
16 }
17 }
Listing 6.3: Resource Leakage Detection
of security levels associated with the addresses of memory blocks that participate in
the flow ($e->src and $e->dest) and the global security context stored in $Pc. A
discovered violation results in the termination of a program run via abort statements
(Lines 8 and 11).
6.4.3 Resource Leakage
This section details a SFM specification (Listing 6.3) that implements a dynamic anal-
ysis for a CWE property of resource leakage (CWE-404: Improper Resource Shutdown
or Release). This specification checks whether file streams allocated by a C program
via invocations of fopen are properly released via calls to fclose.
The global associative array %FH (defined at Line 1) tracks streams allocated via
fopen and maps addresses of allocated streams to the program locations (as strings)
6.4 SFM EXAMPLES 105
at which they were opened. The monitor defined at Line 2 tracks the return values
of calls to fopen. This records addresses of streams returned by fopen and associates
program locations (retrieved using function location) in %FH via the statement at
Line 4. The monitor (defined at Line 7) tracks the first argument of fclose calls (i.e.,
the addresses of released streams). This removes addresses of streams de-allocated by
calls to fclose from %FH (via delete statement at Line 9). Finally, the map statement
(Line 14) is executed at program termination (via the pattern at Line 12). This iterates
over addresses and locations in %FH and reports locations stored via printf statement
(Line 15). Since the map statement (Line 14) is executed immediately before the
program’s termination, a location in %FH (i.e., $FH{$_}) represents a location of a
leaked stream (i.e., a stream never released using fclose).
6.4.4 Detection of SQL Injections
The final example demonstrates an SFM specification for detecting SQL injections
using an instance of taint analysis.
Consider a C function sqlexec (struct DB* db, char *buf) that is used to
execute SQL code in a database. Its first argument DB *db holds the database con-
nection, whereas string char *buf captures the executed SQL code. To prevent a
SQL injection, one needs to ensure that a C string supplied as the second argument to
sqlexec is either sanitised or not affected by user input (e.g., an internal query).
To detect SQL injections, taint analysis is used. This tags buffers that store data
received at input as tainted. The tainted tag associated with the buffer is removed if
that buffer is used as an argument of a call to the sqlcheck function, which sanitises
the inputs. A SQL injection is detected if the second argument of a call to sqlexec
is tainted; that is, the code to be executed in the database comes from input and has
not been sanitised by sqlcheck.
An SFM specification for detecting SQL injections is shown in Listing 6.4. Monitor-
ing API functions getTag and setTag are used to associate and retrieve taint tags (as
integers) with memory blocks represented by their start addresses, such that tainted
blocks are tagged 1 and untainted are tagged 0.
The monitoring specification shown in Listing 6.4 consists of three trace monitors.
The first monitor (Lines 1-4) is executed for events of type in that capture data sup-
plied as program input (e.g., via a standard input stream). This monitor taints each
memory block containing input data using the statement (Line 3) that associates tag
1 with start addresses of memory blocks (i.e., $e->addr) using the setTag function.
The second monitor (Lines 6-11) tracks the flow of data and propagates taint tags
(via Line 8). This tags a memory block as tainted (i.e., assigns tag 1) if it is assigned
data from another tainted block. That is, the destination of the flow is tainted if the
source of the flow is tainted.
Finally, the monitor (Lines 13-21) is executed for function calls. This first untaints
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1 match { type => in, ref => e }
2 using {
3 setTag($e->addr,1);
4 }
5
6 match { type => flow, ref => e }
7 using {
8 if (getTag($e->src) eq 1) {
9 setTag($e->addr,1);
10 }
11 }
12
13 match { type => call, ref => e }
14 using {
15 if ($e->name == "santise" && pos == 1) {
16 setTag($e->addr,0);
17 }
18 if ($e->name eq "sqlexec" && $e->pos == 2 && getTag($e->addr) == 1) {
19 abort("SQL injection at %s\n",location()); }
20 }
21 }
Listing 6.4: SQL Injection Detection
memory blocks sanitised by calls to sqlcheck (via Line 15). This is enabled by track-
ing the first argument of calls to sqlcheck. Further, the monitor checks invocations
of sqlexec and terminates the execution (via the abort statement at Line 19) if the
second argument of sqlexec (which holds SQL code) is tainted (i.e., tagged with 1).
This represents a detected SQL injection.
6.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presented a language called SFM for concise and expressive specification
of monitoring at a high level of abstraction. The design of SFM aims to reduce effort
associated with the manual development of monitoring code.
The design of SFM follows the design of a trace monitor that represents elements
that observe programs at runtime using actions and patterns. A key feature of SFM is
that it specifies actions at an abstract level. Additionally SFM includes the Monitoring
API – a collection of functions that encapsulate various monitoring tasks. Such a de-
sign allows for creation of concise, reusable and expressive monitoring specifications.
SFM concentrates on issues related to the dynamic detection of program errors.
This accomplished via the SFM monitoring primitives (such as events or API func-
tions), which identify the range of problems that SFM can address. The primitives
used in designing the SFM language were developed using monitoring analyses de-
scribed in Chapters 4 and 5.
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The expressive power of SFM has been shown by example; four complete moni-
toring analyses in defect detection have been presented. The issues addressed include
stack overflows errors, resource leakage, SQL injections and information flow security
vulnerabilities.
This chapter has not discussed issues related to generating implementation-level
monitors from the abstract specifications. This is because parts of the SFM specifi-
cations presented in this chapter and the resulting C instrumentations were used in
implementations of dynamic analyses in memory safety and information flow secu-
rity reported in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The approximations required to adapt
abstract SFM descriptions to the concrete level of the C programming language were
discussed in the respective chapters.
Overall, SFM summarises the work in monitoring conducted for this thesis and
presents a generalisation of the monitoring techniques presented earlier in Chapters 4
and 5.
7
Summary and Future Work
This thesis investigated aspects of the monitoring of C programs, focussing on de-
veloping techniques that lead to acceptable overheads. This thesis first presented
monitoring techniques to the detection of memory leaks and leakage of confidential
information. The proposed techniques were supported by prototype implementations
for C programs. The applicability of the suggested techniques was demonstrated us-
ing experimentation with real programs and benchmarked code. Further, this thesis
explored the idea of specifying monitoring analyses using abstract specifications and
presented the language (called SFM) capable of expressing monitoring for a range of
problems in bug detection using concise specifications. SFM was supported by a case
study that demonstrated how several well-known problems in bug detection (such as
stack overflows of SQL injections) are expressed using compact SFM specifications.
This chapter provides a summary of the contributions made by this thesis, offers
concluding remarks and discusses directions for future work.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
7.1.1 Detection of Memory Leaks and Leakage Locations
This thesis first presented a technique for detecting memory leaks (Chapter 4). The
key issue addressed by this approach is the detection of program locations where the
leaked memory was lost, and thus where it potentially can be eliminated. To detect
memory leaks programs are instrumented with statements that track memory allo-
cations and operations that potentially update memory structure (e.g., assignments).
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The technique associates each tracked memory block with two types of locations –
allocation and usage. An allocation location represents a point in a program at which
a memory block associated with the location was allocated on the heap. A location of
usage represents a program point at which a given memory block was last reachable
via program variables. The allocation locations are assigned only once, when blocks
are created on the heap. The usage locations are updated based on the execution of
the program. Every time a block containing references is updated, its usage location
is also updated to reflect the reachability of the block via program variables. The
reachability of the block is determined by dynamically computing the dereference of
the block’s address space.
The presented approach is tunable. Monitoring can be adapted based on the size
of the data blocks. This results in a technique where runtime overheads can be re-
duced, at the cost of reporting less debugging information without losing precision in
memory leak detection.
The proposed technique is supported by a prototype implementation for C pro-
grams that was used to monitor test suites of several well-known UNIX utilities (e.g.,
find, grep, diff, rcs) and C SPEC CPU benchmarks. Further, the results of the
prototype were compared to the results of state of the art memory debugger Val-
grind [14]. The results of the experiments show that when only locations of alloca-
tions are detected, the prototype implementation significantly outperforms Valgrind.
For example, compared to runs of uninstrumented programs, the memory and run-
time overheads of the prototype were on an average 1.15 and 1.8 times, while Val-
grind incurred approximately 15 times memory and 30.8 times runtime overheads.
To detect locations of leakage, which requires computing dereference of the address
space of the memory blocks used by a program, the overheads of the prototype in-
crease proportionally to the sizes of the memory blocks. For monitoring UNIX pro-
grams the prototype performed better than Valgrind, which could be attributed to
relatively small allocated blocks. However, for SPEC benchmarks, which focus on
performance evaluation and thus use large inputs and allocate large amounts mem-
ory, Valgrind’s performance was significantly better. In some cases the large runtime
overheads of the prototype for SPEC benchmarks were reduced via overhead tuning,
which excluded large memory blocks from tracking. However, the present form of the
prototype does not perform any program analysis; this feature relies on a programmer
setting the sizes of data blocks manually.
The superior performance of the prototype implementation of the proposed tech-
nique is based on the two features. First, memory blocks are tracked using only
their start and end addresses. This significantly reduces the memory footprint com-
pared to Valgrind (whose monitor uses 9 bits of memory to track 8 bits in the original
program). Second, the proposed technique determines a block’s reachability by dy-
namically computing the dereference of a block’s address space. This does not require
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capturing and updating pointer structure as the monitor executes; however, at present
such an approach is mainly useful where small inputs are used. This is because deref-
erencing large memory blocks can lead to high overheads, as indicated by the results
of the experimentation.
In summary, the results of the experimentation suggest that for memory leak de-
tection where only locations of allocations are reported, the proposed technique may
be used as a replacement for binary instrumentation tools, producing similar results
with considerably less system resources. However, for tracking leakage locations, the
present technique is mainly useful in the domain of functional testing, where program
correctness is established using runs with relatively small inputs.
7.1.2 A Value Tracking Approach to Information Flow Security
Chapter 5 of this thesis presented a monitoring technique for runtime discovery of
disclosure, or leakage, of private information used by a program.
Unlike similar techniques, such as information flow or taint analysis, that focus on
tracking security levels or taint marks attached to program variables, this approach
analyses program values and has the ability to determine whether a value disclosed
to a third party leads to an information leak with respect to values considered secret
at runtime.
The proposed technique analyses programs with annotations that identify secret
data. These annotations are used to instrument an input program with statements
that capture secret values. Additionally, each potentially unsafe assignment (i.e., one
that discloses a value by storing it in a publicly observable location) is instrumented
with a security assertion that verifies the safety of the assignments with respect to
captured secrets. A run of an instrumented program records secret data, and for every
potentially unsafe assignment, executes an assertion that checks if the assignment has
leaked a secret value. A failure of the security assertion is indicative of a prevented
information leak.
The proposed approach is supported by a prototype implementation for C pro-
grams. To evaluate the approach, the prototype was used to check real UNIX security-
oriented utilities (such as openssh, sudo, su) and programs selected from the C SPEC
CPU datasets for information leakage.
The results of the initial experimentation indicated that runtime overheads to
soundly detect application-specific issues; for example leakage of password values
in runs of security-oriented UNIX utilities (e.g., ftp, sudo, su, passwd) was less than
1%. Even with such small overheads the prototype implementation found real leaks
in ftp and su programs. The next step of the experimentation monitored large pro-
grams from the SPEC datasets and real security programs (openssh and ccrypt) for
information leakage using several CWE security properties related to disclosure of
confidential information. The results of experiments with the SPEC programs shown
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that the prototype implementation can handle large and computationally expensive
programs, but the overheads to detect leaks increase significantly averaging to ap-
proximately 7.4 times those of the normal execution (640%). However, when using
test suites of real security programs, the runtime overheads remain low. This is shown
via 39% overhead for the openssh test suite and 2% overhead for the ccrypt test
suite.
The results of the experimentation suggest that the feature of tracking only a lim-
ited number of values whose disclosure constitutes information leakage leads to low
runtime overheads and detects leaks soundly. This was demonstrated by the results
of experimentation with leakage of passwords, where tracking only password values
and relevant assignments resulted in extremely low overheads of under 1%, while
also leading to discovery of real leaks in ftp and sudo. This result is explained by the
basis of the approach in dynamically tracking values, meaning that there is no need
for it to solve aliasing. Monitoring large and computationally expensive programs
from SPEC datasets for CWE vulnerabilities resulted in larger overheads, as monitor-
ing SPEC programs requires a large number of values to be tracked. However, such
overheads are still within an acceptable range for use with testing. Finally, when the
proposed technique is applied to the domain of functional testing (where relatively
small inputs are used), its runtime overheads for same CWE properties decrease sig-
nificantly (as shown via results of openssh and ccrypt).
Overall, the results suggest that for specific problems (e.g., integrity of password
values at runtime), the instrumentation introduced by the proposed approach may
be used with release versions of software. For a broader set of properties, requiring
tracking of a large number of values, this technique is a good fit for use with testing.
7.1.3 Common Specification Language
The final contribution made by this thesis was presented in Chapter 6 and consti-
tutes a language for abstract and concise specification of monitoring analysis called
Specification for Monitoring (SFM).
While detection of different defects typically requires different implementation
techniques, there exist a number of monitoring components that can be reused to en-
able efficient monitoring analysis. The SFM language represents an effort to reduce
the development overheads often associated with the implementation of a monitor-
ing analysis from scratch. In SFM, monitoring components are expressed concisely
at a high level of abstraction. The actual implementation-level monitoring code is
generated from such descriptions. SFM also addresses issues associated with similar
approaches that are either “too” abstract or, on the contrary, use implementation-level
details.
The main strength of SFM is employment of a separation of concerns principle,
112 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
where semantic issues related to monitoring are kept distinct from the implementation-
level details. This approach yields compact specifications, as the implementation de-
tails are delegated to the implementation of SFM. Also, even though SFM uses ab-
straction, it is not as abstract as many specification techniques, and thus retains a
measure of efficiency for the implementation of the API. The design of SFM follows
that of a trace monitor that defines monitoring using patterns, which select program
events that need to be observed, and actions, which encapsulate the functionality that
observes executions of events selected by patterns. In this design, the key focus is on
the abstract specifications of actions. This represents a departure from existing trace
monitors that focus only on the expressiveness of patterns.
In addition to the details of abstract representation, SFM also describes a mon-
itoring API: a collection of functions that encapsulate monitoring tasks (e.g., track-
ing source locations or capturing memory allocations). This feature relieves users of
the need to deal with minor implementation details, or to re-implement well-known
paradigms.
In its present form, the focus of SFM is on the design of the specification language
and its expressiveness. This question of expressiveness is important, as it describes the
types of issues SFM can potentially address. At this stage, SFM focuses on tracking
monitoring memory allocations, function calls and flow of data within a program
(e.g., data assignments or programs inputs and outputs). Implementations of these
components for the C programming language were discussed in detail in Chapters 4
and 5; the aim is to make further use of the efficient implementations developed
during the work on monitoring for memory leaks and leakage of sensitive information.
To demonstrate the expressiveness of SFM, several examples were presented.
These examples show how well-defined problems in error detection, including such
issues as stack overflows, information flow vulnerabilities, resource leakage and SQL
injections are encoded using the SFM language.
7.2 Future Work
This section describes potential extensions of the work presented in this thesis.
7.2.1 Improving Overhead Results
The results of the experimentation with the technique for the detection of memory
leaks and locations of leakage show that, for large inputs this approach produces
overheads of up to 1000 times compared to unobserved execution (which cannot
be considered acceptable). Therefore, one potential direction for future work is to
improve on those results, adapting this technique for monitoring large and compu-
tationally expensive programs. A potential solution to this problem is to reduce the
number of tracked assignments by using a light-weight, but sound static analysis to
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filter out the assignment statements that cannot leak. Further, the results of overhead
tuning indicate that in some cases the overheads can be reduced by excluding large
blocks assumed to be “data only” (i.e., that do not contain pointers). At the present
stage, this is enabled manually, with a programmer setting the size of the blocks that
are not to be tracked. Excluding large blocks automatically, for example, by tracking
addresses of program pointers and dereferencing only memory blocks that are known
to have references, may improve overhead results.
The question of reducing overheads for cases where large values are used is also
of interest in extending the technique for detecting information leakage. One possi-
ble way is to improve the annotation process and track only a selected set of values,
rather than capturing all program inputs and outputs (as done in the experimenta-
tion with SPEC programs). Further, overheads may be reduced by using a different
string comparison criterion that is relevant for security, but not as expensive as the
Levenshtein distance, which was used to determine if leakage occurs.
7.2.2 Using Different Properties
Another potential direction for future work is monitoring for different defect types.
The work with memory leaks has shown that the instrumentation used to detect leaks
can also be used to detect different defect types (such as illegal dereferences) with
overheads similar to memory leak detection. Illegal dereferences is only one defect
of potential interest. This approach could also be adapted to address other memory
issues, such dangling pointers or accesses of uninitialised memory.
The approach to information leakage detection presented in this thesis is limited
to the analysis of values that leak in their entirety via implicit flows. It would be
interesting to extend this approach to handling leakage of parts of values (e.g., bit-
by-bit) or detecting information disclosure through explicit flows.
7.2.3 Generating Monitoring Analysis
This thesis considered an approach to expressing monitoring analysis using concise
and abstract monitoring specifications. Currently, this work concentrates only on
the expressiveness of specifications. A logical extension of this work is a complete
implementation of the driver to translate SFM to implementation-level code, program
instrumentations, and optimisations to reduce the runtime overhead of monitoring.
A
Grammar of the SFM language
Constant = ? Integer, floating point or string literal ? ;
Type = ’Int’ | ’Float’ | ’Str’ | ’List’ | ’Hash’ ;
Identifier = ? An identifier : [A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]+ ? ;
UnaryOp = ’!’ | ’-’ ;
BinaryOp = ’+’ | ’-’ | ’>’ | ’<’ | ’>=’ | ’<=’ | ’==’ | ’&&’ | ’||’;
Event = ’read’ | ’write’ | ’malloc’ | ’free’ | ’def’ | ’undef’
| ’out’ | ’in’
| ’begin’ | ’end’ | ’init’ | ’final’
| ’ret’ | ’call’ | ’flow’
| ’ref’ | ’type’
;
Attribute = ’addr’ | ’size’ | ’name’ | ’posn’ | ’src’ | ’dest’ ;
Specification = { Monitor } ;
Monitor = ’match’, Pattern, ’using’, Stmt ;
Pattern = ’{’, Event, ’=>’, (Constant, Identifier), ’}’ ;
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Declaration = ’my’, Type, Identifier, [ ’=’ Expression ] ;
Reference = ’$’, Identifier, ’->’, Attribute ;
Variable = ’$_’
| Reference
| (’$’, ’@’, ’%’) , Identifier
| ’$’ , Identifier , ’{’ Expression ’}’
| ’$’ , Identifier , ’[’ Expression ’]’
;
Expression = Variable
| Constant
| Expression, BinaryOp, Expression
| UnaryOp, Expression
| (’delete’, ’exists’), Variable
| ’(’ Expression ’)’
| Identifier, ’(’, [ Expression, { ’,’, Expression } ] ’)’
;
Statement = Declaration
| ’map’, Statement, (’%’ , ’@’), Identifier
| ’if’, ’(’, Expression, ’)’, Statement, [ ’else’, Statement ]
| ’while’, ’(’, Expression, ’)’, Statement
| Variable, ’=’, Expression, ’;’
| (’return’ | ’next’ | ’last’), ’;’
| ’{’ Statement ’}’
;
Listing A.1: SFM Grammar (EBNF ISO/IEC 14977)
B
Acronyms
AOP Aspect Oriented Programming
API Application Programming Interface
AVL Adelson-Velsky and Landis
ATOM Analysis Tools with OM
BNF Backus-Naur Form
BISL Behavioural Interface Specification Language
CCI Configurable C Instrumentation
CFG Control Flow Graph
CPU Central Processing Unit
CWE Common Weakness Enumeration
DBI Dynamic Binary Instrumentation
EBBA Event Based Behavioural Abstraction
EBNF Extended Backus-Naur Form Form
EDL Event Description Language
EEL Executable Editing Library
ECC Error-Correcting Code
GB Gigabyte
GC Garbage Collector
GHz Gigahertz
IFIP International Federation for Information Processing
ISO International Organization for Standardization
JPaX Java PathExplorer
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JML Java Modelling Language
KLOC Thousand Lines of Code
LLVM Low-level Virtual Machine
LOC Lines of Code
LSL Larch Shared Language
MB Megabyte
MEDL Meta Event Definition Language
MOP Monitoring Oriented Programming
OS Operating System
PEDL Primitive Event Definition Language
PQL Program Query Language
PTQL Program Trace Query Language
RAM Random-Access Memory
SFM Specification For Monitoring
SPEC Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation
SQL Structured Query Language
SSH Secure Shell
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